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CHAPTER 1 
 
Twenty Five Years of Mechanisation of Tabular Orebodies in South 
African Gold and Platinum Mines: An Introduction 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In this first chapter of this treatise it is the intention to provide details of 
the qualifications and experience, specifically related to mechanised 
mining, of myself, K.A.Rhodes (KAR) the candidate. In addition, a brief 
introduction will be given of my pioneering work related to trackless 
mining on South African gold mines in the 1980’s and later on platinum 
mines in the Rustenburg area of South Africa. 
 
1.1 Higher Education Qualifications 
I attended the University of Leeds in England in the 1950’s and 
was awarded a B.Sc. (Honours) degree in mining engineering. I 
hold a British First Class Managers Certificate for coal mines and 
South African Mine Managers Certificates for both coal mines and 
metalliferous mines. I have also been a Professional Engineer 
(Engineering Council of South Africa) for more than 40 years. Refer 
to Appendix 1.1 at the end of this chapter for details of my 
qualifications. 
 
1.2 Experience and Career Achievements 
Since leaving university I have had six decades of experience in the 
mining industry. For more than forty years I have held senior 
management and consultancy appointments in southern Africa in 
diverse mining operations on coal, copper, gold and platinum 
mines. Refer to Appendix 1.2 at the end of this chapter for a more 
detailed summary of my practical experience. 
 
In 1953 I was awarded a National Coal Board (NCB) scholarship to 
attend university. After graduation and on completion of a three 
year directed practical training programme with the NCB there 
followed several years of junior official positions before my final 
appointment as an under(ground)manager. During this time 
significant mechanisation experience was  gained at  the coal face.   
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In 1964 I left England to work on the Zambian Copperbelt where I 
gained my first experience of mechanisation on a metalliferous 
mine. This was followed by appointments in South Africa on highly 
mechanised coal operations, and in South West Africa, now 
Namibia, at a newly developing copper mine where mechanised 
methods were being used. This experience on mechanised mining 
led to my pioneering trackless mining in South African gold mines 
in the 1980’s. At Randfontein Estates Gold Mine (REGM) I 
successfully motivated for and then introduced a full range of 
trackless machines for a flat dipping tabular orebody (so called 
wide reef) and subsequently for narrow reef stoping, also at 
REGM. Based on this experience at REGM, when I moved to the 
new H.J.Joel Gold Mine I was responsible, as mine manager, for 
the design of the first totally trackless gold mine in South Africa. 
All these projects were planned and managed by myself from the 
outset and these achievements have been documented in 
published technical papers which are attached to this chapter as 
appendices and are entitled as follows.  
 
Appendix 1.3: “The Use of Nonel at Cooke 2 Shaft, Randfontein 
Estates Gold Mining Company, Witwatersrand Limited” 
K.A.Rhodes, Association of Mine Managers of South Africa, 1986.  
 
Appendix 1.4: “Wide Reef Mechanised Room and Pillar 
Operations at Cooke 2 Shaft, Randfontein Estates Gold Mining 
Company, Witwatersrand Limited” K.A.Rhodes, Association of 
Mine Managers of South Africa (AMMSA), 1986. This paper was 
awarded the gold medal by AMMSA for 1986. 
 
Appendix 1.5:  “Planning for a Trackless Access Stoping 
Operation in Narrow Reef Conditions” K.A.Rhodes, presented at a 
JCI Technical Meeting, 1986. This pioneering paper was submitted 
to the Association of Mine Managers of South Africa for 
publication in 1986 but was later withdrawn by JCI, the parent 
company, for confidentiality purposes. 
 
Appendix 1.6: “Shaft Sinking and Mid-Shaft Loading Operations 
at H.J.Joel Gold Mine, Orange Free State, South Africa” 
K.A.Rhodes, The Mining Engineer, The Institution of Mining 
Engineers, August 1988.  
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Appendix 1.7: “The Design of a New Trackless Gold Mine” 
K.A.Rhodes, Association of Mine Managers of South Africa 
Trackless Mining Symposium, February 1988. This paper was 
awarded a special medal for the best paper presented at the 
symposium. 
 
My experience on these projects underlined the necessity for the 
establishment of standard procedures for the operation of 
trackless equipment, including the need for driver discipline from 
the start of any such project, the commitment of mining managers 
to the engineering function and a ‘hands-on’ management style. 
 
This treatise will further detail the work carried out by myself on 
the development of low profile equipment introduced to South 
African platinum mines and specifically my work at Amplats’ new 
Waterval Mine where I was involved from the beginning in the 
design of the mine and on-going ‘hands-on’ consultancy work up 
to steady state production. 
 
Finally, in this treatise there will be a detailed discussion of several 
new projects and trials of mining methods which came about from 
the direct involvement of myself; these included certain new 
projects for Amplats (Styldrift Mine and the Boschfontein Mines) 
and trials with long hole stoping methods and tunnel boring. I was 
the project manager at Bafokeng Rasimone Mine when a tunnel 
borer was used to develop a reef raise and the published technical 
paper on this project is attached as an appendix at the end of this 
chapter; Appendix 1.8 “Reef Development with a Tunnel Boring 
Machine on a South African Platinum Mine”, by M.Stander, 
K.Rhodes, P.Horrell, D.Sammons, G.Harrison, J.Dean, presented at 
the 6th International Symposium on Mine Mechanisation and 
Automation, South African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy, 
Johannesburg 2001. 
 
Since 1995 I have been an independent mining consultant and 
have worked with many clients, mainly in central and southern 
Africa. My consultancy work has focussed on the practical 
planning of new mechanised mines with specific emphasis on the 
management of trackless mining operations.  
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As a consultant I was also responsible for the design of a fully 
mechanised new underground gold mine at Shakisso in Ethiopia: 
the Legadembi Gold Mine. Trackless horizontal cut and fill was the 
selected method of mining. However, geotechnical investigations 
restricted the mining spans to be less than the orebody width and 
it was therefore necessary to provide for in stope pillars. Various 
in stope pillar and bay layouts (modified room and pillar layouts) 
were considered in order to determine the most favourable 
option. Refer to the technical paper “Design of In Stope Pillars in 
Cut and Fill Mining for a Gold Mine in Ethiopia” by K.A.Rhodes 
and T.Rangasamy, published in the transactions of MassMin 2008 
and presented at the 5th International Conference and Exhibition 
in Mass Mining in Lulea, Sweden in June 2008 and attached as 
Appendix 1.9 of this chapter. 
 
In the upcoming chapters in this treatise the trackless mining 
projects pioneered by myself, which proved to be successful on 
South African gold mines and platinum mines, will be described. 
However, as a mining consultant, other attempts to motivate for 
changes to new mechanised mining methods, such as long hole 
stoping and tunnel boring, will also be discussed. 
 
All these projects carried out by myself, as the responsible 
manager or as a consultant, took place over a period of twenty 
five years. 
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Consultancy Work from 1995 to Date 
 
As an independent mining consultant KAR has worked with the following clients. 
• Anglo Platinum: Design and project management of new mines, feasibility studies, 
audits and mechanised mining projects. 
• Anglo American Corporation (Zimbabwe): Mining consultant for the new Unki 
platinum mine. 
• Ashanti Goldfields (Zimbabwe): Consultancy for trackless mining work at the Freda 
Rebecca Mine. 
• JCI Limited for Delta Gold: Mining consultancy work for the design of the new 
Hartley platinum mine in Zimbabwe. 
• IMC Knight Piėsold Mining for Samancor: Chrome mine feasibility studies. 
• Hernic Ferrochrome: Mine design work. 
• Time Mining: Mine feasibility study for a gold mine in The Yemen. 
• JCI Projects: Pre-feasibility study for an ultra-deep mine for Western Areas Gold 
Mine. 
• Placer Dome Western Areas JV: Trackless costs benchmarking. 
• Anglo Platinum/Bomar: Project Manager of TBM reef raise project at Bafokeng 
Rasimone Mine. 
• PGM (Canada): TBM advisory consultancy for a new platinum project in South Africa. 
• TWP Consultants: Mining consultant for Waterval UG2 Project. 
• Knight Piėsold for Assmang Limited: Feasibility study for Dwarsrivier Chrome Mine. 
• Anglo American Corporation: Mining consultant for an energy balance study for 
different mining methods at platinum mines. 
• De Beers Canada: Consultancy work for the new Snap Lake Mine. 
• BHP Biliton: Consultancy work at Samancor Western Chrome Mines. 
• Meridian Securities: Consultancy work at President Steyn Gold Mine. 
• MIDROC Gold Mines: Project Manager for the design of a new underground gold 
mine at Legadembi, Ethiopia. 
• Barplats: Consultancy for the selection of a new trackless fleet of equipment at 
Crocodile River mine. 
• Konkola Copper Mines (Vedanta): Trackless consultancy for a large copper mine in 
Zambia. 
• Saumya Mining Joint Venture: Consultancy work for the design of a new uranium 
mine for UCIL in India. 
• Kamoto Operating Limited: Consultancy related to a maintenance action plan for 
trackless equipment at a large copper mine in DRC. 
• South Deep (Goldfields): Consultancy related to trackless mining costing. 
• Anglo Platinum: Technical advisory work for trials of ultra low profile trackless 
equipment at Amandelbult Mine. 
• Zimplats: Consultancy for the introduction of a new fleet of trackless equipment at 
Ngezi Mine, Zimbabwe. 
• Anglo Gold Ashanti: Part of a consortium looking at means to mechanise operations 
and introduce automation at ultra deep levels. 
 
Appointments with Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Company (JCI) between  
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1973 and 1995 
 
1994 – 1995: Platinum Division, JCI Head Office 
Permanent appointment to JCI Head Office as Consulting Mining Engineer in the Platinum 
Division. Primary responsibilities were the preparation of several feasibility studies for new 
mining projects in terms of a Strategic Planning Initiative for the Platinum Division. 
Following unbundling of JCI into three separate entities, namely Amplats, JCI Limited and 
Johnnic, status was that of Consulting Mining Engineer for Amplats (Anglo American 
Platinum Corporation Limited) later to become Anglo Platinum. 
 
1991 – 1994: Mine Manager East Mine, Rustenburg Section 
Mine Manager responsible for all operations. Rustenburg East Mine was a very large 
underground mine exploiting narrow reefs. Between 1991 and 1993 new longwalls were 
established and with a substantial increase in the use of hydraulic props, safety and 
productivity improved. In addition, new mining methods with revised development layouts 
were introduced by KAR including downdip mining. 
 
1989 – 1991: Platinum Division, Head Office 
Appointed to be responsible for the planning of new shaft systems for ore reserve 
development at Rustenburg Mines Rustenburg Section, the largest platinum mining complex 
in the world. During 1991 technical evaluations were carried out by KAR on certain chrome 
mines in the Rustenburg district and technical reports were submitted. Following the 
acquisition of Purity Mine, KAR was appointed as Consulting Mining Engineer for the mine 
responsible to the Managing Director of CMI (an associated JCI Company). 
 
1988 – 1989: Mine Manager, Western Areas Gold Mine 
Responsible for all operations at the North Division of Western Areas Gold Mine. In order to 
reverse the losses being experienced following the installation of trackless equipment to the 
low grade orebody in 1985, specific objective plans were prepared by KAR and 
implementation commenced in 1989. 
 
1985 – 1988: Project Manager/Mine Manager, H.J.Joel Gold Mine 
On appointment to the H.J.Joel Project (a new development in the Orange Free State) a new 
mining plan was initiated by KAR to introduce a mechanised option utilising trackless 
mechanised mining methods in narrow reef conditions. This mine was the first gold mine in 
South Africa to be designed from the outset as a trackless mine; KAR’s responsibilities were 
for the design, development and commissioning of the mine. The mine was commissioned 
in 1988 when KAR was still the mine manager. 
 
Two shafts were sunk to depths of 1035 metres with mid shaft loading arrangements (MSL) 
established on two levels whereby development of the mine was carried out simultaneously 
with sinking. Of major importance to the management of this mine was the necessity to 
avoid an inrush of water to the workings which represented a real threat, the danger of 
methane and the complications of changing ventilation conditions during sinking and MSL 
development; this demanded a total ‘hands-on’ style of management. 
 
1983 – 1985: Manager Mining, Randfontein Estates Gold Mine 
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Manager Mining for the Cooke 2 Shaft Complex at Randfontein Estates Gold Mine. At this 
mine KAR pioneered the use of trackless equipment in narrow tabular reefs on gold mines 
and in late 1983 initiated studies for a trackless mining operation to replace existing 
conventional scraper cleaned wide reef stopes and in 1984 successfully motivated the 
introduction of a full range of trackless equipment for a wide reef room and pillar operation, 
which commenced in July 1984. In late 1984 further motivations by KAR commenced for a 
narrow reef trackless mining operation; approved in 1985 and development work began 
immediately. 
 
1982 – 1983: Project Mining Engineer, JCI Coal Division 
Project Mining Engineer in the Coal Division with duties to carry out the following work. 
• Feasibility study for the proposed Phoenix Opencast Project for export coal. 
• The expansion of the Arthur Taylor Colliery, a highly mechanised underground mine 
producing coal for the export market. This work necessitated an extensive study of 
pillar extraction operations on coal mines throughout South Africa. 
 
1979 – 1982: Manager Mining, Randfontein Estates Gold Mine 
Manager Mining at the Old Randfontein Section of Randfontein Estates Gold Mine, 
responsible for all underground operations. The operations were mainly centred at SD 32 
Shaft where narrow reefs varied from steeply inclined (near vertical) to flat dipping with 
extensive faulting. Very poor gold and uranium values necessitated the most stringent 
management control of the operations with continuous labour reductions in order to 
constantly improve productivity. In 1981 KAR re-opened several old shafts  after many years 
of being idle and these shafts were returned to profitability albeit on a small scale. 
 
1977 – 1979: Underground Manager, Rustenburg Platinum Mines, Rustenburg Section 
Underground Manager for Townlands Shaft at Rustenburg Section. Longwall mining had just 
been introduced and this appointment provided the opportunity for KAR to successfully 
develop this method of mining achieving high face advances which came about from the 
establishment of new layouts and specific control systems developed over a two year period 
by means of ‘hands-on’ management. 
 
1976 – 1977: Manager Mining, Elsburg Gold Mine (Western Areas Gold Mine) 
Appointment to Elsburg Gold Mine (later to be merged with Western Areas Gold Mine) as 
Manager Mining responsible for underground mining operations. In this period several 
major fires occurred at Western Areas and significant experience was gained in bringing 
these fires under control: this work was exacerbated by the complex mining layouts 
necessary to exploit the extensively faulted multi-reefs. 
 
1976: Assistant to the Consulting Engineer (Coal), JCI Head Office 
A feasibility study was carried out by KAR for the Middelburg Uitkyk Coal Prospect; this 
study provided for a large mechanised colliery serving the export market and was planned 
for both underground and surface mining methods. The study was completed in six months 
by KAR and initial planning experience was gained in opencast mining. 
 
 
1974 – 1976: Project Manager/Underground Manager, Otijhase Copper Mine, SWA 
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Appointment at Otijhase Copper Mine, a developing greenfields  copper mine in South West 
Africa (now Namibia). Over a two year period KAR was responsible for the development of 
the mine from outset to first production with the use of trackless mechanised equipment. 
 
1973 – 1974: Mine Manager, Tavistock Colliery 
Mine Manager at Tavistock Colliery and during this period KAR successfully introduced 
mechanised equipment to the bord and pillar operations for the first time at this colliery. 
 
1973: Underground Manager/Mine Manager, Phoenix Colliery 
Initial appointment in the JCI Group. 
 
Appointments prior to employment with JCI 
 
1972 – 1973: General Mining Corporation 
Following the takeover of Coalbrook Collieries by Gencor, certain transfer appointments 
occurred as follows. 
1972 – Relieving Mine Manager, Transvaal Navigation Collieries. 
1973 – Assistant to Operations Manager (Natal). 
 
1968 – 1972: Assistant Manager/Acting Mine Manager, Coalbrook Collieries, OFS 
Assistant Manager at Coalbrook Collieries and for four years KAR was responsible for all 
underground operations. The mine, a major producer to Escom, employed mechanised bord 
and pillar methods, with conventional mechanised equipment and the only continuous 
miners in South Africa, working under difficult mining conditions: high inflows of water to be 
controlled; poor roof and sidewall conditions; seams liable to high rates of methane 
emissions and to spontaneous combustion; limited pitroom. 
 
1967 – 1968: Technical Assistant, Cornelia Colliery, OFS 
Appointed by the Anglo American Corporation as a Technical Assistant and assigned to 
Cornelia Colliery, OFS. Difficult geological conditions predominated at Cornelia and the mine 
was also prone to underground heatings and fires and practical experience was gained in 
the control and sealing of underground fires on coal mines. 
 
1964 – 1967: Shift Boss, Mufulira Copper Mines, Zambia 
Shift Boss at Mufulira Copper Mines, a very large underground mine which employed many 
different mining methods including open stoping (with and without sand fill), sub-level 
caving, block caving and the cascade system. At this time the mine was introducing trackless 
mechanisation in their sub-level caving and cascade methods and early experience was 
gained by KAR with the use of trackless equipment on a metalliferous mine. 
 
1960 – 1964: Junior Underground Official, National Coal Board, United Kingdom 
On completion of the directed practical training programme there followed a period of 
contract work at the coal face before a series of appointments as an underground official at 
various collieries. All experience gained with the National Coal Board was associated with 
the longwall method of mining in seams of varying thickness. Systems of mining included 
hand loading methods and fully mechanised operations including shearers, trepanners, 
ploughs and armoured face conveyors with hydraulic support. During these early years of 
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work this was the first opportunity for KAR to obtain experience in the transformation from 
manual methods of working to totally mechanised operations at the coal face; this 
experience was to prove invaluable. 
 
1957 – 1960: Mining Engineering Trainee, National Coal Board 
Three year training programme as a mining engineering trainee in the No.8 Castleford Area 
of the National Coal Board. During this extensive training period experience was gained at 
various collieries; this experience incorporated all aspects of underground operations and 
associated  technical, administrative and management work. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
The Background to the Start of Mechanised Mining of Tabular Reefs 
on the Gold Mines of Johannesburg Consolidated Investment 
Company Limited 
 
In this chapter the candidate, K.A.Rhodes (KAR), sets out the background to his 
work, specifically related to the introduction of mechanised mining operations 
on the tabular reefs at the gold mines of Johannesburg Consolidated 
Investment Company Limited (JCI). 
 
In August 1983 I was appointed as Manager Mining at Cooke 2 Shaft, 
Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Company, Witwatersrand Ltd. (REGM) with 
responsibilities for all operations at the shaft. Immediately prior to my taking 
up this appointment a major fall of ground had occurred in a wide reef stope 
on the E8 Reef horizon and four mineworkers had been killed. The first time 
that KAR went underground at Cooke 2 Shaft it was to accompany the General 
Manager, Mr W.J. van der Meulen, on a visit to the 85N2 E8 stope where the 
multi fatality had occurred;  the General Manager was to carry out a follow-up 
inspection of the stope on that day. 
On completion of the inspection and whilst still underground, Mr van der 
Meulen had asked KAR what he thought of conditions in the stope to which 
KAR replied that it appeared to him that he had entered an ‘underground 
quarry’. At the time it was what came immediately into my mind; as I 
remember there was an excessive amount of large broken rock throughout the 
stope indicating an ore clearance problem and hence my reference to a quarry. 
Refer to the photograph in Figure 2.1 and other photographs in Annexure 2.1 
in Volume 2 showing excessive rocks in strike gullies in other wide reef stopes 
(these photographs were not taken on the day of the visit but are typical of 
conventional wide reef stopes at the time). The other striking issue at the time 
was the obvious practical problem of drilling, barring down, making safe, 
charging up and the carrying out of construction work in the working height 
which was of the order of 3 metres; refer to the photograph in Figure 2.2 and 
other photographs in Annexure 2.2 in Volume 2, also taken at a later date. 
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FIGURE 2.1 
 
Excessive Rocks in Strike Gulley in a Conventional Wide Reef Stope 
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FIGURE 2.2 
 
The Need for a Ladder to Carry-out Construction Work in a Conventional Wide Reef Stope 
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Of course, what was really meant by my response to the General Manager was 
that under the conditions seen on the visit there would be more control over 
the safety of the operation if the operations were mechanised using 
equipment designed for the conditions. The suggested change to 
mechanisation was not that well received and was immediately challenged by 
the General Manager. I remember that he responded to my proposal by saying 
that in order to get large equipment through a small vertical shaft, along long 
rail haulages and into the stoping area would raise severe practical difficulties. 
I replied that I believed that it could be done. It was at that time I decided to 
set out a motivation and prove to the General Manager, Mr van der Meulen, 
and JCI Head Office that mechanisation was a viable option. There was going to 
be resistance, that I knew, but it is important to record that when Mr van der 
Meulen realised my determination to mechanise the E8 Reef at Cooke 2 Shaft 
(which I proved to him during the coming months) he became very supportive, 
notwithstanding his initial scepticism of my proposal. 
 
In summary and with the benefit of hindsight, the timing of my appointment 
immediately following upon a multi fatality accident from a major collapse of 
hangingwall on the E8 Reef would lead to an opportunity for me to introduce 
mechanisation on that specific reef horizon at Cooke 2 Shaft. 
 
2.1  Early Background 
At Cooke 2 Shaft in late 1982 there had taken place a change in the 
method of mining for wider reefs. This change had enabled wider 
stoping widths, at lower overall grades, to be mined differently from the 
normal method of mining conventional stopes. The revised method for 
stoping widths between 2,5metres and 4,0metres would rely on pillars 
(a type of bord and pillar layout) for support with rock bolting between 
the pillars. The original conventional systems had relied on grout based 
packs and stick support. This change, although still employing 
conventional methods, had initially been introduced on the UE1A Reef 
and after several months of employing the method on that reef the new 
method had been shown to be both productive and safe. The method 
was then adopted for the underlying E8 Reef. Although, until July of 
1983, no falls of ground or unstable hanging wall had been reported in 
the E8 stopes a sudden collapse, spanning several pillars, occurred in the 
85N2 E8 stope. In my mind, on that very first visit underground at Cooke 
2 Shaft, it was clear from the outset that the use of mechanised trackless 
equipment could improve both productivity and the overall safety of the 
operation. The conclusion reached at that time by myself was based on 
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my previous experience with mechanisation. At this point in the chapter 
it will be useful to consider some of this experience in brief detail. 
  
 2.1.1. Experience with Mechanisation 
Following graduation in the late 1950’s from the University of 
Leeds, England, I (KAR) completed a three year programme of 
training (Directed Practical Training) with the National Coal Board, 
United Kingdom. This was at a time when manual coal face work 
was being phased out and mechanisation of face operations was 
taking place rapidly in the nationalised industry. This was 
therefore the first opportunity to be part of a major 
transformation at the coal face from the old manual methods to 
mechanisation. Significant experience was gained over a period of 
several years as an official in charge of mechanised face 
operations and at Under(ground) Manager level. 
 
On leaving the National Coal Board in the mid 1960’s, experience 
was gained on the Copperbelt of Zambia, where at Mufulira 
Copper Mine, one of the largest underground mines in the world 
at the time, KAR had first-hand experience of mechanised 
trackless equipment in hard rock mining. In fact, this was the real 
beginning of mechanised operations in metalliferous mining 
world-wide. However,  although the availability to the industry of 
a full suite of equipment for drilling, loading, transport and other 
ancillary operations was still a long way off  this initial exposure to 
mechanisation on a large scale on a large metalliferous mine was 
invaluable. 
 
In South Africa in the late 1960’s into the early 1970’s KAR 
managed a highly mechanised operation at Coalbrook Collieries in 
the Orange Free State; at this time very little mechanisation was 
being practised on South African coal mines. In addition to the use 
of conventional mechanised equipment, Coalbrook was the only 
coal mine in South Africa using continuous miners. The 
employment of such equipment instilled in a manager the 
necessity to develop a hands-on management style which was to 
prove essential for KAR in later years in the development of new 
mechanised projects in South African gold mines. 
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In 1973 KAR joined the Johannesburg Consolidated Investment 
Company and was appointed colliery manager at Tavistock 
Collieries and was immediately involved in the conversion of 
Tavistock from a hand-loading labour intensive operation, which 
was the widely accepted system prevalent at that time in the 
Witbank Coalfield, to a completely mechanised mine. This was 
when there were still very few mechanised collieries in South 
Africa. 
 
In the mid 1970’s KAR was transferred, within JCI, as the 
responsible mining manager to a new mine at the start of its 
development: Otjihase Copper Mine in South West Africa (now 
Namibia). Otjihase had changed its original mining policy from 
labour intensive methods, similar to gold mines in the group, to 
increased mechanisation utilising drill rigs and LHDs. KAR was, 
therefore, the manager responsible at the time mechanised 
mining was introduced at Otjihase.   
 
The above brief references to previous experiences that KAR had 
before 1983 with mechanised mining on various mines provided 
the platform to enable him to focus on mechanised options at 
Cooke 2 Shaft when he was transferred there, within the JCI 
Group, in 1983. 
 
2.2 Arguments for Wide Reef Mechanisation at Cooke 2 Shaft, REGM. 
Following the underground visit by KAR to the 85N2 E8 stope where the 
multi fatality had occurred, the most striking argument from the outset 
was safety. It is axiomatic that in wider orebody operations where 
conventional labour intensive methods are employed, it becomes more 
difficult to maintain safe working conditions as the mining height 
increases. However, when mechanised mining is practised in the same 
circumstances, the safety of persons at the face is markedly improved 
when mechanised equipment designed for the conditions is used. 
 
During 1983, the first year that wide reef conventional mining was first 
introduced at Cooke 2 Shaft, there had been many serious accidents 
from falls of ground and also persons falling off ladders and drilling 
platforms. In this respect refer to Table 1. 
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Table 1 
 
Working 
Place 
Date Nature of Injury Description of Accident 
95 NIE8 21.1.1983 Suspected fracture right 
hand dorsal 
Struck by rock whilst barring 
hanging 
 25.6.1983 Laceration wound right 
index finger 
Struck by rock from hanging whilst 
drilling 
 14.7.1983 Loss of one upper tooth 
(handling of equipment) 
Struck by jack whilst fastening 
same 
 29.10.1983 Laceration left cheek and 
loose teeth 
Struck by rock from hanging whilst 
cleaning holes after drilling 
 25.11.1983 Contused right wrist Struck by rock from hanging whilst 
drilling 
85 N2 E8 10.3.1983 Laceration wound right 
dorsum foot 
Struck by rock from hanging whilst 
drilling 
 23.7.1983 Fatal Major fall of ground 
 23.7.1983 Fatal Major fall of ground 
 23.7.1983 Fatal Major fall of ground 
 23.7.1983 Fatal Major fall of ground 
 23.7.1983 Compound fracture right 
tibia 
Closed upper right tibia 
Laceration lateral and 
medial side right foot 
Caught by hanging whilst 
fastening eye bolt 
 28.7.1983 Cornea left eye Struck by rock from face whilst 
drilling 
 4.11.1983 Contused right shoulder Struck by rock from hanging 
 4.11.1983 Fractured pelvis Struck by hanging whilst fastening 
prop 
106 N1 
UE1A 
6.8.1983 Laceration wound left 
middle finger 
Struck by rock whilst lashing 
 22.8.1983 Contused back Fell from ladder whilst installing 
roof bolt 
 30.9.1983 Severe laceration upper arm Struck by rock from hanging whilst 
drilling 
 1.10.1983 Contused right foot Struck by rock from face whilst 
drilling 
 11.11.1983 Medial malleolus – severe 
laceration heel and severed 
Achilles 
Struck by rock from hanging whilst 
barring 
106 N1 E8 15.10.1983 Contused lumber region Slipped and fell from platform 
whilst drilling 
 20.9.1983 Laceration forehead and 
upper lip 
Injured by rock from hanging 
whilst drilling 
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In addition, and notwithstanding that the change to a bord and pillar 
mining method from grout based packs and sticks had enabled the 
mine to exploit more profitably the low grade ore reserve, it was 
nevertheless believed in late 1983 by KAR that further significant 
improvements in productivity were possible by the employment of 
mechanised equipment in the stopes. 
 
At the time, in the mind of KAR, there were clear arguments for a 
trackless mechanised option. Firstly, in conventional mining a 
footwall grid has to be developed before stoping on the reef horizon 
can commence and this is a lengthy process. Access from a footwall 
crosscut off the main haulage by means of a travelling way up to the 
reef horizon has to be established for every stoping connection; only 
then is a centre gulley raise developed on reef following which 
ledging and and construction work for winches and grizzlies takes 
place. In addition, orepasses have to be developed from the footwall 
crosscut to serve the stope. In the trackless operations envisaged by 
KAR, once the reef horizon has been accessed all operations would 
take place on reef and from the developed declines (winzes) stoping 
operations could commence; there is no ledging and construction 
phase. Some boxhole development would still be necessary for LHD’s 
to tip; this changed with the use of trucks tramming to a single 
tipping point, but this came later in the project. Build-up of reef 
production could therefore be expected to be more rapid with the 
trackless mining option. In other words, when the full fleet of 
equipment was working on the reef horizon KAR likened the concept 
at the time to a mechanised ‘panzer division’ which could move 
freely on the same horizon at will. 
 
Notwithstanding that the footwall development for a mechanised 
method would be minimal there would be obvious advantages on the 
reef horizon related specifically to drilling, support work and cleaning. 
Face drilling would be more easily controlled for reason that there 
would be only a few drill rigs in use compared to the many rock drill 
operators required for conventional mining. Also, more accurate 
drilling with drill rigs would result in less damage to the surrounding 
strata. Although no real change would occur in the support 
requirements for both the conventional and trackless options the 
means of installation would be far more effective using trackless 
equipment such as roofbolters, and a marked improvement in quality 
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of support would occur. With regard to the cleaning phase, the use of 
LHD’s would without doubt prove far more effective than scraper 
winches. 
 
Therefore, in late 1983 KAR decided to prepare motivations for a 
trackless mechanised alternative in wide body conditions. These 
series of motivations would be based on the following key factors. 
Firstly, there would be an improvement in productivity due to a 
reduction in manpower. Secondly, profits would increase due to the 
reduced labour complement; a significant reduction in development 
costs; the partial elimination of ancillary operations. Finally 
mechanisation would provide for a safer operation. 
 
2.3 Motivations for Trackless Mining  
 These motivations would lead to the approval of the Cooke 2 Shaft E8 
 Reef Mechanised Project; details of this project will be set out in Chapter 
 3 of this treatise. 
 
The successful start-up with mechanisation of the wider E8 Reef at 
Cooke 2 Shaft encouraged KAR to consider the mechanisation of the 
much narrower UEIA Reef at Cooke 2 Shaft and in a following chapter, 
Chapter 4, the motivation for and the introduction of narrow reef 
mechanisation on the 95 Level at Cooke 2 Shaft will be set out. 
 
Following the successful two years of introducing mechanisation at 
Cooke 2 Shaft REGM KAR was transferred to the new HJ Joel Gold Mine 
to be developed by JCI in the Orange Free State. This new mine had 
initially been designed and planned as a conventional gold mine but 
would, in fact, become a new trackless mine designed, planned and 
managed by KAR from the outset. Full details of the development of the 
HJ Joel Gold Mine will be addressed in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
The Wide Reef Mechanised Mining Project at Cooke 2 Shaft, 
Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Company, Witwatersrand, Limited 
 
On the 4th November 1983 at REGM’s offices K.A.Rhodes (KAR) made a brief 
presentation to the Technical Director of JCI on a proposal for a mechanised 
operation at Cooke 2 Shaft. In this presentation it was stated as the intention 
to present a report which would motivate the introduction of a trackless 
mining operation on the E8 Reef horizon. This presentation was to be followed 
up with a series of motivational reports over the next three months. 
 
The initial report was very short and was presented later in November and it 
was followed by a more updated report in mid-December. The final provisional 
motivational report for the approval of the project was presented in January 
1984. 
 
In the course of this chapter these preliminary motivational reports will be 
examined. Further, the so-called Phase 1 of the project will be described 
leading up to the approval of the final Phase 2 of the project and finally the on-
going build-up to the planned production from the project during 1984 and 
1985 will be discussed. 
  
3.1 Initial and Interim Report 
Following the above meeting with the Technical Director, a short interim 
report on the proposal was submitted on 23rd November 1983 to 
REGM’s Consulting Engineer. In this report it was stated that the 
mechanised operation would be carried out on the E8 Reef horizon 
between 85 Level and 95 Level in the north eastern portion of the lease 
area of Cooke 2 Shaft. In this area the reef varies in width between 2 
metres and 5 metres and with the dip from 2° to 10° in an easterly 
direction. It was contended that a highly mechanised trackless operation 
based on a bord and pillar mining layout was feasible. 
 
In a general overview of the proposed operation the following aspects of 
the project were briefly set out. 
 
3.1.1 Geology and Geological Reserves 
The geology of the area of E8 Reef which had been targeted was 
relatively undisturbed. The reserve available had been calculated 
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as 4,219 million tons at a grade of 4,6g/ton. Assuming a geological 
loss (10%) and a loss for leaving regional pillars (4%) and an 
extraction of 92% within stopes, the actual mineable reserve was 
estimated at 3,118 million tons at a reef width greater than 2 
metres. 
 
3.1.2 Rock Mechanics Considerations 
The important rock mechanics considerations were stated as 
follows. 
 
The necessity to overstope the E8 Reef horizon was important. 
The UEIA Reef lies 20 to 40 metres above the E8 horizon and 
therefore the highest possible extraction of the UEIA Reef had to 
be attempted. The percentage extraction of the underlying E8 
Reef would only be maximised if pillars on the UEIA Reef could be 
minimised. 
 
Any regional pillars on the UEIA Reef horizon would have to be 
superimposed on identical regional pillars on the E8 Reef horizon. 
 
A sequence of primary and secondary extraction was seen to have 
advantages. Initially pillars would be developed larger than 
required and therefore there would be a high safety factor during 
primary mining. Bord spans during primary mining were 
recommended not to exceed 10 metres in width. However in a 
two stage extraction these spans could be exceeded during 
secondary extraction when the mined area would be abandoned 
and barricaded off on retreat. 
 
 When the E8 Reef was overstoped the E8 horizon would be de-
stressed and consequently pillar loads would be low. 
Notwithstanding the necessity for computer modelling it was 
considered feasible for pillar widths to be designed for 1 to 1,5 
times the stoping width and an extraction rate of 92% would then 
be possible. 
 
3.1.3 Design and Planning 
It was envisaged that steady state production would be 40 000 
tons per month operating a double shift. At the reserve stated, 
the life of the operation was estimated in excess of six years. 
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Access to the mining area would be from 90 Level and all reef 
development and stoping operations would be carried out with 
trackless equipment. All trackless equipment would have to be 
transported through the shaft and along 90 Level haulage to the 
mining area. The diameter of Cooke 2 Shaft and internal shaft 
steelwork would dictate that equipment would have to be 
stripped on surface and re-assembled underground at an inbye 
assembly bay at the end of the rail haulage in 90 Level North 11 
Crosscut. 
 
The overall mining layout on reef would provide for winzes 
(downdip roadways) developed on true dip at 150 metre centres 
following which bord and pillar mining would take place on strike. 
Actual dimensions of the stopes would be determined after 
computations by rock mechanics but bord widths would not 
exceed 10 metres during primary mining. 
 
Ore tramming on the mining horizon would be to orepasses 
developed at 150 metre intervals down dip. Ore clearance would 
take place on 101 Level where the rail haulage was being 
upgraded; this haulage would need to be extended to establish an 
effective ore clearance to the shaft using trolley line locomotives 
and high capacity hoppers. 
 
In terms of the required ventilation, multi blast conditions would 
have to be provided for: blasting twice in a 24 hour period. The 
total volume of air to satisfy the necessary criteria was estimated 
at 135m³/sec: the criteria to be considered were the production 
rate, diesel exhaust fumes dilution, heat removal and multi blast 
requirements with early re-entry periods. 
 
Trackless equipment for the project was detailed: LHDs, drill rigs, 
roofbolters and utility vehicles. For improved effectiveness it was 
proposed that electro-hydraulic drill rigs be considered, 
notwithstanding the increased strain this would place on 
maintenance skills. At the time of this motivation trucks had not 
yet been considered by KAR.  
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3.1.4 Engineering Considerations 
At this initial phase of the motivation process it was clearly 
understood by KAR that there were important and critical factors 
related to the engineering aspects of a trackless operation. 
Trackless mining was going to be a new concept for all the officials 
on the project, both mining and engineering, and it was important 
that they should realise that, from the beginning, they would have 
a steep learning curve to climb and the control and management 
of this operation had to be grasped from the outset. If this was not 
realised and understood from the very beginning then the project 
would, in the opinion of KAR, fail. 
 
Some of the important engineering factors at the time can be 
 stressed. 
 
Workshops 
Workshop facilities would be provided for on 90 Level in close 
 proximity to the access ramp from 90 Level to the E8 Reef horizon. 
The establishment of these workshops would commence as soon 
as the project had been approved. 
 
Maintenance 
Maintenance had to be done in accordance with strict schedules 
and mining personnel had to have the discipline to enforce this. 
 
Fuel Supply 
Fuel supplies had to be readily available; diesel transported by rail 
mounted tankers. In fact, a far more streamlined system was to be 
planned for later. 
 
Stores 
An underground store had to be established in the workshop area.  
 
Service 
An efficient back-up service from the original equipment 
manufacturers (OEMs) had to be put in place. It was critical that 
the availability of the equipment had to be high if the project was 
to succeed. 
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Training 
Training of operators, artisans and supervisors would commence 
prior to commissioning of the equipment underground. OEM’s 
would provide the training programme and supervise the training.  
 
Although, in hindsight, these few basic considerations set out in this 
interim report in late 1983 are but a far cry from a maintenance action 
plan guide developed by KAR many years later, in 1983 they represented 
the early stance taken by KAR in order to ensure that the engineering 
function was being committed to by mining managers and supervisors. 
As the project grew additional factors would focus on operating 
standards for both mining (operators) and engineering (maintenance) 
and in turn would lead to the compiling of standards manuals.  
 
This interim report then had briefly set out the principles of the project 
but the costs and efficiencies of the operation had still to be worked out 
and this would lead to a second (follow-up) report which was submitted 
in December 1983. 
 
3.2  Second Report (Follow-up to the Interim Report) 
This report, submitted by KAR on the 14th December 1983, was an 
updated follow-up report to the Interim report submitted in November 
1983. Consideration was now given to a comparison of the proposed 
method and the current conventional layout in respect of efficiencies, 
working costs and safety. 
 
3.2.1 Efficiencies 
In terms of efficiencies, it was estimated that the trackless project 
would provide for a productivity of 33 tons/non-skilled worker 
compared to the conventional planned efficiency of 7 tons/non-
skilled worker: a reduction of 192 persons at a production rate of 
40 000 tons/month. 
 
3.2.2 Costs 
At this point in time an estimate was made of the working costs 
(stoping and development) for the trackless project and also a 
comparison with the actual costs of conventional mining. This cost 
comparison was still not definitive but did provide a comparative 
guide. At this stage the capital replacement costs and major 
overhauls had not been separated but were included in the overall 
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estimated working cost for trackless mining. The comparative 
costs were estimated at R7,77/ton and R6,21/ton for conventional 
and trackless mining respectively. The comparative guide did 
therefore indicate that the working cost estimate for a trackless 
method would be markedly less (20%) than the actual 
conventional costs. 
 
3.2.3 Safety 
With such a reduction in stope labour there was justification in 
claiming that in mechanised operations, with the lower 
complement of workers exposed to the conditions, there could be 
less accidents from falls of ground. Also, with mobile equipment 
designed to operate in higher workings the persons injured from 
falling from fixed ladders and drilling platforms could be 
eliminated. 
 
In summary then it could be stated that for the trackless project the 
geology of the target area on the E8 Reef was favourable for trackless 
equipment and it was now proposed to employ a room and pillar layout. 
Further, it was argued that the proposed change to mechanisation 
would prove to be significantly more efficient in the use of labour and 
there would be a reduction in working costs. Finally, the method was 
safer and a reduction in accidents could be expected. 
 
3.3 Final Preliminary Motivation Report 
The final preliminary report, submitted by KAR on 31 January 1984, 
provided more details of the project and enforced what had previously 
been stated that a mechanised trackless operation would be both 
feasible and viable and also safer. There were some changes from the 
Interim Report and a summary of the main aspects of this motivation 
can be set out below. KAR’s own copy of the original Final Preliminary 
Motivational Report (with some random highlighting and notes by KAR) 
dated 31st January 1984 can be seen in Annexure 3.1 in Volume 2. 
 
3.3.1  Geology 
The target area comprised the largest block of potentially payable 
E8 Reef at Cooke 2 Shaft. The reef in the area was given to be 
relatively undisturbed and the general dip of the fan shaped body 
was between 2° and 10°. 
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3.3.2  Reserves 
The actual mineable reserve was now estimated at 3,050 million 
tons at a reef width of 2 metres and greater. 
 
3.3.3 Rock Mechanics Considerations 
It was re-iterated that the percentage extraction on the E8 Reef 
horizon would only be maximised if maximum extraction of the 
UEIA Reef took place. This conclusion was the result of 
observations in the E8 stopes at Cooke 2 where a highly loaded 
pillar on the UEIA horizon had necessitated that larger pillars be 
left on the underlying E8 Reef in order to ensure stope stability on 
that horizon. Also there had been a pillar failure in the 85N2E8 
stope (the stope where the multi fatality had occurred previously) 
due to an overlying pillar on the UE1A Reef; refer to Figure 3.1 for 
a photograph. Once again it was stated that all regional pillars on 
the UEIA horizon would be superimposed on identical regional 
pillars on the E8 horizon. 
 
It was now planned that mining would take place in two stages; 
this policy being confirmed when the mining method changed 
from bord and pillar to room and pillar. A sequence of primary and 
secondary extraction has the advantage that the primary 
operation when mining on advance will provide for larger pillars 
with an overall high factor of safety but can allow for larger spans 
when on retreat during the secondary extraction phase. Pillar sizes 
on primary mining would be 7 metres x 10 metres and following a 
secondary extraction stage on retreat the final pillars would be 5 
metres x 5 metres; these sizes had been agreed, for the two 
stages of extraction, with the Group Rock Mechanics Engineer. 
Overall extraction was now estimated at 90%; refer to the 
calculation below. 
 
Room width   = 10 metres 
Pillar size   = 7 metres (wide) x 10 metres long 
Holing between pillars = 4 metres 
Final pillar size  = 5 metres x 5 metres 
Therefore final extraction after secondary mining on retreat is as 
follows (7 + 10) x (10 + 4) – (5 x 5)       x 100% 
   (7 + 10) x (10 + 4) 
    = 89,5 (say 90%)  
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FIGURE 3.1 
Pillar Failure in 85N2E8 Stope Due to Overlying Pillar on UE1A Reef 
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 3.3.4  Mining Design and Planning  
In terms of the final mining design and layout, steady state 
production, expected to be achieved during the second year 
(1985), would be unchanged at 40 000 tons/month for six years.  
 
Development of the area would commence on 90 Level elevation. 
Initially contour reef drives would be developed from 90 N11 
crosscut and from these drives decline winzes (access ramps) 
would be developed on true dip at approximately 150 metre 
centres. When an access ramp holed into a bottom access 
airway/travellingway only then would stoping commence.  
Dimensions of the drives and declines were designed to be 8 
metres wide x 4 metres high. 
 
The method of mining selected for this operation was the stepped 
room and pillar system. Rooms would be developed 5° down dip 
of true strike with access holings 60° down dip of strike being 
developed at 14 metre centres. The general development showing 
contour drives and access ramps or declines, the general stoping 
configuration and detailed stope layout are shown in Figures 3.2, 
3.3 and 3.4 . 
 
Secondary extraction would be carried out when primary stoping 
in any winze connection is complete. During secondary extraction 
operations partial extraction of pillars would take place on retreat; 
pillars being reduced in size in stages to minimum dimensions. The 
stages in the partial extraction of pillars are shown in Figure 3.5, 
signed off by the Group Rock Mechanics Engineer. A fuller 
explanation of these stages is given in the Final Preliminary 
Report. 
 
At this point I can refer to a personal visit KAR made to England  in 
June 1985, when time was spent at  the International Mining 
Exhibition in Birmingham and the application of a remote radio 
controlled system (ToroTel) for use with Toro LHD’s was discussed 
with A.R.A. (Toro) engineers. The use of this system was envisaged 
for the project to provide for maximum extraction during 
secondary stage stoping when final cleaning of the blasted pillars 
would take place. 
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FIGURE 3.2 
 
Contour Drives and Access Declines 
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FIGURE 3.3 
 
General Stoping Configuration 
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FIGURE 3.4 
Detailed Stope Panel Layout  
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FIGURE 3.5 
 
Stages in the Partial Extraction of Pillars 
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3.3.5  Cycle of Operations 
Further details were now set out in this final preliminary 
motivational report related to the cycle of operations during 
stoping. 
 
Drilling and Blasting 
The decision had now been made to use electro-hydraulic (two 
boom) drill rigs for stoping; they were also planned for the 
development work. A further decision was made to use Nonel 
short period delay detonators (SPD’s) in stoping. The face shape 
would be staggered providing for a leading panel with a slashing 
panel lagging by approximately 5 metres. It was expected that by 
using Nonel SPD’s that most of the reef blasted on the slashing 
(lagging) panel would be thrown into the lower leading panel. In 
the leading panel the use of the proven Nonel long period delay 
detonators (LPD’s) would be in use. 
 
The use of Nonel will be discussed in greater detail later in this 
chapter. 
 
Cleaning 
Trucks were now being envisaged by KAR for this project and the 
reasons for this decision will be seen in more detail later in this 
chapter. 
 
Cleaning operations would be carried out by 2,7m³ LHD units 
(consideration would be given later to larger units) into 16 ton 
trucks. Loading of trucks would take place in the access ramps 
where a height of 4 metres would be available, the LHD unit 
tramming to the access ramps on strike. Loading of reef by LHD 
would mainly take place on the lower leading panel, any reef left 
on the slashing panel being transferred only to the lower panel in 
order to prevent any machine slipping over the edge of the 
slashing panel. 
 
The trucks would transport the reef to a main tip up the access 
ramps and along strike haul roads (reef drives). These roadbeds 
would be prepared using crushed stone from development 
operations and concreted where necessary. The haul roads, 
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developed at 8 metres wide, would allow two vehicles to pass 
each other without the necessity for passing loops.  
 
Final transfer of ore to the shaft system would take place by 
locomotive haulage on 90 Level and 101 Level. 
 
Support 
The recommended support for the stopes (and development) was 
2,7 metre x 25mm end anchored resin rebar on a 2 metre x 2 
metre pattern. During secondary extraction, being on retreat, it 
would not be necessary to install any support when pillars were 
reduced in size. 
 
3.3.6 Ventilation 
Few changes to the interim report were necessary for the 
ventilation design. The total volume of air for the project, 
including double shift multi-blast stoping, would be 140m³/sec. 
Stope faces would be ventilated by air jet fans (see a photograph 
in Figure 3.6). The air jet fans were planned to work in conjunction 
with force and exhaust fans and columns; refer to Figure 3.7 for 
general stope ventilation.  The Environmental Control Department 
at REGM had now compiled a detailed report of ventilation 
requirements which provided for a three hour re-entry period 
after the blast. 
 
3.3.7 Equipment, Workshops and other Engineering Aspects 
At this time details were made available for the equipment 
schedule for a build-up to full production. However, planning was 
still in progress for the streamlined haulage on 101 Level for final 
clearance of ore. 
 
Workshop facilities would be provided for in close proximity to the 
90 Level elevation reef development. Development of a 
permanent workshop would take place immediately the first LHD 
unit was made available. The workshop would provide for two 
major bays (initially A, and when in full production A + B). Refer to 
Figure 3.8 in this chapter, taken from the Final Preliminary 
Motivation Report. This would in fact be the No 1 Workshop in the 
final design.  
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FIGURE 3.6 
 
Air Jet Fan in Stope 
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FIGURE 3.7 
General Stope Ventilation Layout 
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FIGURE 3.8 
 
Proposed No 1 Workshop 
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The proposed workshop complex was extensive and would be 
developed in the footwall of the E8 Reef horizon and it was 
therefore axiomatic that rock mechanics aspects be considered.  
Full recommendations from the rock mechanics engineer for the 
support of the workshop and pillars to be left on the E8 stoping 
horizon are referred to in the Final Preliminary Motivation Report. 
 
In the initial period whilst the permanent workshop was being 
constructed a temporary satellite bay would be made available on 
the reef horizon. 
 
In terms of fuel supply, KAR was now giving consideration to 
pumping fuel to underground storage tanks by direct pipeline 
from surface. However, initially fuel would have to be transported 
underground by rail-bound tankers. 
 
With regard to the access of capital equipment into the 
underground workings, all equipment had to be stripped on 
surface before being transported down Cooke 2 Shaft and on the 
90 Level haulage to a place where re-assembly would take place . 
Documentation which provided details of dimensions and masses 
of sub-assemblies of certain favoured equipment for the project 
had been made available, by the responsible manufacturers, to 
the project. This information confirmed what KAR had believed 
from the beginning that the proposed equipment could be 
transferred underground. Full documentation generated by the 
original equipment manufacturer (OEM’s) was collated at the 
request of KAR by the Trackless Mining Project Mine Overseer and 
submitted to KAR. 
 
 3.3.8   Labour 
Full details of complements were now given in this report for both 
C.W.S. and N.C.W. personnel. As an explanatory note, at that time 
JCI had changed to a new nomenclature for what was previously 
seen as white and black labour: C.W.S. (common wage scale or 
skilled) and N.C.W.S. (non-common wage scale or unskilled) 
respectively. 
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 3.3.9 Training 
 Schedules were now being planned for all persons (CWS and 
 NCWS) to be sent for training for the first full year (1984) of the 
 project.  
 
3.3.10 Efficiencies 
The labour planning for conventional wide reef stoping was 7,5 
tons/NCWS per shift and in general actual performance did not 
exceed this figure. Therefore, in conventional stopes, it would be 
planned for a complement of 222 in order to achieve 40 000 tons 
production. Stope preparation crews and winch movers would 
probably necessitate a further 20 persons, giving a grand total of 
242 NCWS workers. 
 
A labour estimate for the trackless operation was 23 NCWS per 
shift stoping complement, detailed as follows. 
 
 Job Category    Complement 
Drill Rig Operators (3 rigs)    6 
ST 3½ yd³ LHD Drivers (5 machines)   5 
Truck Drivers      4 
Team Leaders      2 
Rock Bolt Helpers      5 
Tip Attendant      1 
Total per shift      23 
 
Total for double shift operations is therefore 46 
 
Assuming a crew of 4 for pipe construction  4 
 
Total stoping complement    50 
 
Such a complement would therefore provide for an efficiency of 
33 tons per stoping employee per shift compared with a planned 
efficiency of 6.9 tons per NCWS per shift in the conventional 
calculation (planned figure adjusted to account for additional 
crews referred to above). 
 
The proposed trackless system would therefore provide for a 
reduction of stoping labour of the order of 192 persons; such a 
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reduction being a strong motivation for the introduction of a 
highly mechanised operation if consideration was given to the 
continuous escalating cost of NCWS labour and in addition, the 
obvious advantages of employing a reduced labour force. 
 
A comparison of CWS labour for trackless and conventional mining 
show slight reductions in favour of trackless mining (details in the 
Final Preliminary Motivation Report in Annexure 3.1 in Volume 2). 
 
These calculations therefore confirmed the statements given in 
the follow-up notes to the Interim Report. 
 
3.3.11 Costs 
At this stage of the planning further calculations had been made 
(which were not to be the final figures) for a comparison of 
working costs for the two options: conventional and mechanised. 
The costs included development costs which would prove to be 
significantly reduced for the trackless operation. In this respect, it 
had been recorded that the footwall development required to 
develop the reserve for the 90 Level E8 Project would have been 
10 000 metres if stoping was done conventionally. 
 
 
Comparative Estimated Costs in January 1984 
Operation            Cost R/Ton 
      Conventional     Trackless 
Development    0,97   0,03 
Labour     3,07   1,45 
Drilling     0,74   1,29 
Blasting     1,12   1,12 
Cleaning     1,40   1,39 
Support     0,60   0,60 
Ventilation     0,06   0,06 
Other      0,37   0,27 
       8,33   6,21 
 
3.3.12 Safety 
Once again the same arguments for a safer operation, as stated in 
the previous motivation reports, were stressed. A mechanised 
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room and pillar operation would be safer for the conditions and 
accidents could expect to markedly decrease. 
 
3.4  Final Comment on the Motivation of the 90L E8 Mechanised Project 
This final preliminary motivational report concluded that a trackless 
mining operation on the E8 Reef was believed to be technically feasible 
and safe. 
 
The geology of the area targeted on the E8 Reef was favourable and the 
selected mining method of room and pillar was a proven method. The 
report showed that the proposed trackless operation would be more 
efficient in the use of NCWS labour and the comparison of labour 
efficiencies for both NCWS and NCWS were favourable to trackless 
mining over the conventional methods. 
 
The costs were estimated to be R2,12/ton less for the trackless option 
(R6,21 versus R8,33 for conventional). The expected savings in costs at a 
production rate of 40 000 tons/month would be in excess of R1 million 
(or in today’s terms of the order of R12 million) per year.  
 
In summary, over a period of three months KAR had set out in three 
reports the motivation for a trackless mechanised operation on the E8 
Reef horizon at Cooke 2 Shaft, REGM. Each subsequent report contained 
further details of the project. On the 31st January 1984, the date of the 
final preliminary report, it was considered that sufficient motivation had 
been done to warrant the approval of an initial phase for the project. 
 
3.5   1984: Phase 1 of the Project 
In early 1984 work continued on the preparation of an application for a 
capital vote for what may be called Phase 1 of the 90L E8 Trackless 
mining project. 
 
Following the submission of the Final Preliminary Motivation Report on 
31st January 1984, a draft application for the capital vote was made on 
16th February 1984 and finally revised on 30th March 1984. Approval for 
the capital, to be known as Vote 574, was authorised by the Consulting 
Engineer on 3rd May 1984. The capital equipment authorised in this vote, 
in addition to significant underground workshop equipment, was as 
follows. 
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LHD 2,7m³     2 
LHD 3,8m³     1 
Twin boom electro-hydraulic drill rig 2 
Roof bolter     1 
18 Ton truck    2 
Toyota land cruisers   3 
Utility scissors vehicle   1 
 
In terms of the above fleet it can be seen that 18 ton trucks were now 
being planned for whereas in the very early motivations trucks were not 
included at all. The 18 ton trucks (upgraded from the 16 ton size quoted 
in the final preliminary report) matched well with the 2,7m³ LHD unit; 
four passes would fill the truck. 
 
At the time, the use of any trucks underground in tabular bodies in gold 
mines did not command support at senior level in the company and 
therefore the decision to introduce trucks required significant 
motivation from KAR. In considering the use of trucks it had been 
determined that trucks would be markedly less costly to operate than 
LHD’s. They were able to travel in the workings at twice the speed of 
LHD’s and, therefore, it would be possible and cost effective  to reduce 
the tramming distance of LHD’s to the minimum by the use of trucks; in 
this respect LHD’s should tip into trucks as close as practicable to the 
face.  Also, this decision would provide for the further advantage of 
allowing the trucks to travel to a single tipping point where an impact 
breaker could be constructed and cause all the reef to pass through a 
single orepass to 101 Level. The haulage on 101 Level was being 
upgraded to transport all the reef from the trackless operations, 
including the new 95 Level UEIA Project. This ‘super’ haulage and the 
new 95 Level UE1A Project will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
However, notwithstanding all the obvious necessities for the 
documentation and official approval of any project through a 
motivational process as has been described up to now, it can be 
recorded that there was an increase in the confidence of the project  to 
such an extent that verbal approval had been given as early as 
December 1983 (before the submission in early 1984 of the application 
for a capital vote) for the purchase of two LHD’s and two drill rigs for the 
wide reef project; both subject to the need for a three tender system. 
This approval had been confirmed in a memorandum, dated 12 
55 
 
December 1983, from the General Manager REGM. It was then that I 
knew I had overcome the doubts of Mr van der Meulen, the General 
Manager and therefore it was from the end of 1983, only four months 
after the arrival of KAR at Cooke 2 Shaft, that it could be said that the 
project really started to accelerate. 
 
In terms of progress with the project in early 1984, it would now be 
relevant to examine the involvement of KAR with the use of Nonel, 
referred to in the final preliminary motivational report, and its relevance 
to this project. 
 
3.5.1 Nonel 
 Standard blasting techniques at REGM (as on other gold mines in 
South Africa at that time) utilised fuses and igniter cord for the 
firing of charged shot holes. Although these techniques had 
proven effective for many years they nevertheless contained 
certain undesirable features. A major disadvantage of the system 
had always been its inability to guarantee consistent sequential 
firing; out of sequence shots in the range of 1% - 3% had been 
recorded in controlled tests at REGM. Notwithstanding the 
acceptance of that system over the years, any attempt to improve 
the system had to be considered. Therefore, in late 1983 
discussions had taken place between the Gold Division of JCI and 
African Explosives Chemical Limited (AECI) regarding the use of 
Nonel assemblies. Nonel is a non-electric ignition system which 
can eliminate cut-offs and, further, guarantee sequential firing. 
The system was invented by NitroNobel (Sweden) and is based on 
a plastic tube internally lined with an explosive powder which on 
initiation carries a propagating shock wave to ignite the delay 
element of a Nonel detonator. It is a safe system and cannot be 
initiated by flame, impact or electric current. In December of that 
year Mr GHS Bamford, the Consulting Engineer of the Gold 
Division of JCI, made the decision to carry out trials with Nonel at 
REGM’s Cooke 2 Shaft. The trials were to be conducted with Nonel 
Short Period Delays (SPD’s) and Nonel Long Period Delays (LPD’s). 
The Nonel SPD’s which were not commercially available in South 
Africa, and had to be imported from Sweden, were to be used in 
trials in the conventional wide reef room and pillar stopes and the 
narrow reef crush pillar and stick stopes. The Nonel LPD’s which 
had been available from AECI for some years were to be tested in 
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development operations and advance strike gulleys (ASG’s) in 
conventional stoping. All this controlled test work would take 
place at Cooke 2 Shaft under the direct supervision of the 
Industrial Engineering Department at REGM who in turn were 
responsible to KAR in his capacity as manager of Cooke 2 Shaft. 
   
 The major findings from this controlled experimental work, which 
were to relate specifically to the 90L E8 Reef Trackless Project and 
have a significant impact on the project, can be summarised as 
follows. 
  
SPD’s 
In wide reef room and pillar stopes the use of Nonel SPD’s was 
shown to be cost effective for blast holes of 2,0 metres or longer 
with burden spacing of 90cms to 100cms. Blasting with Nonel 
SPD’s improved fragmentation and the throw of the blast proved 
very effective; more than 85% of the stoping panel was thrown 
into the ASG in the wide reef stopes. These positive findings in 
conventional wide reef stopes with 10 metre rooms would ensure 
their effectiveness in trackless stopes where the slashing panel 
was planned to be only 5 metres long. Throw and fragmentation 
from using Nonel in a trackless operation would provide for ideal 
muckpile conditions for an LHD. In this respect it has to be 
emphasised that the major constraint in conventional stopes had 
been the inability of the ASG winch to handle the large tonnage of 
broken ore from a rapidly advancing face. This caused an 
excessive build-up of rock in the stope as seen in the photographs 
included in Chapter 2 and Annexure 2.1 of Volume 2 of this 
treatise. Therefore, the results dictated that Nonel SPD’s must be 
used in the future trackless stopes; refer to P1/P2 layout in Figure 
3.9. Also refer to photographs, taken at a later date, in trackless 
operations showing a Nonel face lit up before blasting and the 
effect of the throw blast from P2 into P1; Figures 3.10  and 3.11 
respectively. 
 
In footwall lifting (benching) and pillar extraction operations 
Nonel SPD’s would be ideal and it was planned that they would be 
used in all such future operations in trackless mining. 
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FIGURE 3.9 
P1/P2 Layout 
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FIGURE 3.10 
 
A Nonel Face Lit Up Before The Blast 
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FIGURE 3.11 
 
 The Result of the Throw Blast from P2 into P1 
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LPD’s 
It was concluded that the use of Nonel LPD’s in rounds of 2 metres 
or less could not be justified. Nevertheless, in trackless stopes the 
leading panel (P1) in the stope was to be drilled by electro-
hydraulic drill rig (3,8 metre blastholes); therefore Nonel LPD’s 
would be viable and necessary in order to maximise advance and 
justify the cost of drilling long rounds. Further, the use of LPD’s in 
trackless development (similarly long rounds with electro-
hydraulic drill rig) would also be cost effective. It should also be 
stressed that with LPD’s an increased advance would be achieved 
due to a significant reduction in socket length resulting from 
sequential firing as opposed to fuse blasting with igniter cord. 
 
The major disadvantage of Nonel was always going to be the cost; 
Nonel assemblies were more than double the cost of fuses. 
Nevertheless, the conclusions from the controlled trials with 
Nonel had shown that with SPD’s if blast holes in stoping were 
drilled 2,0 metres or greater and if in development LPD’s were 
used to drill 2,0 metre rounds or more, in both cases the use of 
Nonel was viable. 
 
These controlled trials at Cooke 2 Shaft had shown positive 
findings for the 90L E8 Trackless Project which was, at that time, 
building up  in  the  Phase 1 period. They had shown unequivocally 
that both Nonel SPD’s and LPD’s held significant benefit for the 
new trackless project and therefore the findings from these trials 
were quickly integrated into the trackless operation in 1985 with 
significant advantages to the project. 
 
The technical paper “The Use of Nonel at Cooke 2 Shaft, Randfontein 
Estates Gold Mining Company, Witwatersrand Limited” written and 
presented to the Association of Mine Managers of South Africa by 
K.A.Rhodes is attached as Annexure 3.2 in Volume 2. This paper was 
published in the transactions of the Association of Mine Managers of 
South Africa in 1986 and was based on the detailed documentation 
emanating from the controlled experimentation on Nonel under the 
direction of the KAR at Cooke 2 Shaft, REGM. 
 
The pace of the project was rapidly accelerating in early 1984 and it was 
now necessary to develop specific strategies for mechanisation of the 
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project. It was believed by KAR that the important factors for the 
introduction of any mechanisation programme were engineering 
maintenance, training and management controls. 
 
3.5.2 Engineering Maintenance Philosophy 
It was realised that a most important issue in a trackless operation 
was the need for machines to be available when they were 
required to do work; a high availability of the equipment had to be 
achieved from the outset and throughout the life of the machine. 
In the early days of the project it was necessary for all responsible 
officials to understand that mining and engineering personnel 
must work together and that senior managers (from myself down) 
were committed to this key objective. Trackless mechanised 
mining was going to be very different from the standard way of 
managing a gold mine and any management philosophy which 
took the attitude of ‘us and them’, which was all too prevalent 
between mining and engineering functions on gold mines, would 
cause any trackless mechanised operation to fail, and fail quickly. 
The most important part of this policy was that there had to be a 
commitment by the mining managers to the engineering function. 
It was therefore critically important, for the success of this first 
mechanised project, that this support by mining managers and 
supervisors for engineering maintenance programmes was 
entrenched from the outset; this was my responsibility to ensure 
this happened. In this respect the specifics of this philosophy can 
now be discussed. 
 
The two major factors for an effective maintenance programme 
were swiftly realised in early 1984: the provision of adequate 
underground workshops in order to carry out maintenance and a 
strictly enforced maintenance schedule carried out by trained 
artisans.  
 
Underground Workshops 
Underground workshops had to be made available from the very 
beginning. Although it would not be practical to develop and 
construct a workshop immediately for the full fleet of equipment 
which would be required at steady state production, it was 
necessary to establish workshop facilities in stages. 
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The first underground workshop bay required was to become 
known as the assembly bay; this bay would be developed in 
advance of any equipment being sent underground. At Cooke 2 
Shaft access to the future trackless area was more than three 
kilometres distant, along a rail haulage, from the vertical shaft. All 
machines had to be stripped on surface and transported to the 
end of the track system where the assembly bay had been 
constructed; the bay was developed by conventional drilling and 
cleaned by rail-mounted loaders loading into hoppers. This 
assembly bay was then to serve as a maintenance bay for the first 
equipment delivered underground whilst this equipment was 
being used to develop the first workshop for the project. Refer to 
photograph in Figure 3.12. Therefore, in early 1984, it was 
necessary to focus attention on the assembly bay.  
 
An important factor however in the development of workshops 
was seen to be the necessary support of the strata of these key 
excavations and the necessity for pillars in the workshop area and 
also the proximity of the workshops to the mining horizon. All 
these factors were incorporated in plans provided by the rock 
mechanics engineer and approved by KAR as the responsible 
manager before any development took place. 
 
Also in 1984 initial planning was being undertaken for the supply 
of diesel fuel direct from surface by fuel pipeline to underground 
tanks in close proximity to the future workshop complex. Details 
of this system will be given later in this chapter 
 
  Maintenance 
At the start of this project there were certain issues relating to 
maintenance which were considered key to the success of the 
operation. There had to be strong discipline exercised over the 
operators of the equipment to ensure that machines would be 
available at the right time for their scheduled services; it was the 
responsibility of the mining supervisors to enforce this directive 
from the very beginning. 
 
  The availability of spares was identified as a major factor. 
Machines at the start of the project had  to  have  high  mechanical 
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FIGURE 3.12 
 
Assembly Bay Being Developed Underground by Conventional Methods 
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availabilities (over 85%) and if spares could not be guaranteed 
when required, due to a breakdown on any one of the machines 
(and there were very few machines at the start of the operation), 
then the whole cycle of operations (drilling, cleaning, support) 
would be dislocated and development progress seriously affected. 
In due course major changes were to take place in the overall 
stores infrastructure at REGM but in 1984 it was the responsibility 
of the responsible engineer, in close contact with the respective 
OEM’s, to ensure that spares were available when required. The 
machines would be new, and without abuse (which will be 
discussed later), availabilities would be expected to be high with 
only minimum downtime. However, as the project grew and 
machines aged, downtime would inevitably increase. It was 
therefore important at the beginning to establish an effective 
engineering maintenance philosophy. 
 
Probably from an engineer’s point of view the most important 
issue of any maintenance plan has to be the quality of skills of his 
artisans and therefore, early concentration was given to artisan 
skills and artisan training. The specialised skills required for the 
maintenance of the electro-hydraulic drilling rig for instance, 
introduced to the project instead of compressed air operated rigs, 
was highlighted very early. 
 
 3.5.3 Training 
Reference has been made to artisan skills training but a pre-
requisite for success has to be the level of competence of 
operators or driver skills. The machines being introduced were 
few and they were expensive and the machines could not be 
allowed to be damaged or abused by any driver’s irresponsibility; 
such a trend would represent a major risk to the project. In 
recognition of this risk, before any machines had been delivered 
or went underground, an early appointment was made by KAR of 
a Mechanical Equipment Supervisor (MES). The person appointed 
had previous mechanised experience and had completed certain 
training courses which specifically included hydraulic courses 
prepared by the OEM’s. The MES had the legal appointment in 
terms of the Mines and Works Regulation 18.2.2(c) in that he was 
delegated by the responsible engineer to test the competency of a  
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driver before issuing a licence; see attached in Figure 3.13 the first 
legal appointment of an MES made by KAR and in Figure 3.13A the 
duties of the MES as set out by KAR. 
 
The success of this appointment led to it becoming a standard 
appointment in any trackless project within JCI; refer to the 
attached JCI Policy and Procedure Manual, Trackless Mechanised 
Mining Methods, Ref.01-03-66 dated 1987-03-31 in Figure 3.14, 
highlighting the position of the MES, then called an overseer. 
 
For KAR this was always going to be a key appointment and as can 
be seen from the duties and responsibilities described above the 
MES had reporting authority directly to the senior manager, which 
in itself emphasised his importance to the project. The 
appointment of an MES has proved effective in the management 
career of KAR, and in later years, has always been recommended  
for any new trackless project wherever KAR has been the 
appointed consultant to any mine/client. 
 
Notwithstanding the importance of operator skills, it was also 
determined that training was necessary for drivers’ immediate 
supervisors. It was not expected that any supervisor needed to be 
able to operate a machine to the degree of competence of a 
driver but they had to know how to operate the machine and its 
basic functions and be aware of the potential for abuse of the 
machine. Finally, it was required for management to be subjected 
to a machine appreciation programme designed to give them the 
necessary technical knowledge to manage trackless operations 
effectively. 
 
3.5.4 Trackless Management Responsibility 
From the very start of this first mechanised project I had to ensure 
that mining managers and supervisors subordinate to myself 
gained the necessary knowledge to enable them to manage the 
project effectively. In addition to the programmes outlined above 
I arranged, whenever and wherever possible, to expose officials 
(and myself) to other mechanised operations and therefore 
several visits were made to mines in southern Africa during 
1984/1985.These extended visits had the purpose of gaining 
practical knowledge of trackless mining on fully mechanised mines 
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FIGURE 3.13 
 
First Legal Appointment of Mechanical Equipment Supervisor 
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Duties of the Mechanical Equipment Supervisor 
as first set out by K.A.Rhodes, Manager Mining, Cooke 2 Shaft, REGM in 1984 
 
1. Select all new candidates for a job as an operator and ensure any new operator is 
trained according to best practice. 
 
 
2. Review all operators’ licences, interrogate all operators training background and re-
appoint or re-train all operators: this to be done in terms of the proposed 
programme. 
 
3. Train and appoint instructors to assist with establishing best practice. 
 
4. Maintain a total on-going re-training programme for all current operators. 
 
5. Assist and co-ordinate supervisory training. Initially set up appreciation training for 
supervisors and management for good and bad practices. 
 
6. Exercise driver discipline over the entire complement of operators on a daily basis. 
Remove incompetent or ill-disciplined operators for re-training; this to be done by 
the MES with the full authority of the manager in charge of the shaft. 
 
7. Investigate damage and abuse of equipment by operators and, further, liaise with 
the responsible engineer in terms of damage report investigation. 
 
8. Enforce TM3 standards. 
 
9. Follow-up on the use of the operators’ check list. 
 
10. Enforce correct drill string procedures (collaring, bit removal etc.). 
 
11. Work in close co-operation with OEM’s on their proposed training programmes and 
their audits of both machines and operator practices. 
 
12. Submit a daily report to the senior manager in charge of the shaft. 
 
 
Figure 3.13A 
68 
 
 
FIGURE 3.14 
 
JCI Trackless Organisational Structure 
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such as the Otjihase Copper Mine where I had been manager in 
the mid-1970’s. Over a period of a few days on such a visit it was 
possible for KAR to develop a team spirit and a commitment of the 
mining and engineering disciplines to the project. Also, these visits 
helped to develop a ‘hands-on’ management style for the daily 
control of all aspects of the operation, which was necessary for 
success. 
 
3.6 Final Report for Motivation of the Project (Phase 2) 
By July 1984 trackless development work had commenced following the 
approval of a Capital Vote No 574 by the Consulting Engineer Gold with a 
value of R2,404 million (in March 1984 terms). The approval of Phase 1 
of the project, a concept new to the industry, would represent a 
milestone in trackless mechanisation in a gold mine. 
 
Development of the project continued in 1984 and the final motivational 
report for Phase 2 of the 90L E8 Project was completed on 12 December 
and an application for a capital vote was submitted by KAR on 31 
December 1984. This application and Final Motivational Report dated 
12 December 1984 by KAR, is reproduced in full in Annexure 3.3 in 
Volume 2.  This report examined the general progress with the project in 
1984 and gave a financial justification for the project; summarised 
briefly as follows. 
 
3.6.1   Production towards the end of 1984 was approximately 10 000 
tons/month (reef and waste); actual reef production in December 
1984 was 11724 tons against a plan of 6336 tons. The report 
projected reef tonnages to be 18000 tons by July 1985 utilising the 
equipment approved in terms of the Phase 1 programme only. Full 
production was projected to be achieved in January 1986 at 40000 
tons/month reef following the introduction of equipment 
approved in the Phase 2 application. 
 
3.6.2   With regard to the all-important issue of underground workshops, 
the No 1 Workshop (previously discussed under the Final 
Preliminary Report) was available and capable of servicing all the 
equipment in operation in December 1984. The second facility, 
No.2 Workshop, was under development and situated inbye of the 
established No 1 Workshop in the 90 Level N11 crosscut. When 
completed, this workshop would provide for full workshop and 
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maintenance facilities for both Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the project. 
It was confirmed that all rock mechanics considerations had been 
taken into account in the layout and development of these 
workshops, with cognizance being taken of the proposed stoping 
layout on the E8 Reef horizon. 
 
 3.6.3  Maintenance  of  the  equipment  was  being  carried  out  in  strict 
 accordance with the planned schedules. 
 
3.6.4 Although diesel fuel was still being transported into the mine by 
 rail fuel tankers to 90L N11 crosscut and then pumped into 
 temporary storage tanks, planning was advanced for the 
 installation of an automatic bulk diesel fuel transfer system where 
 diesel would be pumped direct from surface storage tanks 
 (already installed) by pipeline to storage tanks to be situated 
 between the No 1 and No 2 Workshops.  
 
3.6.5 It was recorded in the report that all trackless equipment for 
Phase 1 (stripped on surface and re-assembled underground) had 
been transferred through the Cooke 2 Shaft to 90L N11 crosscut 
along the 90L rail haulage without any problems. Refer to the 
photographs in Figures 3.15 and 3.15A and other photographs in 
Annexure 3.4 in Volume 2. 
 
3.6.6 Training of operators and artisans had commenced with OEM’s 
 providing training courses. Additional training programmes for all 
 responsible officials had been prepared and implemented by year 
 end. Refer to photographs of drill rig training in Figures 3.16 and 
 3.16A. 
 
3.6.7 The operating costs for the trackless operation, although still not 
 yet definitive, was estimated at R3,84/ton less than the cost of a 
 conventional operation; actual estimates R8,60 and R12,44 
 respectively. 
 
3.6.8 It was also detailed in the report that waste development for the 
 project reserve would have been of the order of 165000 tons 
(165 694 tons) if carried out by conventional mining; however, 
when  the waste development required for the trackless operation 
was  deducted the difference would be approximately 140000tons  
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FIGURE 3.15 
 
Slinging Underground a Component of a Stripped Machine 
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FIGURE 3.15A 
 
Re-Assembly of a Machine Underground 
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FIGURE 3.16 
 
Set-Up of Drill Rig for Training on Surface  
 
 
 
 
 
 
74 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3.16A 
 
Underground Training of Drill Rig Operators with the Drill Master 
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  (165000 less 25000 for waste from workshops, raiseborer orepass 
 from 101 Level, 101 streamlined haulage). If it can be assumed 
 that this footwall waste would be generated during the life of the 
 trackless project, this would have released between 20000 and 
 30000  tons  more reef hoisting capacity at the shaft per year for 
say five years; the shaft was then running at full capacity. If this 
 waste could be replaced by reef then it represented a major 
bonus to the company. The relevant revenue for  this  additional 
reef would be R76/ton, with costs assumed to be R20/ton 
 (incremental) profit would therefore be R56/ton or more than R7 
 million over the period of say 5 years. 
 
3.6.9 In order for conventional mining to take place it would have been 
 necessary to plan for more than 10000 metres (10039 metres) of 
 footwall development for the same reserve at an estimated cost 
 of development of R3,908 million. 
 
3.6.10Finally, the DCF (at 15% discount rate) was calculated at +R6,04 
million for the project. Discount payback was 29 months with an 
IRR of 59%.  
 
3.7 1985: Phase 2 of the Project 
The application for a capital vote for the Phase 2 (and final phase) of the 
90L E8 Reef Project, motivated at the end of 1984, was approved by the 
Consulting Engineer (Gold) and forwarded to the Board of Directors on 
08 March 1985. The Control Budget Estimate for the final phase was 
R5,051 million escalated to forecast completion date (R4,443 million in 
Base Date terms). 
 
Over 80% of the value of this estimate dealt with equipment; below are 
the details for Phase 2, in addition to the machines already in use up to 
that date and approved for Phase 1. 
 
Phase 2 
Twin Boom Drill Rig   2 
Roof Bolter     1 
3,8m³ LHD’s     2 
2,7m³ LHD’s     0 
18 ton Trucks    4 
Utility Vehicles    2 
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Grader     1 
Transport Vehicles    4 
Impact Breaker    1 
            Total  17 
 
The approval for the Phase 2 equipment would be sufficient to meet the 
requirements of the planned production of 40000 tons of reef per 
month.  
 
It would now be the appropriate time to comment on the equipment 
selected for this project in the final phase and the status of workshops in 
1985. 
 
3.7.1 Equipment 
 KAR believed that it was correct to have selected the largest size 
 machine for the project because the fundamental reasoning was 
 that the largest units would achieve a reduction in the working 
 costs due to a smaller fleet; operating costs being  reduced as the 
cost of operating different sized machines did not vary that 
markedly and the number of artisans required to service the 
 fleet does not vary with the size of the units. Nevertheless, having 
accepted the above argument cognizance had to be taken of the 
optimum size of the fleet (there had to be flexibility) and also the 
dimensions of the planned roadways. 
 
 When the type and size of the equipment had been decided it was 
still necessary to go through a tender process based on detailed 
specification documentation, and when the tenders had been 
received a decision was only then made after an adjudication 
process involving the responsible managers and engineers. A 
typical example of this process for a purchase of a utility vehicle 
can be seen in the attached documentation in Annexure 3.5 in 
Volume 2. In this example a decision had been made, for technical 
reasons, to purchase the unit which was not the lowest tender; in 
this respect a variation in scope for the CBE had to be approved.
   
Some relevant discussion of the main groups of machines now 
 follows. 
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Drill Rigs 
 At an early stage in the project it was decided to opt for the 
 electro-hydraulic drill rig over the pneumatic rig. There were 
major advantages to be gained from this decision: faster 
penetration rates would maximise advance; pneumatic rigs 
require a high compressed air pressure possibly necessitating 
booster compressors; any reduction in compressed air 
requirements would reduce costs generally at the shaft.  
 
Roof Bolters 
 Recommended support requirements on the E8 Reef horizon 
 required that a hole of 2,8 metres in length had to be drilled (2,7 
 metre grouted rebar). In terms of the  necessity to mine a stoping 
 width of 3 metres it was not possible to utilise a standard drill rig 
 for reason that a working height of 4,75 metres would be required 
which  was unacceptable. There were two further options open; 
use of a telescopic chain feed or roofbolting with a single boom 
 roofbolter for drilling the hole combined with a separate 
 boom with a basket to enable a man to install the  roofbolt. In the 
 case of the telescopic rig a stoping width of 3,6 metres would have 
been  required and even then the hole could only be drilled 1,8 
metres long; this option was also clearly unacceptable. In effect 
the only acceptable choice at that time was a separate unit with a 
drilling boom and a boom with a basket; refer to photograph in 
Figure 3.17 of an operator working from the basket. In this case 
the hole would be drilled in two passes in a stoping width of 3,1 
metres or three passes down to a stoping width of 2,5 metres. This 
then was the selected option. 
 
 It was important to realise that in a cyclic operation, where 
 multiple faces are available at any one time, it is the right 
 choice to have a machine for each part of the cycle; if the face drill 
 rig is used for roofbolting as well as drilling the face then that 
machine is carrying out two functions in the cycle. A dual purpose 
machine should only be planned for when equipment is captive, as 
in a single development end or for tunnelling work. 
 
LHD’s 
It has been seen in Phase 1 that 2,7m³ capacity LHD’s were 
purchased but  in terms of  the argument put forward for selecting  
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FIGURE 3.17 
 
Roofbolter with Boom and Basket 
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the largest practical size unit, 3,8m³ capacity LHD’s were selected 
for Phase 2 . 
  
 A further development in Phase 2 was the introduction of the   
 ejector bucket (EOD bucket) to the 3,8m³ units. It was believed by 
KAR that ejector buckets were necessary to facilitate the loading 
of trucks where there was a height restriction, this being due to 
the  need to  control  dilution, whether from  waste or (unpay) low  
 grade  reef. Further, to obviate any damage to a truck body and 
the truck wheels and tyres, an LHD with an EOD bucket would be 
able to stand off from the truck and push the load across the truck 
bowl; when conventional loading takes place the LHD can get too 
close to the truck making contact then unavoidable. These 
advantages were considered to outweigh the disadvantage of 
having to maintain additional cylinders and hoses required for the 
operation of EOD buckets. Refer to photograph of bucket and 
photograph of an LHD (with EOD bucket) loading into a truck; both 
seen in Annexure 3.6 in Volume 2. Also refer to a sketch in Figure 
3.18 showing advantages of the EOD bucket.  
 
Trucks 
 The importance of matching LHD’s and trucks was quickly 
 realised. Initially the 18 ton truck was planned to be filled by 
 four passes of the 2,7m³ LHD or three passes of the 3,8m³ 
 LHD. When the 32 ton truck was introduced later in Phase 2 
 (which necessitated a variation in scope) the 3,8m³ LHD  would fill 
 the truck in five passes. The final fleet of equipment would 
 include two 18 ton trucks and two 32 ton trucks. See Annexure 
 3.7 in Volume 2 for photographs of both trucks. 
 
 In introducing trucks to the project it was possible to plan to tram 
 by truck to a single main tip equipped with an impact breaker; the 
 reef being transferred down a long raisebored orepass to 101 
 Level where the high capacity rail haulage was under construction. 
 This main tip provided for two trucks to tip simultaneously, with 
 the impact breaker able to reach any section of the grizzley from a 
 central position. Although this tip would only be available in 
 January 1986, the design of the tip would ensure that there would 
never be any blockage on the grizzley at the tipping point which 
could  cause   a  bottleneck  to  the   entire  ore  clearance  system.  
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Figure 3.18 
 
Advantages of EOD Bucket 
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There had been significant input into the design of this tip 
 and grizzley steelwork and as such it would become a JCI standard 
for trackless mining. Details of the tip layout and tip grizzley, 
designed by KAR, can be seen in Figures 3.19 and 3.19A 
respectively. 
 
 Utility Vehicles 
 In this project utility vehicles (UV’s) had to be available for carrying 
out the ancillary work both efficiently and most importantly safely. 
It has been said earlier that a significant number of accidents had 
occurred in the conventionally mined wide reef stopes due to 
people  falling from platforms and ladders when carrying out work 
such as making safe by barring down, drilling and charging up 
holes, pipe construction and cable hanging. The photograph in 
Figure 3.20 clearly shows the advantages of working from a UV; in 
this case charging up the face. In addition to the important safety 
arguments, in any cyclic operation it is vital that the main 
production machines carry out the work they are bought for and 
are not allowed to be used for other work, for example, an LHD 
being used as a lifting machine; a production machine like an LHD 
is considerably more expensive to operate than any utility vehicle. 
In addition, production can be obviously affected when rigs, LHD’s 
and trucks are employed for other work; therefore the use of 
utility vehicles is necessary to carry out the ancillary work in a 
cyclic operation. 
   
One specific machine that would become available following 
 Phase 2 approval was a grader to carry out  maintenance work on 
 roadbeds. Constant attention had to be given to the condition of 
 roadbeds if the cost of operating LHD’s and trucks specifically was 
 not to spiral out of control. Potholes were being filled in with 
 broken rock but more importantly raise borer cuttings were being 
 imported to provide for a final surface; this would prove to be 
ideal when the grader was brought into use. 
 
Personnel Vehicles 
 Another important support vehicle necessary for the effective 
 supervision of  the  operation and  also  for  engineering and other 
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FIGURE 3.19 
 
Truck Tip Layout 
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FIGURE 3.19A 
 
Truck Tip Grizzley Design 
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FIGURE 3.20 
 
Charging up from a Utility Vehicle 
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 services was the personnel vehicle. The favoured choice by KAR at 
 that  time was the Land Cruiser provided for in the CBE’s. This 
 vehicle proved to  be  a  versatile  machine which could  transport 
people, explosives, spares for machines, roofbolts, in fact anything 
 that would be required to service the project. For example, in the 
 case of an artisan working out of an underground workshop, many    
hours of  machine downtime could  be prevented by such a vehicle 
being available for  fast  access into the workings and, where 
applicable, for the transport of spares direct to where the 
breakdown had occurred. See photograph of a Land Cruiser in the 
 underground workshop in Annexure 3.8 in Volume 2. 
 
Mechanised Vamping Operations with LHD 
During mid-1985 a small (1,5m³) LHD had been hired on a 
 trial basis for the mechanised vamping of the old disused footwall 
 crosscuts at Cooke 2 Shaft. The trial had proved successful in that 
the productivity target of 50 tons per shift, calculated by REGM’s 
 Industrial Engineering Department, was achieved. In a cost 
 exercise it was therefore claimed that mechanised vamping by 
 LHD was viable and a motivation was made by KAR for the 
 purchase of the machine. In Annexure 3.9 in Volume 2 is a 
 justification report by KAR and the application for the purchase of 
 the LHD. 
 
3.7.2 Equipment Performance  
The equipment requirements for the project were based on 
specific planning parameters (which assumed a double shift 
operation). These parameters could be considered to have been 
crude at that time as little or no experience in such conditions was 
available on a South African gold mine. Some degree of 
conservatism was therefore important; if one has to consider the 
assumptions, of that time, juxtaposed with later more reliable 
data used in this exposition, this will be seen to have been the 
case. 
 
Drill Rigs 
At the time it was assumed that an electro-hydraulic drill rig would 
be able to drill 50 metres from each boom in an hour (2 x 50 
metres for a two boom rig). In a P1/P2 room for 80 holes at 3,2 
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metres long this would represent 256 metres. The drilling time 
would therefore be 256 ÷ (2 x 50) or 2,56 hours. 
 
However, the tramming and set up times in one P1/P2 room could 
be assumed to be (say) 0,5 hours as the rig would have to move to 
P1 or P2 in a stepped room and pillar layout and also a similar 
time to tram to the next room. Thus a theoretical estimate would 
be 3,56 hours or (say) 4 hours for a P1/P2 round, equivalent to 1,5 
(rooms) for a shift. 
Tons/rig/month are therefore calculated to be as follows: 
1,5 (rooms) x 47 (shifts/month) x tons/blast 
Where tons/blast is width (5+5) x 3,0 (advance) x 2,5 (height) x 
2,85 SG or 215 tons. 
Therefore tons/rig/month (1,5 x 47 x 215) are theoretically 
estimated at 15000 tons; this compared to a more conservative 
12000 tons/month/rig assumed at the time. 
 
Roofbolters 
In terms of the recommended support pattern of 2 metre x 2 
metre grid, for a 40000 tons monthly production, 1400 roofbolts 
would be necessary, but assuming an additional 10% for extra 
supports or even cables this would necessitate (say) 1550 
roofbolts/month. Following a blast in a single room, it would 
theoretically be necessary to install 7,5 roof bolts (average). If it is 
assumed that it would take one hour to install these supports and 
an additional hour to tram between P1 and P2 in the same room 
and to the next room, then the roofbolting performance could be 
three rooms bolted in a shift; equivalent to say 22 roofbolts in a 
shift or 22 x 47 (shifts/month) or 1034 roofbolts/month. Number 
of roofbolters required can therefore assumed to be 1550 ÷ 1034 
= 1,5 (say) 2. 
The project was planned for two roofbolters initially. 
 
LHD’s 
If one had to apply, with practical realistic assumptions, formulae 
used later in this exposition for LHD performance (and in the same 
manner for trucks) the production performance would be 
estimated as follows. 
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Production Performance (P) is 51 x L    ÷   T +        2D            where 
                      S x 16,67 
 
51 =  51 is assumed as the utilised minutes in an hour 
  (85% utilisation) 
L = LHD carrying capacity (4.2tons or 6tons) 
T = time to load, manoeuvre and tip (3 minutes) 
S = average speed of unit (6 kilometres/hour) 
D = one way worse tramming distance (150 metres) 
 
Therefore for a 2,7m³ unit 
P = 51 x 4, 2    ÷  3 +     2 x 150                       
             6 x 16,67 
 = 36 tons/hour 
 
For a 3,8m³ unit 
P = 51 x 6   ÷  3 +    2 x 150 
       6 x 16,67 
 = 51 tons/hour 
 
In terms of the above and assuming 280 working hours/month the 
tons per month performance is calculated at 10000 tons for the 
2,7m³ LHD and 14000 tons for the 3,8m³ LHD; these compare to 
8000 tons/month and 11000 tons/month respectively, assumed at 
the time for this project. These later calculations therefore 
confirm some conservatism in the original estimates. 
 
Trucks 
Utilising the same formulae as for LHD’s, the production 
performance for the 18 ton and 32 ton trucks could be calculated 
based on the following assumptions. 
 
 L = 16tons for the 18ton truck and 29 ton for the 32ton 
  truck  (assuming a fillability factor of 90%)  
T = 12 minutes 
S = Average speed (full and empty) of 12kms/hour 
D = One way tramming distance of 1000 metres 
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For the 18 ton truck 
P = 51 x 16   ÷  12 +    2 x 1000 
            10 x 16,67 
 = 34 tons/hour 
 
For the 32 ton truck 
P = 51 x 29   ÷  12 +     2 x 1000 
             10 x 16,67 
 = 61 tons/hour 
 
Therefore, the monthly performance for the 18 ton truck is 9500 
tons and for the 32 ton truck is 17000 tons; this compares to 8000 
tons and 12000 tons respectively in the original calculations, once 
again confirming conservatism in those assumptions at the time. 
 
3.7.3 Workshop Status 
 No 1 Workshop, planned to service the equipment delivered in 
 Phase 1, had been completed in early 1985 and the development 
 of No 2 Workshop was underway; together they would provide 
 full workshop facilities for the total fleet of equipment when 
 stoping operations commenced. Provision for replacement of 
 major sub-assemblies and even major overhauls would have to be 
 carried out in these workshops as the full fleet of machines was 
 now captive underground. 
 
 By mid-1985 the diesel fuel pipeline system was complete. Two 
 9m³ service fuel tanks were situated in immediate proximity to 
 the two workshops. Diesel was pumped direct from a surface 
 storage tank (23m³) down the shaft to 90 Level into an 
 intermediate batching storage tank (9m³) and then along the 
 haulage (3200 metres) to the service tanks. The batching tank was 
 necessary to ensure that  the pipe in the shaft was completely 
 drained; for this to be effective fuel was transported down the 
 shaft in batches. The required quantity was pre-determined and 
 the system was automatic. Refer to Figure 3.21 for schematic 
 arrangements of the system. 
 
3.7.4  Engineering Planning 
In early 1985 a start was made on the compilation of engineering 
costs  and  other related statistics;  for  example, the  life  of  major  
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FIGURE 3.21 
 
Schematic Arrangements for Fuel Transfer from Surface to Underground 
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sub-assemblies. It was important to capture this information for 
future cost control purposes. LHD buckets had each been given an 
individual reference number. All tyres had been branded from the 
outset with their own number and the history of each individual 
tyre was kept from new until it was scrapped, with the reasons 
given on each tyre record card. At that stage, all this information 
was being captured manually as computerised planning systems 
were still in the future. This was the time when a monthly report, 
which provided for availabilities and utilisation of equipment, 
costs/hour of machines and equipment history, first started to be 
recorded. Some of the parameters being used were as follows. 
  
Drill Rig 
For every drill rig including roofbolters, the cost of spares/drilled 
metre and the cost of hydraulic fluid and lubricants (excluding 
fuel)/drilled metre. 
Drifter 
Cost of drifter spares/drifter percussion hour. 
LHD 
For each LHD, cost of spares/engine hour and fuel/engine hour. 
Truck 
For each truck, cost of spares/engine hour and fuel/engine hour. 
Tyres 
For LHD’s and trucks, cost/hour, cost/ton and history and life of 
every tyre. 
 
3.7.5  Equipment Costs 
 At the end of 1985 the progressive costs of all equipment showed 
 an actual cost of R4,12/ton compared to the motivation report 
 estimate of R3,23/ton. There were however some reasons at that 
 stage of the project for the higher than forecasted costs and 
 cognizance had to be taken of the following issues. 
 
 Spares 
Since the Final Motivational Report had been submitted spares 
costs for the equipment had increased markedly, primarily due to 
the deterioration in the exchange rate of the Rand. 
 
 
91 
 
Production Rate 
 The project had still not reached steady state production of 40000 
 tons per month and current production was only 22000 tons per 
 month mainly for reasons of ore clearance constraints; 
 construction of the main tip not yet being complete. 
 
 Trucks 
Trucks were only just being introduced to the project and when 
they became fully operational, costs would fall as LHD tramming 
distances would then be reduced. 
 
 Tyres 
 Tyre costs were considered excessive due mainly to the abnormal 
 ramp development. These costs would be reduced  in  1986 due to 
  to improved roadbeds when  the  grader came available; more use  
 of trucks; the establishment of steady state tonnage following the 
 commencement of stoping operations. 
 
 Drill String 
 Nevertheless, it was re-assuring at that time to be able to record 
 that drill string costs were below the forecast estimated costs.              
One reason for this, which again underlined the need for a 
 ‘hands-on’ style of management, was the introduction of bit 
 sharpening  to the project. In experimental trials at the end of 
 1984 it had  been shown that the cost per metre drilled for button 
 bits in use could be reduced by half:  R0,65/metre drilled when 
 bits were sharpened as against R1,38/metre drilled when drilling 
 to destruction. 
 
 There was at this early stage of the project a need to take 
 advantage of any specialist knowledge available from OEM 
 sources. As one example of this KAR remembers discussions that 
were held with Paavo Horkko of Tamrock Drills in August 1985. 
Notes were made at  the time regarding his advice related to the 
practical aspects of drilling with rigs. He explained  how to remove 
a bit by positioning the bit square to the face and then removing 
by percussion. It was said that positioning the bit obliquely would 
result in bit damage; and also that 80% of all bit damage was 
caused by oblique collaring of the hole. Also ‘free percussing’ at 
the face would inevitably result in significant damage to the 
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drifter, a significant contributor to overall rig costs and collaring 
would best be done on half percussion feed. Another issue was 
the importance of positioning the rig as close as practicable to the 
face when preparing to drill; in other words, do not drill when the 
machine is on the extreme limits of its boom extension. This type 
of discussion would prove invaluable in the control of drill rig  
costs in the future. 
 
 Taking cognizance of these positive aspects it could be expected 
 that  at steady state production equipment costs would be less; 
however the cost of equipment spares would increase if the value 
 of the Rand continued to fall as all the equipment (and spares) 
 were  imported. 
 
 3.7.6  Overall Costs 
At the end of 1985 a comparison of conventional and expected 
trackless working  costs continued  to show a R4/ton difference in 
favour of trackless mining (R12,60 versus R8,57) and the operation 
was considered viable; in today’s money terms this difference 
would be of the order of nearly R50/ton. As referred to in the 
Final Motivation Report, the  Cooke  2  Shaft complex was working 
at full hoisting capacity  and  the  significant  reduction  in footwall 
waste development rock for the  trackless  operation had  allowed  
for an increase in reef hoisting capacity thereby providing for 
additional revenue and therefore profit. 
 
3.7.7 Safety and Standards 
 The serious accidents that occurred following the introduction of 
 conventional wide reef mining which had begun in the 1983/84 
 period have been referred to in the motivational reports. From 
 April 1984 when the trackless operation commenced until 
 November 1985 there were thirty three lost time accidents 
 recorded in the conventional wide reef stopes and four accidents 
 in the trackless operation, albeit for a markedly less tonnage from 
 the trackless section. The trackless operations were therefore 
 proving to be safer with a clear improvement in the accident 
 rate. 
 
 Nevertheless, the use of large mobile mechanised machines 
 coupled with poor driver discipline, when operators do not follow 
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 standards and procedures, would always represent a risk of 
serious accidents and possible fatalities. Therefore it was 
important and necessary to begin to build up standard working 
instructions for trackless mining at the very early stage. In due 
course JCI manuals would be put together but this was later and 
therefore in  late  1984 KAR issued the first of a series of 
managerial instructions for trackless mining at Cooke 2 Shaft, 
some of which are included in Annexure 3.10 in Volume 2 as 
examples. Many of these instructions were directed at safe driving 
techniques. 
 
3.8  POSTSCRIPT TO CHAPTER 3 
In September 1985, in an interview with the Technical Director of JCI, I 
was told that I was to be transferred from REGM to JCI’s new mine in the 
Orange Free State (OFS), the H.J.Joel Gold Mine. Although I believed I 
had not completed all of what I had set out to do in the two years I had 
been at Cooke 2 Shaft, the opportunity to go to a new mine where shaft 
sinking had not yet started would become the greatest challenge of my 
career. However, in the two years at Cooke 2 Shaft, REGM, I had 
achieved a great deal. The 90L E8 Reef Project was well on its way to 
reaching steady state production; this was expected to be achieved in a 
few months time, January 1986. This project had proved that trackless 
mechanised mining methods (TM3) were indeed both technically and 
economically viable and importantly were proving to be safer. In fact, 
the Cooke 2 Shaft E8 TM3 Project was to become the standard for future 
TM3 projects in JCI. 
 
In addition to the 90 Level E8 Wide Reef Project, the 95 Level Narrow 
Reef UEIA Project had commenced at Cooke 2 Shaft in 1985 under the 
direction and control of KAR, a project  which was to form the basis for 
planning a new trackless gold mine later that year; the H.J.Joel Gold 
Mine in the OFS. 
 
However, some concluding remarks are relevant before closure of this 
chapter. It has to be emphasised that the planning for the TM3 
operations at Cooke 2 Shaft, REGM , described in this chapter and in the 
next chapter (Chapter 4) , had been initiated and managed by KAR only. 
It can also be said that, in addition to the planning for and management 
of these operations, they were part of the total production at Cooke 2 
Shaft which KAR was responsible for and it can be recorded that the 
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shaft was operating at a production rate of more than 
200000tons/month reef and waste with all production targets in excess 
of plan at the time KAR was there. 
 
In 1986 KAR submitted and presented his paper “Wide Reef Mechanised 
Room and Pillar Operations at Cooke 2 Shaft, Randfontein Estates Gold 
Mining Company, Witwatersrand Limited” to the Association of Mine 
Managers of South Africa (AMMSA). It can also be recorded that this paper was 
adjudged by AMMSA as the best technical paper for 1986 and the gold medal 
for that year was awarded to KAR. A full copy of the paper can be seen in 
Annexure 3.11 in Volume 2. 
 
I would like to make a final comment to end this chapter: following my award 
of the gold medal in 1986, when I was the mine manager at H.J.Joel Gold Mine, 
I received a letter from Mr.W.J. van der Meulen, still the General Manager of 
REGM, congratulating me on the achievement. At the time (and even now, I 
still have the letter, shown overleaf) it seemed to me, and I am sure to Mr van 
der Meulen himself, to be a satisfactory conclusion to those first discussions 
we had had in late 1983 when I arrived at Cooke 2 Shaft, REGM. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Narrow Reef Mechanisation at Cooke 2 Shaft, Randfontein Estates 
Gold Mining Company, Witwatersrand, Limited 
 
Following the successful motivation of the mechanised wide reef room and 
pillar project on the E8 Reef horizon at Cooke 2 Shaft, Randfontein Estates 
Gold Mine (REGM) and its commencement in mid-1984, I submitted proposals 
for the introduction of trackless equipment to the UE1A narrow reef. Approval 
for this narrow reef project was given in early 1985 and the initial development 
commenced immediately. 
 
4.1 Arguments for Narrow Reef Mechanised Operations  
The introduction of mechanised equipment to the E8 Reef at Cooke 2 
Shaft, REGM previously described in Chapter 3, utilised a proven method 
of mining: the stepped room and pillar method. However, it was its 
introduction to a South African gold mine employing conventional 
mining methods from a vertical shaft system that was to prove to be 
significantly different and new to the industry. Now the proposed use of 
trackless equipment in narrow reef conditions would represent a major 
advance in the mechanisation of conventional gold mines. 
 
The background in the South African gold mining industry to narrow reef 
mechanised mining, up to that point, can be stated simply. In 1983 small 
size LHD’s had been introduced in narrow reef stopes at Anglo American 
Corporation’s (AAC) Western Deep Levels Mine. These LHD’s had been 
used to replace the winch in strike gulleys (ASG’s). However the 
experiments were very limited and were restricted to a small area of the 
mine. Also, in 1984 AAC had indicated that trackless mining techniques 
were being considered, specifically at Vaal Reefs Mine, but there were 
no significant operations taking place there. 
 
This proposal by KAR for a mechanised trackless operation on a narrow 
reef would therefore prove to be the first large scale operation of its 
kind on a South African gold mine. 
 
When giving consideration to the proposals for trackless mechanised 
mining methods (TM3) in narrow reef conditions at Cooke 2 Shaft, KAR 
argued that the geology of the reef in the target area and the position of 
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the established footwall haulages in relation to the reef horizon in that 
area had to favour the introduction of TM3. If Figure 4.1 (transverse 
section of 95N12 line) is referred to it will be seen that the UE1A Reef in 
the area is very flat (0° - 5° dip) and it was also lying at only 5 metres 
above 95 Level elevation in a basin (or syncline in section). It was 
therefore considered as impractical to mine from 95 Level 
conventionally as the area was three kilometres from the main shaft 
system (see Figure 4.2) and there would be no capacity in any system of 
orepasses on 95 Level. The original planned conventional development 
programme provided for all footwall development to take place on 101 
Level with orepasses in excess of 60 metres and some footwall 
development on 95 Level for top access to the stoping horizon; the 
alternative to this layout was the establishment of an interlevel which 
would reduce orepass development but would introduce an extra level 
which would be costly. In both these conventional layouts waste 
development would prove to be excessive. The development layouts for 
both these layouts are seen in Figure 4.3 (101 Level and 95 Level) and 
Figure 4.4 (101 Level with interlevel and 95 Level). 
 
The total metres required to be developed for the two alternatives were 
17979 metres for alternative one with no interlevel and 13866 metres 
for alternative two with an interlevel. Full details of these calculations 
will be seen in the motivation report. At the time the costs of these 
conventional options were estimated at R7,0 million and R5,6 million 
respectively. In today’s money terms this would be equivalent to R80 
million and R60 million respectively. 
 
In addition to the above argument, the up-graded haulage being 
established on 101 Level would be used for ore clearance from the UE1A 
project, utilising a single tipping point on the UE1A horizon and down a 
raise-bored orepass to the 101 Level haulage. 
 
In terms of these arguments a trackless operation on the reef horizon 
which obviated the necessity for any excessive footwall development 
had to be considered as a viable alternative. 
 
In summary, the proposed system envisaged a short ramp from 95 Level 
onto the UE1A reef horizon which would provide for the trackless access 
to the project and an extension of the 101 Level streamlined haulage to 
a  point where  a  raise-bored orepass  could  be  developed to  the UE1A   
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FIGURE 4.1 
  
Transverse Section of 95N12 Line: refer to Annexure 4.2 Volume 2 
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FIGURE 4.2 
 
Proposed UE1A Trackless Mining Area: refer to Annexure 4.2 Volume 2 
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FIGURE 4.3 
Conventional Development without Interlevel: refer to Annexure 4.2 Volume 2  
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FIGURE 4.4 
Conventional Development with Interlevel: refer to Annexure 4.2 Volume 2 
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reef horizon where a single main tip would then be established. This 
development, except for the workshop complex excavations on 95 Level, 
would represent the only waste development for the project. Thus the 
saving in footwall development was seen as a major argument for a 
trackless operation. 
 
These arguments were the crux of the proposal made to the General 
Manager of REGM Mr W.J. van der Meulen and to the Consulting 
Engineer in late 1984. As referred to in previous chapters, Mr van der 
Meulen had gained confidence in KAR’s proposals and motivations for 
the 90E8 wide reef project and in the manner in which that project was 
being managed, and for these reasons the motivation for the 95UE1A 
narrow reef project had his early approval. The motivational technical 
report was submitted on 01 February 1985 to the Consulting Engineer 
with a request for approval of the project. 
 
4.2 Motivational Technical Report for 95L UE1A Reef at Cooke 2 Shaft  
The Motivational Report for the 95 Level UE1A Reef Project by 
K.A.Rhodes can be seen in Annexure 4.1 in Volume 2; technical details 
of the report are now discussed. 
 
4.2.1 Geology and Reserves 
The UE1A Reef in the area dips at between 0° - 5° and is in the 
form of a low profile basin (previously seen in Figure 4.1). The E8 
Reef in the same area had low grades and was not as wide as in 
the 90LE8 project and was not therefore considered to be 
economic. The proven reserves of the UE1A Reef in the target 
area at that time (September 1984) were more than 750 000 tons 
over a channel width of 106 cms at a grade of 15,6 g/ton Au and 
0,19 kg/ton U308. In addition to these reserves there were further 
estimated reserves of 3,1 million tons at 5,3 g/ton Au and 0,18 
kg/ton U308 over a channel of 105 cms. Therefore total estimated 
reserves for this project were of the order of 3,85 million tons at a 
grade of 7,3 g/ton Au and 0,18 kg/ton U308. 
 
4.2.2 Proposed Mining Method and Mine Design 
Due to the proximity of the UE1A Reef to 95 Level an access ramp 
was to be developed onto the UE1A Reef and once this had been 
done all operations would then be carried out on the reef  
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horizon. Final ore clearance was planned to take place on 101 
Level from a single orepass as stated. 
 
4.2.3 Production Rate 
The maximum planned production rate from the operation was 
50000 tons/month operating on a double shift basis. The 
mineable estimated reserve of 3,54 million tons (estimated 
reserve less 8% for crush pillars in stope and regional stability 
pillars) would provide for a life of project of about six years. 
 
4.2.4 General Mining Layout 
Once established on reef, development would consist of access 
ramps or roadways (ARD’s) across the basin and from these 
roadways access strike drives (ASD’s) would be broken off at 40 
metre intervals; these ASD’s would be developed down dip of 
strike (-5°) which would ensure control of water from the drilling 
operations but necessitate pumping at the face when drilling was 
taking place. 
 
The dimensions of the roadways were planned at 4,5 metres wide 
and 3,0 metres high to provide for truck tramming and the ASD’s 
at 3,5 metres wide and 3,0 metres high. The general layout of the 
area is seen in Figure 4.5 and the detailed layout of panels is 
shown in Figure 4.6. 
 
4.2.5 Cycle of Operations 
Development 
All development operations on reef (access roadways and ASD’s) 
were to be carried out by drilling with electro-hydraulic drill rigs 
and cleaned by 3,8m³ LHD’s into 24 ton trucks with loading taking 
place in the access roadways. 
 
Stope Drilling and Blasting 
As stated in the motivational report it was always envisaged that 
drilling operations on the stope face would be carried out by 
hydraulic drill rig although for the purposes of the report, 
conventional face drilling had been assumed. Nevertheless, in 
early  1985   trials   had   begun  with  a   bar  type  drill  rig  with  a  
power pack provided by  Delfos &  Atlas Copco (Pty) Limited and in 
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FIGURE 4.5 
 
General Mining Layout with Access Roadways: refer to Annexure 4.2 Volume 2 
106 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4.6 
 
Detailed Layout of Stope Panels: refer to Annexure 4.2 Volume 2 
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April 1985 Atlas Copco had submitted initial proposals for a stope 
rig and were requesting REGM to share the capital cost of the 
project; see copy of letter overleaf sent by Atlas Copco for the 
attention of KAR. This then was the beginning of the development 
of the Stomec Drill Rig by Atlas Copco; however the prototype rig 
would only commence its trials after I had left REGM for H.J.Joel 
Gold Mine. The first studies on the progress with the prototype rig 
at Cooke 2 Shaft were reported on in March 1987 by the Technical 
Services Division of JCI. All indications at that time were that a 
production machine could be manufactured as the results from 
the trials were very positive. Refer to Figure 4.7 for a photograph 
of the prototype Stomec drill rig seen operating underground at 
Cooke 2 Shaft at a later date. 
 
Stope Cleaning 
It was planned for the stope face to be cleaned by a face winch in 
the conventional manner into the ASD where LHD’s would load 
and tram back to the access roadways and transfer into a dump 
truck; the truck would then travel to the main tip for transfer to 
the 101 Level (streamlined) haulage. 
 
Stope Support 
The method of support for stoping was to be the established 
conventional crush pillar and stick system; full details of the 
support system for stoping and for the development of roadways 
and drives had been given final approval by the Group Rock 
Mechanics Engineer. 
 
4.2.6 Ventilation 
The total volume of air required to ventilate the area had been 
calculated at 160m³/sec; such a quantity would support an output 
in excess of 50000 tons/month reef produced on a double shift 
basis with a possible re-entry period of two hours. 
 
4.2.7 Equipment, Workshops and Engineering Considerations 
The primary equipment at steady state production had been 
defined: 4 x 3,8m³ LHD’s; 4 x electro-hydraulic drill rigs; 6 x 24 ton 
trucks; 2 x UV’s; 6 x transport vehicles. 
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FIGURE 4.7 
The STOMEC Drill Rig in Operation Underground at Cooke 2 Shaft REGM 
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Notwithstanding the production parameters to be 50000 tons reef 
per month, in the original calculations for equipment KAR had 
assumed 60000 tons per month production; thus some 
conservatism was built into the estimate from the beginning. 
 
LHD’s 
The original estimates by KAR for the number of LHD’s required 
was four 3,8m³ units; this being based on the following simplistic 
calculations. 
 
It had been assumed that there would be 47 shifts worked/month; 
this being the standard eleven shift fortnight worked at the time. 
A shift was assumed to be 7,3 hours working time. Further, 
assuming a machine availability of 85% and a utilisation of 80% 
then the production rate required would be 
60000 ÷ (7,3 x 0,85 x 0,80) = 257 tons/hour 
   47 
It had been further estimated, by KAR, that the loading rate of the 
6 ton LHD would be 100 tons/hour, therefore the number of LHD’s 
required would be 257 ÷ 100 = 2,57 or say 3 
One extra LHD would be required for waste packing. 
Therefore the estimated number of 3,8m³ LHD’s required would 
be 4. 
 
In hindsight, the estimation of 100 tons/hour was optimistic. If the 
formulae later discussed in chapter 5 is used the loading rate of 
the 6 ton LHD, in circumstances of the 95 Level Project, would only 
be 68 tons/hour. However, with the machine hours being 
estimated in later projects at 280 hours in a month, the re-
estimated fleet of LHD’s would be 3,2 plus one for waste packing 
proving that the original estimate was marginally close to being 
correct. 
 
Trucks 
In terms of truck requirements, it was estimated that the 
tramming capacity of the 24 ton truck would be 50 tons/hour; this 
assuming a cycle time of 29 minutes, made of the following 
assumptions; 
LHD loading time    =    14minutes 
Tipping      =    1,5minutes 
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Turning round at tip   =    1,5minutes 
Tramming time (assuming 1000m  
one way run at 12kph)   =    10minutes 
Truck passing time (where one 
truck stands in lay-by)   =    2minutes 
Total cycle time for truck   =    29minutes 
Therefore tons/hour   =    24 x 60 
            29 
      =    50 tons/hour 
Number of 24 ton trucks required =    257 tons/shift ÷ 50 
      =    5,2 or say 6 
Therefore the estimated number of 24 ton trucks required would 
be 6.  
 
Drill Rigs 
In ASD’s, assumptions were stoping width at 1,10 metres, panel 
length 40 metres with an SG of 2,75 which equals 121 
tons/panel/metre advance. 
At 20 metres face advance/month 
Tons/month     =  2420 
Therefore required number of working 
panels for the planned tonnage  = 60000  
        2420 
      = 25 panels 
Therefore metres advance/month for ASD’s 
25 panels x 20 metres/month  = 500 metres 
Assume 3,0 metres advance/round and 3 rounds/day/rig 
Number of rigs required for ASD’s = 500 
       23,5 x (3x3) 
      = 2,4 (say) 3 
 
Theoretically for access roadways (ARD’s), if all development is 
pay and with ARD’s at 150 metres spacing, ore reserve tons per 
metre ARD advance    = 150x1,10x2,75 
       = 453 
       
      or = 60000 tons 
         453 
       = 132 m/month 
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It can be further assumed that only two rounds of 3 metres 
advance/round (6,0 metres/day) will be achieved in development 
due to longer tramming distances between development ends. 
Therefore number of rigs for ARD’s  = 132 
        23,5 x 6 
       = 0,9 (say) 1 
 
Therefore calculated number of rigs is 3 for ASD’s and 1 for ARD’s 
or 4 in total 
 
In summary then, the primary equipment was planned for 4 x 
LHD’s (3,8m³), 6 x 24 ton trucks and 4 x twin boom electric-
hydraulic drill rigs. 
     
It was intended to use the 95N12C crosscut (already developed) 
with additional excavations to provide full workshop facilities. The 
fuel supply to the project would be the same as the 90LE8 Project: 
initial transport by rail tankers followed up by a fuel pipeline 
system. 
 
All the machines would be stripped on surface and transported 
through the shaft and along the 95 Level rail haulage, with re-
assembly taking place in the workshop crosscut; this being the 
same procedure as for the 90LE8 mechanised project. 
 
4.2.8 Labour and Efficiencies 
Labour complements had been set for the trackless operation and 
a comparison made with what would be required for conventional 
mining. This was as follows at the production rate of 50000 
tons/month. 
          Trackless    Conventional 
NCWS complement   385  646  
Tons/NCWS/shift    5,4  3,2 
CWS complement    22  25 
Tons/CWS/shift    94  83 
 
4.2.9 Costs 
Comparative cost estimates had been made in the report for both 
the trackless and conventional options which clearly indicated 
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that working costs for mechanised mining would be less than 
conventional; R11,50/ton against R15,06/ton respectively.  
 
4.2.10 Dilution 
In this early stage of motivation of the narrow reef project it was 
obvious to KAR that the employment of large machines on a reef 
horizon with a channel width of 1,05 metres would be critically 
addressed by opponents of change. In fact the calculation in the 
motivational report showed that waste dilution could be less for 
the trackless option than for conventional mining provided that 
separation of the waste content, of the ASD’s specifically, was 
effectively carried out. It was envisaged that the footwall waste in 
an ASD would be blasted first and trammed as waste by LHD to 
abandoned areas and dumped. The reef would then be stripped 
down from the hanging wall of the ASD in a separate blast. Even 
so, it was clear in the mind of KAR that this subject would 
continue to be a major issue in any narrow reef project and would 
have to be addressed again and again. 
 
4.2.11 Additional Reef Hoisting 
In this motivational report KAR showed that because the waste 
development would be minimised it would therefore be possible 
to generate additional revenue from an increase in reef hoisting; 
at that time shaft hoisting capacity at Cooke 2 Shaft had been 
reached and replacement of waste hoisting capacity by additional 
reef could only increase profits. The calculated waste tons from 
conventional development had been estimated at about 265000 
tons and trackless waste mining for workshops, streamlined 
haulage extensions, ramping and the raise-bored orepass from 
101 Level was estimated at 45000 tons. The difference of 220000 
tons over (say) a period of five years could realise an additional 
profit of R3,3 million/year based on assumed revenue and costs at 
that time. 
 
4.2.12Safety 
It was expected that accidents would reduce with the introduction 
of mechanised cleaning and tramming, when compared with the 
use of numerous small capacity trains on locomotive haulages. In 
addition, any reduction in the number of workers in the area 
would support the argument that accidents would be less due to 
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fewer workers being exposed to falls of ground. Accidents due to 
locomotive haulage tramming and falls of ground were the major 
sources of serious accidents at REGM; therefore any reduction in 
these categories would result in a safer mine. 
 
In terms of this motivational report it was argued that there was 
justification for a narrow reef trackless project on 95 Level at Cooke 2, 
Shaft primarily for reasons that footwall waste would be markedly  
reduced causing working costs to be less and enabling additional reef (to 
replace waste) to be hoisted and thereby increasing profits. Further, and 
not least, the mechanised operations would improve safety. 
 
However the primary concern of waste dilution would remain, but KAR 
was confident that the practical measures outlined for its control would 
prove effective. 
 
4.3 The Start of Narrow Reef Mechanisation at Cooke 2 Shaft, REGM 
The formal approval of the 95 Level UEIA Narrow Reef Trackless Mining 
Project was given by letter on 12 April 1985: Vote 576. At that time it 
was not known by KAR that he had little more than four months left at 
Cooke 2, REGM before his transfer to the new gold mine JCI planned to 
develop in the Orange Free State. 
 
In mid-1985 progress with the project moved quickly with both 
workshop development and development of an access ramp onto the 
reef horizon from 95 Level being carried out. Nevertheless, there were 
important issues to focus upon, specifically dilution control and also a 
follow-up on workshop strategy based on the experience gained from 
the ongoing wide reef project at Cooke 2 Shaft under the control of KAR. 
 
4.3.1 Dilution Control 
This matter has already been highlighted but more discussion is 
believed important and necessary. It can be further stated that 
when big end development is carried out by mechanised 
equipment, questions are going to be asked about waste dilution 
and how will it be controlled in practice. KAR had given 
considerable attention to this matter and it is necessary to explain 
clearly how waste would be separated from reef in the 
development phase. In main access roadways (ARD’s) and access 
stope drives (ASD’s) it was planned to blast waste in a separate 
116 
 
cycle and tram the waste initially to a waste tip, and later, 
following the normal geographic expansion of the workings, to a 
worked-out ASD to be packed. It was realised early that an LHD 
provided for selective loading and dumping which was not 
possible with a scraper winch working in a strike gulley in 
conventional mining. In addition, when waste is trammed 
separately by an LHD, control can be exercised over this cycle in 
that waste packed in a worked-out area of the mine can be seen 
and measured during the cycle.  Nevertheless, in order to 
maximise the packing of waste in old workings it would be 
necessary to use a bulldozer to work alongside the LHD and ram 
the waste up to the hanging wall level; the LHD alone even with 
an ejector bucket would only be able to pack the waste to within 
1,5 metres of the hanging wall. 
 
Following clearance of the bottom cut (waste) the top section 
(reef) would be blasted down and trammed as reef. Although it 
could be theoretically possible to clean out all the waste in the 
bottom cut, in practical mining terms this would not happen, and 
for planning purposes it was assumed that only 60% of the waste 
cut would be trammed as waste and the remaining 40% waste 
would be cleaned out with the top reef blast; this would represent 
the dilution. Waste dilution calculations based on the above and 
the geometry of the layout showed that the dilution could be  
7,0% in total for on reef development work. Originally it was 
thought that all the waste in the ARD’s could be allowed to be 
trammed with the reef; however, later calculations showed that 
the overall dilution would then be 9,7%. It was then decided by 
KAR that ARD’s would be treated the same as for ASD’s (40% only 
of waste to be trammed with the reef) in order to reduce the 
overall dilution to 7,0%. 
 
Referring to Figure 4.8 it can be seen how the waste is blasted 
separately to the reef and Figure 4.9 shows how the LHD is able to 
physically clean in an ASD where the stoping width is typically 1,20 
metres. Dilution calculations are as follows. 
 
ARD Development 
Distance between access roadways = 150 metres 
ARD width     = 4,5 metres 
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FIGURE 4.8 
 
Dilution Control in Access Stope Drives: refer to Annexure 4.2 Volume 2 
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FIGURE 4.9 
 
Profile of LHD Unit Cleaning in Access Stope Drive: refer to Annexure 4.1 Volume 2 
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ARD height     = 3,0 metres 
Stoping width (assumed)   = 1,2 metres 
Therefore: 
Ore reserve tons generated for 1 metre ARD advance  
      = (150 x 1,2 x 2,75SG) 
      = 495 tons 
Development waste portion of ARD per metre advance 
      = (4,5 x 1,8 x 2,75SG) 
      = 22,3 tons 
Waste trammed as reef    =  40% 
Therefore: 
Dilution is calculated to be  = 22,3 x 40% 
             495 
      = 1,80% 
 
ASD Development 
Panel length (centre to centre between ASD’s) 
      = 40 metres 
ASD width     = 3,5 metres 
ASD height (excluding roadbed) = 3,0 metres 
Stoping width    = 1,2 metres 
Therefore: 
Face tons blasted per metre advance by ASD 
      = (40 x 1,2 x 2,75SG) 
      = 132 tons 
Waste portion of ASD advance  = (3.5 x 1,8 x 2,75SG) 
      = 17,3 tons 
Waste trammed as reef   = 40% 
Therefore: 
Dilution is     = 17,3 x 40% 
           132 
      = 5,2% 
Total dilution is therefore   = 1,8% + 5,2% 
      = 7,0% 
 
However, there would be additional waste generated from the 
necessity to develop turning circles for machines and also for 
tipping points. This waste, if allowed to be trammed as reef, 
would account for an additional 1% dilution. Refer to Figure 4.10 
and accompanying dilution calculations in Figure 4.11.  
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FIGURE 4.10 
 
Turning Points in Access Reef Declines: refer to Annexure 4.2 Volume 2 
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CALCULATION OF DILUTION AT TURNING/TIPPING POINTS IN ACCESS REEF 
DECLINES: ACCOMPANYING NOTES TO FIGURE 4.10 
 
 
 
Sidewall Blasting 
 
Area of additional waste blasted  =  2 x 9,1   = 18,2m² 
Tons of waste blasted    =  18,2 x 1,80 x 2,75  = 90 tons 
Where: Average waste height  =  180cms    
 
 
 
Hangingwall Stripping 
 
Area of hangingwall to be blasted (see diagram)    = 20m³ 
Tons of waste blasted    =  20 x 1,5 x 2,75  = 83 tons 
Where: thickness of hangingwall stripped =  1,5m  
 
 
 
Total waste tons blasted   =  90 + 83   = 173 tons 
 
 
Total reef produced in a panel  =  40 x 150 x 1,20 x 2,75 = 19800 tons 
Where: Face length    =  40m 
   Advance    =  150m 
   Average stoping width  =  110cm 
 
 
Theoretically for one turning point every 150 metres between access roadways 
 
   Dilution  =  173   x  100 
         19800      1 
      =  0,87%   
      =  (say)  1,0%   
 
 
N.B: This dilution will only occur if the waste is trammed as reef  
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4.11 
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In terms of these waste dilution calculations it was also possible to 
confirm that there would be sufficient volume (of space) available 
in the worked-out areas to accommodate all the waste, blasted 
and trammed, from the on reef development. 
 
Previous calculations had shown that waste dilution for any 
conventional mining in the same area on 95Level, where the reef 
was flat and with minor faulting thereby necessitating deeper 
gullies (3 metre depth from the top reef contact) in order to 
negotiate these conditions, would be 6,9%, very much the same as 
the 7,0% calculated above for trackless mining. It was therefore 
argued that waste dilution from mechanised mining need not be 
greater than for conventional mining and the operation of large 
machines when mining narrow reefs did not necessarily imply 
higher waste dilution. However the importance of management 
control over these operations cannot be over-stressed if dilution 
was to be controlled. 
 
4.3.2 Size of Equipment and Dilution Control 
In the 90LE8 Wide Reef Project it was stated that the largest size 
units had been selected for the reason that the larger units would 
cause a reduction in working costs and it was also believed that 
this argument remained the same for narrow reef mining. 
Notwithstanding the above, in narrow reef conditions attention 
had to be paid to their possible effect on dilution and on the on 
reef roadway dimensions. 
 
In conclusion, the largest practical size units were selected for the 
narrow reef project taking cognizance of the need to work within 
the limits of waste dilution. In other words, the selected 
equipment would operate in the roadway dimensions stated in 
the previous dilution control calculations. A further important 
factor in equipment selection was the use of the ejector bucket on 
LHD’s. This issue has been discussed previously in the 90LE8 
Project but in narrow reef mining it was even more important. 
When loading a truck with an ejector bucket the required height at 
the tipping point is less than that required with a conventional 
bucket; refer to  the  sketch in Figure 4.12 showing reduced height 
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FIGURE 4.12 
 
Advantages of EOD Bucket: refer to Annexure 4.2 Volume 2 
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and therefore less waste. In addition the sketch indicates the 
advantage of being able to select a larger sized truck because the 
ejector bucket pushes the load horizontally across the truck bowl. 
 
4.3.3 Workshop Strategy 
The experience gained with the introduction of equipment to the 
90LE8 Project had shown that it would be better to establish a 
fully equipped assembly bay before allowing any trackless 
equipment to be stripped on surface and allowed to go 
underground. Refer to Figure 4.13 for details of the 95 Level 
assembly bay which was planned to be used later in the project as 
the wash bay. With regard to workshop layout, certain footwall 
development work had been completed for anticipated 
conventional scattered mining before the planning of this project 
had begun and use was made of these excavations when setting 
out the workshop facilities. For this reason the workshop complex 
was not going to be ideal but would be a practical compromise in 
the circumstances. Refer to Figure 4.14 for the overall layout of 
the workshop area and Figure 4.15 showing a photograph of the 
development by conventional methods of the 95 Level assembly 
bay in early 1985. 
 
4.3.4 Justification for the Narrow Reef Project 
The concept of a trackless operation for the narrow UEIA Reef on 
95 Level at Cooke 2 Shaft, REGM had been accepted, and a capital 
vote approved. The justification for the project was that there 
would be a reduction in working costs compared to the normal 
practice of conventional scattered mining. The lower costs would 
be  realised for  reason that  stoping  costs would  be less; footwall  
development costs would be markedly reduced; ancillary 
operations on footwall service levels were virtually eliminated 
except for the streamlined gathering haulage. 
 
In addition, because waste development linked to the project 
would be minimal there would be an opportunity for additional 
reef hoisting to provide further revenue. 
 
Finally, the trackless system would prove to be safer than 
conventional mining. 
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FIGURE 4.13 
 
Assembly Bay Layout: refer to Annexure 4.2 Volume 2 
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Figure 4.14 
 
General Layout of 95 Level Workshop: refer to Annexure 4.2 Volume 2 
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FIGURE 4.15 
 
Conventional Development of the 95 Level Trackless Workshop Assembly Bay: 
refer to Annexure 4.2 Volume 2 
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In due course (1986) KAR prepared and presented the paper 
“Planning for a Trackless Access Stoping Operation in Narrow 
Reef Conditions” to a JCI Technical Meeting and later submitted  it 
to  the  Association of  Mine Managers of South Africa (AMMSA) 
for publication; however the paper was withdrawn by JCI from 
publication in the transactions of AMMSA for confidentiality 
reasons. Refer to Annexure 4.2 in Volume 2 for a copy of the 
paper. 
 
4.3.5 Conclusions 
In late August 1985, shortly before KAR left REGM for the H.J.Joel 
Gold Mine, the progress on the project was such that the 
assembly bay was 98% complete; the ramp ex the workshops 
crosscut (seen in figure 4.14) had 76 metres to go to reef and 
would be complete by the beginning of October; development of 
the workshop bays were well underway; the majority of the 
equipment was ordered and would be sent underground when 
the assembly bay and the first workshop bays were completed. 
 
This operation at Cooke 2 Shaft, REGM was to be the first major 
narrow reef trackless mining project in a South African gold mine 
and was expected to reach the planned production rate of 50000 
tons/month in March/April 1987. 
 
KAR was however not to be in charge of this project much longer 
as he was to be transferred from REGM to the H.J.Joel Gold Mine, 
a mine having been planned conventionally but where shaft 
sinking had not yet begun. Nevertheless, following KAR’s new 
appointment, the H.J.Joel Gold Mine mine would soon be 
designed as the first totally trackless gold mine in South Africa 
based on the work carried out by KAR for the 95 UEIA narrow reef 
project at Cooke 2 Shaft; the full documentation of this change of 
design and the build-up to gold production at the new mine will 
be detailed in Chapter 5. 
 
Before concluding this chapter on narrow reef trackless mining it is 
important to record the planning and work carried out for the 
streamlined rail haulage on 101 Level at Cooke 2 Shaft and work 
proposed for the exploitation of the Kimberley Reefs from Cooke 2 Shaft, 
REGM. 
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 4.4 101 Level Streamlined Haulage 
At Cooke 2 Shaft the major portion of ore reserves were approximately 
3,5 kms from the shaft system. The need for an efficient ore clearance 
system serving these reserves was dictated by the planned increase in 
tonnage in the five year plan. In early 1984 certain work on the 101 Level 
so-called streamlined rail haulage, to serve both 90 Level and 95 Level, 
was underway. However with the geographic expansion of the workings, 
specifically the new trackless projects, stoping tonnage would increase 
significantly and the improvements to the 101 Level haulage, which 
were then being carried out, would be inadequate and a further 
upgrading (Phase 2) was therefore considered necessary by KAR. 
 
The planned tonnage from 90 Level, 95 Level and 101 Level would 
increase from 3600 tons/day in mid-1984 to 5500 tons/day in the second 
half of 1985. In terms of the then current streamlined programme (call it 
Phase 1) the expected maximum tramming capacity of 101 Level would 
be 3000 tons/day. It was axiomatic that this capacity would not meet the 
requirements of the new five year plan and the planning of both 
trackless projects (90 Level E8 and 95 Level UEIA) could therefore be 
jeopardised. Thus the importance of the 101 Level haulage to the new 
trackless initiatives, could not be over emphasised. 
 
4.4.1 Constraints to the Phase 1 Programme 
The first constraint related to the quality of the track. Rail ballast 
consisted of run of mine development waste as was common on 
normal rail haulages on gold mines. This would not be acceptable 
for high speed tramming which would be essential to a 
streamlined haulage that KAR had in mind. Secondly, the rails, 
30kg/metre, were worn with poor fishplate joints. Thirdly, there 
was no provision for any increased rail gauge on bends which was 
the norm of general railway design parameters; in this respect 
variable gauge concrete sleepers were available. Finally, track 
maintenance, including the control of water, was considered too 
labour intensive, expensive and inefficient for the required 
streamlined haulage. 
 
There were also engineering considerations to overcome. The 
recently re-furbished trolley line locomotives had no standard 
components and with spares availability inadequate downtime 
was inevitable. In early 1984 the overall availability for the four 
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locomotives on the level was only 52%. Also there were three 
different types of motors being used, each with its own traction 
wheel characteristics. 
 
Finally, the Phase 1 upgrade did not provide for any improvement 
to remove any of these constraints. 
 
4.4.2 Recommendations for the Further Upgrading of 101 Level 
 Haulage: Phase 2 
There had to be radical changes to make the 101 Level haulage an 
efficient streamlined system and the proposals from KAR, in his 
motivational report, were as follows. 
 
Twin Haulage System 
The 101 Level was only planned to be a single haulage, again 
normal on multi-level gold mines at that time. However it was 
now proposed to introduce a twin haulage one way travelling 
system. A second haulage, the RAW which was already developed, 
would become part of the twin haulage. 
 
Transfer Boxes 
In order to ensure continuous movement of trains when loading 
at the transfer boxes and to avoid shunting delays, additional 
development would be necessary and also the use of hanging wall 
chutes would be constructed in the centre of roadways. 
 
Track Installation 
The track was to be lifted to provide for a minimum of 300mm 
thickness of ballast below the sleepers. The old ballast would be 
removed/vamped, using the purchased vamping Toro 150 
referred to in the previous chapter, and new ballast, graded 
15mm to 50mm, imported to the mine from surface: 600m³ 
ballast/km of track. This new ballast would provide the necessary 
well drained support for the concrete sleepers and would greatly 
facilitate on-going alignment and levelling of the track. Finally the 
use of a ballast tamping machine was recommended. 
 
Sleepers 
All new trackwork would use concrete sleepers 900mm spacing 
and wider gauge on curves. 
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Rails 
Where necessary existing rail ends would be cropped and 
fishplates huck bolted with crown welded rail joints. 
 
Rolling Stock 
The trolley line locomotives then in use could not be relied upon 
and were a risk to production. It was therefore proposed to 
acquire 15 ton trolley locomotives with 18 ton bottom discharge 
hoppers (6 ton hoppers were the norm on haulages). Refer to 
photographs in Figures 4.16 and 4.16A showing a new trolley 
locomotive and a 18 ton hopper on surface at Cooke 2 Shaft. 
 
Labour 
There was to be no general increase in labour complements but 
the signing on of a qualified tracklayer was considered essential. 
 
The first motivational report submitted by KAR was dated 28 May 
1984 with the final motivational report from KAR to the General 
Manager REGM and the Consulting Engineer JCI requesting the 
capital vote, submitted on 30 October 1984. Both these 
motivations and submissions are included in Annexure 4.3 in 
Volume 2. 
 
Towards the end of 1985, before KAR left for H.J.Joel Gold Mine in 
late August, the  new  upgraded  101 Level  haulage  was  virtually 
complete and operational. In the photograph in Figure 4.17 one 
can see the completed new streamlined haulage and Figure 4.18 
shows the Plasserail Mechanical Tamping Machine underground 
on 101 Level; a ‘first’ in a South African gold mine. Related 
documentation showing track standards and the cost motivation 
for the Plasserail Tamping Machine are all shown in Annexure 4.4 
in Volume 2. 
 
4.5 Kimberley Reefs 
Before KAR’s departure from REGM a final motivational report, dated 30 
July 1985, was submitted for the exploitation of the Kimberley Reefs at 
Cooke 2 Shaft. This project had been thoroughly planned in the previous 
months following an initial report by KAR in May 1985. 
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FIGURE 4.16 
 
15 Ton Trolley Locomotive on Surface at Cooke 2 Shaft, for use on the Streamlined Haulage 
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FIGURE 4.16A 
 
18 Ton Hopper, for Use on the Streamlined Haulage, Standing on Surface at Cooke 2 Shaft 
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FIGURE 4.17 
 
The new 101 Level Streamlined Haulage at Cooke 2 Shaft 
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FIGURE 4.18 
 
The Plasserail Mechanical Tamping Machine on 101 Level Cooke 2 Shaft 
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The Kimberley Reefs were a group of reefs identified immediately 
adjacent to the Cooke 2 Shaft system. There were various reef 
combinations for exploitation and it was possible that both trackless 
wide reef and narrow reef mining methods could be  employed. At the 
time there were no proven ore reserves established but from extensive 
drilling (71 boreholes) there were possible/probable reserves (in terms 
of the definitions at that time) of almost 4,5 million tons at 4,33 
grams/ton with a stoping width of 138 cms. There was the possibility of 
combining reefs to increase the stoping width at a lower grade; this 
would enable mechanised wide reef mining to take place. 
 
In the report it was proposed to develop from 95 Level station to the 
point of reef intersection from where on reef development would be 
carried out. In terms of ore clearance a gathering haulage would be 
developed on 106 Level. 
 
Justifications for the project were based on similar arguments as for the 
95Level UEIA Project and full details of financial advantages were 
outlined in the motivation report. The application for the capital vote for 
the project was submitted to the Consulting Engineer with the report  
Exploitation of the Kimberley Reefs at Cooke 2 Shaft by Trackless 
Mining Methods by K.A.Rhodes dated 30 July 1985, one month before 
KAR left REGM; refer to Annexure 4.5 in Volume 2.  
 
4.6 Concluding Remarks 
By the end of August 1985 the 95 Level UEIA Project, the first 
mechanised narrow reef mining project on a South African gold mine, 
was progressing well. In addition, the new upgraded streamlined 
haulage was in operation for both the wide reef and narrow reef 
trackless projects. Also approval for development of the Kimberley 
Reefs, starting from Cooke 2 Shaft 95 Level Station, would soon be given. 
As a final comment, the revolutionary new method of mechanised 
trackless mining of narrow reefs in South African gold mines had 
commenced. This method of mining proved common in later years and is 
still being used today. The method first introduced by KAR at Cooke 2 
Shaft, REGM in 1984/1985 is now widely known on South African mines 
as the hybrid system. 
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Now the big challenge for KAR was the design, planning and 
management of the first totally trackless gold mine in South Africa: the 
H.J.Joel Gold Mine in the Orange Free State. This new mine project will 
be discussed in detail in chapter 5 of this treatise. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
The Design, Planning and Management of the H.J.Joel Gold Mine 
In this chapter KAR will detail the work carried out by him on the design and 
planning of a new gold mine and the early years in the life of the mine when he 
was the first appointed mine manager. It is intended to set out a brief 
introductory narrative followed by a technical discussion of work over a three 
year period, from the start of the mine to the time the mine came into 
production and was officially opened. 
 
5.1 Introductory Narrative 
In late August 1985, when I was still the appointed Manager Mining at 
Cooke 2 Shaft REGM and responsible for pioneering  the new trackless 
projects, I was called into the Head Office of JCI by the Technical 
Director. I was told that I was to be transferred immediately to the 
H.J.Joel Project which was planned as a new gold mine in the district of 
Theunissen in the Orange Free State. At that time REGM had a 37% 
equity interest in the project and it was anticipated that in early 1986 
the Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs would grant JCI’s application 
for a mining lease. 
 
Although there was a sense of euphoria within JCI, because after many 
years the company would be returning to gold mining in the Orange Free 
State, I was disappointed by my transfer as I believed that I still had 
much to complete with the trackless projects which I had started up at 
Cooke 2 Shaft REGM. I mentioned these doubts at the meeting with the 
Technical Director but the response was that it was time to move on. I 
did not at any time during the interview, or subsequently, receive any 
directive to review the design of the new mine; at that time a draft 
feasibility study submitted by G.W.Tregoning in April 1985 had been 
based upon conventional mining. 
 
I could never be sure, and at the time I did not think about trying to find 
out, what the Technical Director or Consulting Engineer thought would 
be my reaction to having to leave REGM. After a period of two years of 
pioneering the use of trackless mining at Cooke 2 Shaft I was not about 
to abandon my efforts to advance mechanisation within the JCI Group. I 
had not been given any directive to review the design of the new mine 
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with regards to a change to mechanisation but I was determined to do 
so. Therefore, without any mandate, I decided to commence the 
necessary work to set out an initial proposal for trackless mechanised 
mining for the new mine. 
 
After being told of my transfer I returned to REGM and remained at 
Cooke 2 Shaft for the handover period to the newly appointed manager. 
However, during this period of approximately two weeks I moved to an 
isolated ‘office’ in a section of the Mine Rescue Complex, a short 
distance from the shaft offices. I gave instructions to be called upon only 
for any advice if it was needed; in other words I allowed the new 
manager to get on with his job of managing operations at the shaft 
whilst I commenced the early design work of a new trackless gold mine. 
 
My first motivational report, dated 19 September 1985, was submitted 
to the Consulting Engineer and I then proceeded on a short leave. 
 
5.2 Early Motivations for a Trackless Mechanised Mine at the H.J.Joel 
 Project 
At the end of August 1985 and going into September it was necessary to 
deliberate some of the basic factors which would be important for the 
motivation of a trackless operation at the H.J.Joel Project.  The issues 
considered are seen below. 
 
5.2.1 Costs of an Operating Level  
It was necessary to estimate the costs of operating a conventional 
footwall haulage; this was important because a prime motivator 
for a trackless operation utilising the trackless access gathering 
haulage concept was the reduction in footwall waste development 
and the elimination of footwall service levels. It was therefore 
important to determine all the labour, both mining and 
engineering, required to operate a footwall haulage and, in 
addition, the conventional costs of maintaining a level in terms of 
mining and engineering stores and power costs. In fact an all 
inclusive cost of R/ton was necessary. 
 
5.2.2 Reduction of Waste Development 
For the motivation of a trackless mechanised mine design all 
conventional footwall levels had to be eliminated, except for the 
single gathering haulage, thereby saving the costs for operating 
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footwall haulages. Footwall development costs would then be 
markedly reduced. Also, if waste was not generated from footwall 
development the hoisting of waste would be significantly less and 
in terms of hoisting capacity there would be potential for an 
increase in reef hoisting. 
 
5.2.3 Gathering Haulage 
The requirements for the gathering haulage were at this time to 
tram the total planned tonnage by means of one train only (one 
locomotive plus a spare unit and hoppers of a capacity to be 
determined). At the tip a deceleration zone would be established 
to reduce brake wear and increase safety. The track layout would 
provide for a loop (balloon) both at the tip and at the inbye 
loading point. Labour would be minimal: one man operating the 
security tip, one train driver and an orepass boxfront attendant 
(continuous loading system). 
 
5.2.4 Additional Reef Hoisting 
The amount of waste to be broken in the narrow reef stopes and 
its handling and packing in the worked-out areas needed to be 
assessed and also the vamping of these areas prior to the waste 
packing; this estimate would define the potential for increased 
reef hoisting. 
 
5.2.5 Stope Face Work 
The mechanisation of the face drilling operations needed follow-
up and trials with new electro-hydraulic face rigs; this would come 
in the near future. Cleaning of the face by winch was the accepted 
method at that time but consideration had to be given to the use 
of Nonel Unidets to improve throw and lessen the need for a face 
winch. Refer to the paper on the use of Nonel by K.A.Rhodes in 
Annexure 3.2 in Volume 2. 
 
5.2.6 Shaft Sinking 
Another important aspect would be a revision of the shaft sinking 
and station development schedule in terms of the reduction in 
levels. Certain levels and stations could be eliminated and this 
would save both money and time. 
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All these factors (and many others) had to be assessed before 
completing even a first motivational report. 
 
5.3 First Motivational Report: September 1985 
The initial motivational report prepared early in September 1985 also 
took cognizance of the original Feasibility Study. Based on the geology of 
the orebody and the siting of the first two shafts to be sunk (No 3 and 
No 4 Shafts) it was to be seen that there would be certain major 
advantages for a mechanised operation against the conventional 
scattered mining operations envisaged in the Feasibility Study. There 
would be a major reduction in capital expenditure. Although for this 
motivation the capital expenditure would not be estimated, the main 
savings would fall under sinking and lining; station development; shaft 
system development; ore reserve development; ore/waste pass 
systems; hostel accommodation; housing and other surface 
infrastructure. 
 
Working costs would be reduced compared to that in the Feasibility 
Study by at least R10/ton. 
 
The commissioning of the shafts would be accelerated by approximately 
four months. 
 
There would be a potential for an increase in reef hoisting. 
 
Finally, there would be an expected improvement in safety performance. 
 
An examination and some analysis of this technical report now follows. 
 
5.3.1 Geology 
The Feasibility Report showed that the reef was relatively 
undisturbed by minor faulting and the dip of the reef varied 
gradually between 0° and 12°. These conditions were considered 
favourable for the introduction of trackless equipment. 
 
The immediate hanging wall consisted of siliceous quartzite and 
was considered to be competent. 
 
However it  was to  be  expected  that  water  bearing  fissures and  
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dykes would be intersected and cognizance of this would be of 
extreme importance in the design of the mine. 
 
5.3.2 Method of Mining 
It was shown in this motivational report that the waste 
development for a conventional scattered mining layout would be 
excessive. The total metres of development (for a 20 month ore 
reserve) were calculated at 27167 metres or 91 tons/metre of 
footwall development. Further, in order to exploit the reef in the 
area of influence of the No 3/4 Shaft systems a further 56758 
metres of footwall waste development would be required. 
Therefore the total estimated footwall waste development to 
exploit the estimated ore reserve of 7,65 million tons was 83925 
metres in total. 
 
It was axiomatic therefore, at that early stage of the motivation, 
that a trackless operation on the reef horizon which would obviate 
the necessity for a development programme on seven levels but  
would only require a gathering haulage on one level, must be a 
viable alternative and such an option would be a mechanised 
trackless operation. 
 
5.3.3 Trackless Alternative 
Four blocks of reef, defined by major faults, had been identified to 
be exploited from the No 3/4 Shaft system. On the first level (60 
Level) a single drive would intersect the reef horizon and on 70 
Level twin development ends would establish the gathering 
haulage to serve all four blocks. Below the main reef decline in 
each block a footwall service decline would be developed in 
waste, approximately 8 metres below the reef decline. The total 
footwall waste development would be 17910 metres. However, all 
the waste development on 60 Level would be completed as capital 
development during the period of mid-shaft loading (MSL) and 
therefore in terms of post MSL, taking cognizance of both the 
waste and reef mined, the estimated ore replacement factor for 
the trackless option would be 647 tons/metre of footwall 
development, a significant improvement on the corresponding 
conventional factor of 91 tons/metre. 
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5.3.4 General Mining Layout 
Once trackless development from 60 Level had intersected the 
reef horizon at the various sub-outcrops, a main reef decline and 
access roadways would be developed for each of the four blocks. 
From these roadways access stope drives would be broken away 
to establish the stope panels. Behind the on reef development a 
service decline would be developed lagging the reef development 
to take into account any changes in the reef such as minor 
faulting. The main reasons for a footwall service decline were 
primarily to ensure reliable intake airways off the reef horizon and 
for an alternative tramming roadway. 
 
Access roadway dimensions would be 4,5 metres wide and 3,0 
metres high to provide for truck loading by LHD and truck 
tramming. Access stope drives would be 3,5 metres wide and 3,0 
metres high to allow movement of LHD’s; waste generated in 
these drives was planned to be packed in worked-out areas in a 
similar manner as planned at 95L UEIA Project at Cooke 2 Shaft, 
REGM. 
 
A gathering haulage on 70 Level would serve all blocks and reef 
hauled by truck to a single tip (orepass down to 70 Level) 
constructed for each block. A trolley line locomotive, only one 200 
ton capacity train, would transfer all the reef to the shaft system. 
This gathering haulage would have a single track with balloon 
layouts at both the shaft and the loading points for continuous 
loading and tipping. Before establishment of the rail haulage, reef 
would be trammed back to the shaft on 60 Level by truck; refer to 
Figure 5.1. 
 
5.3.5 Production Parameters 
The production from the Phase 1 of the project had been planned 
in the Feasibility Study at 80 000 tons reef/month. Original 
planning had envisaged 30 000 tons/month of waste to be 
generated but with the trackless option this would now be 
significantly reduced. It was now estimated that for the reserve 
down to 90 Level that at 80 000 tons reef/month footwall waste 
would be 5200 tons/month. 
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FIGURE 5.1 
 
Ore Clearance System: refer to Annexure 5.1 Volume 3  
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5.3.6  Rock Mechanics Considerations 
In discussions with the Group Rock Mechanics Engineer there 
were no issues with the proposed support systems as they were 
very similar to the 95 Level narrow reef project at Cooke 2 Shaft, 
REGM. However, with regard to the planned footwall service 
decline it would have to be at least 15 metres below the reef 
horizon in order to avert the stresses induced by the reef pillars. If 
backfill were to be used instead of crush pillars and sticks this 
distance could be reduced to 5 metres. 
 
5.3.7 Cycle of Operatons 
Main Reef Development 
All roadways and access stope drives were to be developed using 
electro-hydraulic drill rigs and cleaned by 3,8m³ LHD’s into 32 ton 
dump trucks. 
 
In the same manner as the 95L UEIA Project at Cooke 2 Shaft, 
REGM, the bottom section of the face of the access drive would 
be blasted first in a double cut operation. The waste would be 
cleaned out and trammed as waste by LHD to worked out areas 
when they came available. After cleaning the waste, the top (reef) 
cut of the drive would be blasted down. When writing this 
motivation it was assumed that 80% of the waste would be 
removed; however this was scaled back, for practical reasons, to 
60% in later motivations. 
 
In this report the first reference was made to what would become 
a key issue: cover drilling in main development. 
 
Stope Drilling and Blasting 
Conventional face drilling was still accepted for the motivation but 
the objective was always to be the development of a mechanised 
face rig. Also, the use of Nonel was to be further considered. 
 
Stope Face Cleaning 
The face was planned to be cleaned by face winch. However, the 
successful use of the (Nonel) Unidet could change this in terms of 
improved throw of the blast. 
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Stope Support 
Crush pillar and stick was the method of stope support. 
 
5.3.8  Ventilation 
For this first motivation a ventilation report had been compiled by 
the Environmental Superintendent for Cooke 2 REGM. This 
analysis confirmed that a single main intake on 70 Level would 
prove effective for the ventilation of operations at the No 3/4 
Shaft System (Phase 1). 
 
5.3.9 Equipment 
A full preliminary inventory of equipment was listed for Phase 1 
(80 000 tons/month). 
 
5.3.10 Workshops 
A major workshop would be developed close to the 60 Level 
station and adjacent to the main tramming haulage. This 
workshop would provide for all the required services and repairs 
to all equipment. 
 
All equipment, stripped on surface prior to transport through the 
restricted dimensions of the shaft (it was too late to effect any 
changes to the size of the shafts), would be re-assembled in the 
proposed assembly bay on the 60 Level Shaft Station. 
 
Diesel fuel would be pumped underground direct to an 
established fuel bay. 
 
5.3.11 Training 
Training had always been identified as a critical issue for the 
trackless mechanised mining and, before any equipment arrived 
at the mine, an early appointment would be the Mechanical 
Equipment Supervisor (MES). He would be solely responsible for 
the selection and training of operators and enforcing driver 
discipline. 
 
5.3.12 Labour 
At this point in time the estimated labour complement for the 
mechanised operation was 1175 non-common wage scale or 
unskilled (NCWS) and 157 common wage scale or skilled (CWS). A 
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comparison with the Feasibility Study showed a difference of 
1975NCWS and 34 CWS in favour of the trackless option. 
 
5.3.13 Safety 
Once again the safety in a mechanised operation over 
conventional mining was stressed. Locomotive tramming in 
conventional scattered mining was a major source of serious 
accidents and therefore, to operate a single train on a streamlined 
gathering haulage would greatly reduce this risk. Further, the 
markedly lower total labour complement of 1300 against 3300 
(planned for in the Feasibility Study) would mean 2000 less people 
would be exposed to danger, representing a significant reduction 
in risk. 
 
5.3.14 Justification 
It was argued that there were major cost advantages for the 
change to the trackless access gathering haulage concept at the 
new H.J.Joel Mine. 
 
Shaft Commissioning 
It was envisaged that the shaft sinking commissioning date would 
be brought forward by approximately four months. This would be 
because shaft sinking would stop at 80 Level (and not at 100 
Level) thereby saving 400 metres of shaft sinking and, in addition, 
two of the proposed stations would not be required. Capital 
expenditure would thereby be markedly reduced. 
 
Footwall Waste Development 
For the trackless option total footwall waste development had 
been calculated at 18 000 metres as opposed to 85 000 metres for 
a conventional scattered layout. A difference of 67 000 metres 
must be considered significant and would reflect substantial cost 
savings for both capital and working costs. 
 
Working Costs 
Working costs would be considerably reduced due to lower 
stoping costs, very much lower development costs and costs of 
ancillary operations on footwall haulages would be virtually 
eliminated. It was estimated in this motivation, that a cost saving 
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of R10/ton could be realised (equivalent in today’s money terms 
of R120/ton). 
 
Additional Reef Hoisting 
There would be potential for additional reef hoisting because 
waste generated would be minimal. 
 
Surface Infrastructure 
Meaningful savings could be effected in the capital expenditure of 
the mine hostel at the mine and also housing accommodation in 
Virginia, the nearby town. In addition, there were many other 
aspects of surface infrastructure which could mean less capital 
expenditure; reduced use of compressed air, reduction in waste 
hoisting, use of less manpower to name just a few. 
 
This Motivational Report entitled Proposed Trackless Access Gathering 
Haulage Mining Operation at the H.J.Joel Project by K.A.Rhodes was 
submitted to the Project Manager for the Consulting Engineer on 19 
September 1985. It is now attached as Annexure 5.1 in Volume 3. 
 
The response to this report by the Consulting Engineer, dated 23 
September 1985, can be seen in his memorandum to the Technical 
Director and is seen overleaf. 
 
To sum up then, in a period of less than one month from the start of 
planning, the first motivation for a trackless mine at the H.J.Joel Project 
had been received favourably by the Consulting Engineer and had been 
forwarded to the Technical Director. 
 
5.4 Follow-up and Second Motivational Report: October 1985 
After the submission of the initial motivational report (Report No 1 
dated 19 September 1985) a meeting was held on 20 September with 
the Consulting Engineer. At that meeting approval was given for KAR to 
work on a follow-up report (Report No 2) which would detail 
development and stoping schedules, shaft sinking programmes, life of 
mine schedules, working costs and capex estimates. It was requested 
that this report should be made available for discussion on 28 October 
1985; the report was submitted on that date by KAR. This second report 
provided for significantly more detailed information and the major 
additions were as follows. 
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5.4.1 Life of Mine Schedules 
A life of mine schedule (known as Option 9) was completed in the 
same format as for the Feasibility Study (Option 3). Both these 
schedules were over a span of 31 years. 
 
5.4.2 Capex Estimates 
A comparison of factorised capex estimates had been made for 
conventional mining and trackless mining by the Capital Projects 
Control (CPC) Department of JCI and these were in favour of the 
mechanised operation by a difference of more than R45 million 
for Phase 1 of the mine, in today’s terms (2014) this would be 
over R500 million. 
 
5.4.3 Shaft Sinking Programme 
A revised bar-chart for the commissioning of the No 3 Shaft and 
No 4 Shaft systems indicated that the completed programme 
could be brought forward by four months. Although it was not 
necessary in terms of the mechanised option to sink No 3 Shaft 
below 80 Level it was still recommended, and provided for in the 
revised programme, that sinking and equipping should continue to 
100 Level in order to provide for a fall-back position if company 
policy dictated later that mining should revert to conventional 
methods. 
 
5.4.4 Shaft Equipping 
At No 3 Shaft it was envisaged that the shaft would be equipped 
as initially approved. However, at No 4 Shaft it was recommended 
that a large single cage be installed in order to provide for the 
movement of large equipment through the shaft, thereby 
obviating major stripping and slinging in the shaft as had 
previously been the case at the trackless operations at REGM’s 
Cooke 2 Shaft. 
 
5.4.5 Station Layouts 
Detailed station layouts had been set out for both 60 Level and 70 
Level. On 60 Level provision was made for a workshop with total 
facilities for the maintenance, breakdowns and overhaul of 
trackless equipment; a separate re-assembly bay in close 
proximity to the No 3 Shaft which would be re-positioned in terms 
of the new proposal for a large cage at No 4 Shaft; main tipping 
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arrangements for trucks; material storage and handling 
arrangements; a bus terminal from where the transport of people 
direct to the face would take place. On 70 Level there would be 
main tips for reef and waste and a balloon rail system for 
continuous tramming; workshop facilities for electric trolley line 
locomotives; a 25 ton hopper repair bay;  Plasserail workshop and 
a store. 
 
5.4.6 Dilution 
In estimating the dilution, it had now been assumed that 60% of 
the bottom waste cut, in the double cut method in both access 
reef declines and access stope drives, would be trammed as waste 
and 40% of the waste cut would be trammed as reef. 
Therefore: 
Dilution in Access Reef Declines (ARD’s) = 40 x 22,28 x 40% 
                19800 
       = 1,80% 
In terms of the above 
Channel width     = 1,20 metres 
Panel length      = 40 metres 
Waste portion of ARD per metre advance = 22,28 tons 
Dilution      = 40% 
Ore reserve tons generated for 40 metres of ARD development 
       = 19800 tons 
 
Dilution in Access Stope Drives (ASD’s) = 17,32 x 40% 
             132 
       = 5,25% 
In terms of the above 
Channel width     = 1,20 metres 
Waste tons in ASD per metre advance = 17,32 tons 
Dilution      = 40% 
Face tons blasted in ASD per metre advance = 132 tons 
 
Total dilution is therefore   = 1,8% + 5,25% 
       = 7.05% 
 
These calculations were virtually identical as for the dilution 
calculations set out by KAR for the 95L UE1A Project at Cooke 2 
Shaft, REGM; refer to chapter 4. In effect the calculations showed 
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once again that the use of large size equipment working on a 
narrow reef horizon did not imply an acceptance of excessive 
dilution. 
 
In a supporting contribution to the report from the JCI Group 
Surveyor there was general agreement for the dilution 
calculations given in the report for both trackless and 
conventional mining. 
 
5.4.7 Capital Equipment 
The list of capital equipment had been revised with the main 
changes being an up-grade in sizes of the LHD’s and the 
introduction of roofbolters. 
 
5.4.8 Labour 
There were only minor changes to the labour complements. New 
complements were as follows with previous figures in brackets, 
NCWS 1137 (1175) and CWS 159 (157). 
 
5.4.9 Working Costs 
Working costs for the conventional option in the Feasibility Study 
had been R65/ton for the production rate of 80 000 tons/month; 
the mechanised option was estimated at R54/ton at the same rate 
of production. 
 
5.4.10 Further Investigations  
The report set out certain aspects of the proposed option that 
required further investigation in the immediate future, but it was 
stressed that they were not areas of concern; these issues are 
briefly recorded below. 
 
No 4 Shaft Cage 
The finalisation of the cage and winding arrangements at the No 4 
Shaft which would accommodate large components and sub-
assemblies of trackless equipment and also the identification of 
the individual components for each machine which would be 
handled by the cage. 
 
No 1/2 Shaft System 
Consideration would be given to a single large diameter downcast 
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shaft to handle large equipment in No 1 Shaft and the possible 
future conversion of No 3 Shaft to an upcast shaft which would 
obviate the necessity for No 2 Shaft. 
 
Backfill 
An evaluation of the stope support systems described in the 
report by the Group Rock Mechanics Engineer and a 
determination of the necessity for a backfill plant. 
 
Material Handling 
A study was to be carried out of the material handling 
arrangements from the stores to the underground workings 
through the shaft system 
 
Explosives 
There was a need for an evaluation of options for the delivery of 
explosives to the shaft, which would include the possibility of 
direct delivery by AECI from its future factory in Virginia. 
 
Stoping Cycle 
The preparation of stoping layouts and detailed cycles (blasting 
and cleaning) if a decision had to be made on the use of backfill; 
stope layouts without crush pillars would facilitate face cleaning 
and could reduce the number of electro-hydraulic rigs for ASD 
development. 
 
Water Control 
The preparation of detailed layouts for the pumping of water from 
the workings to the shaft station, taking cognizance of the use of 
trackless equipment on the reef horizon. 
 
During October and November 1985 work continued on the motivation 
of the project which culminated in further draft reports being prepared 
(Reports No.3 and No.4) and a final motivation report of 23 January 
1986 (Report No.5). 
 
5.5 Final Motivation Report: January 1986 
Following on from the meetings with the Consulting Engineer in 
September and October 1985 when the first motivational reports for a 
trackless operation at the H.J.Joel Project were discussed, a directive 
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was approved that a report which would provide for a final 
recommendation should be made available before the end of January 
1986; this report could then be submitted to the Board of JCI for their 
approval. 
 
The first draft final report was submitted on 02 January and provided for 
life of mine schedules, capex estimates and a technical report. 
 
5.5.1 Life of Mine Schedules 
In the report three life of mine schedules with different strategies 
were discussed; these options were known as 9A, 9B and 9C. 
 
Option 9A 
In this option the grade would be equalised as soon as possible .To 
meet this parameter it would be necessary to sink conventionally 
the No 1/2 Shaft system immediately in order to develop the 
north-eastern portion of the lease area where the lowest grades 
could be expected. 
 
Option 9B 
This option would delay the sinking of the No 1/2 Shaft system 
until first revenue in June 1988, this option had financial 
advantages. 
 
Option 9C 
This third option would delay the sinking of No 1/2 Shaft system 
until the last possible date to ensure continuous steady state 
input to the plant. This would be the worst case for equalisation of 
grade and would also be a risk to continuity of production. 
 
In effect the recommendation in the final report would be Option 9B, 
soon to become known as Option 10 in the final plan for the project. 
 
5.5.2 Capex Estimates 
The final capex estimates for the 120 000 tons/month mine were 
R738,8 million and R659,9 million for the conventional and 
trackless alternative respectively (in 2014 money terms R8,5 
billion and R7,6 billion respectively). At that point in time these 
estimates were awarded an 80% confidence concept rating, 
indicating  that  at  that  early  stage  there  would  still  be  aspects  
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which could cause scope changes to the project. Refer to Capital 
Expenditure Project reports on the following pages extracted from 
Annexure 5.2 in Volume 3. 
 
5.5.3 Technical Report 
Some important technical aspects of the final report which 
represented changes from the previous motivation reports should 
be examined. 
 
Geology 
There was only one economic reef horizon, the VS5/Beatrix 
Composite Reef situated at the base of the Eldorado Series. The 
reef was displaced by a number of North-South trending faults 
with maximum throws of the order of 70 metres. Relatively little 
minor faulting was expected and the dip of the reef was generally 
flat. Such conditions favoured the use of mechanised equipment 
operating on the reef horizon. Water bearing fissures and dykes 
would be encountered based on the experience of the 
neighbouring Beatrix Mine, but no detailed information was yet 
available at the time of this report. 
 
Reserves 
The accepted life of mine reserve was 34,8 million tons at a gold 
grade of 6,8g/ton. 
   
  Shaft System 
Sinking of No 3/4 Shaft system would be carried out as planned. 
Access to the reef would be on 60 Level with gathering haulages 
on 70 Level and 90 Level. At No 3 Shaft, equipping would remain 
unchanged but at No 4 Shaft provision would be made for a large 
cage to allow for the movement of equipment through the shaft 
and detailed planning had commenced for this change. 
 
The site of the No 1/2 Shaft system remained unchanged. Access 
to the reef horizon from these shafts would be on 110 Level with 
gathering haulages on 130 Level and 150 Level. A large cage would 
be installed at No 1 Shaft. 
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  Station Layouts 
Detailed station layouts had been completed for 60 Level, 70 Level 
and 90 Level. Main tipping arrangements had been set out on 
both 60 and 70 Levels for dump trucks, including the temporary 
requirements for mid-shaft loading (MSL) with the necessary rock 
passes. 
 
The main workshop facilities were to be situated on 60 Level with 
workbays on 70 Level for the MSL development phase. 
 
All arrangements, for material handling and for the transport of 
personnel onto the reef horizon, would be concentrated on 60 
Level. 
 
On 90 Level arrangements for the streamlined continuous rail 
haulage would be established, also the necessary workshops for 
trolley line locomotives, 25 ton hopper repair bay and a Plasserrail 
workshop. Similar arrangements would be duplicated at the 
respective stations at the No 1/2 Shaft system. 
 
Main Development 
All development to the various sub-outcrop portions of the reef in 
the four target blocks (A, B, C and D) would take place from 60 
Level. The development layout remained unchanged from that set 
out in the first motivational report. The total footwall waste 
development for the reserve in the four blocks had now been 
determined to be 22000 metres for a reserve of 12,65 million 
tons, more than half of which would take place in the footwall 
service declines; details of this development are detailed below.  
 
      Metres 
Access ramps    1300  
60 Level Access Roadways  1700 
70 Level Gathering Haulage  3100 
Orepasses ex 70 Level     500 
90 Level Gathering Haulage  3200 
Orepasses ex 90 Level     500 
Footwall Service Declines          11700 
   Total           22000 
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This total of 22000 metres for the trackless mining proposal would 
now compare with 110000 metres of footwall development 
required for the development of the same ore reserve if 
conventional mining methods were to have taken place. 
 
In terms of the overall development planning the two shaft 
systems would be linked and development of the No 1/2 Shaft 
system would be based on the trackless access/gathering haulage 
concept set out at the No 3/4 Shaft system. 
 
Development scheduling would  have  to  take  into  account cover 
drilling constraints in terms of which the maximum advance in any 
development end would not exceed 100 metres per month; this 
rate of 4 metres per day with drilling bays at 30 metre intervals 
would allow for nine days to drill the cover holes before the end 
would be out of cover. 
 
Rock Mechanics Considerations 
Following discussions with the Group Rock Mechanics Engineer it 
had been decided to support the stopes with grout packs; at that 
time such a system was being used successfully at the Rustenburg 
Section of Rustenburg Platinum Mines. The immediate face area 
would be supported by 40 ton hydraulic props. 
 
Ventilation 
The development schedule and production build-up and the 
general mine layout, including detailed stope layouts, had been 
fully discussed with the Group Ventilation Engineer and detailed 
supportive documentation had been provided by him. 
 
Main Development on the Reef Horizon 
Access reef declines would be spaced at 150 metre intervals 
(limiting the LHD tramming distance to 150 metres) with stope 
faces 40 metres between the centres of the access stope drives. 
Notwithstanding the cover drilling programmes taking place in 
advance of the development, 6 metre pilot holes would be drilled 
with every round by the electro-hydraulic drill rig. The 
development of all main access roadways would be carried out by 
the double cut method with the waste being blasted separately 
from the reef. 
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With respect to the access stope drives, such drives would not be 
developed as a development end; all reef would be blasted on the 
face and footwall lifting would be practised. The waste would be 
loaded out and packed in worked-out areas as previously planned. 
 
It was assumed initially that stope drilling would be conventional 
but it was expected that a hydraulic face rig would be considered 
at the time when stoping commenced. 
 
Dilution 
In estimating the dilution from access reef decline development it 
was confirmed that 60% of the waste blasted in the double cut 
operation would be trammed as waste and the remaining 40% 
trammed as reef; this being an acceptable practical assumption. 
Refer to Figures 5.2 and 5.2A showing photographs of double cut 
mining. 
 
In the access stope drives in the proposed footwall lifting or 
benching operation it was also assumed that only 60% of the blast 
would be taken out as waste and the remainder trammed as reef. 
In order to avoid loss of reef (reef trammed as waste) it would be 
necessary to carry out this benching operation in advance of the 
stope face and therefore between the two immediately adjacent 
faces; in this respect refer to Figure 5.3. The total dilution had 
been previously calculated at 7,05% for all development. 
However, in addition to ongoing development it would be 
necessary to establish turning and passing points for dump trucks 
and also tipping points (LHD into truck) at the intersections of 
access reef declines and access stope drives. The total waste 
generated from these sources was shown to be less than 1% 
(theoretically calculated in Figure 5.4 and 5.4A to be 0,69%). 
However, this would only be dilution if this waste was allowed to 
be trammed as reef. 
 
The waste dilution calculations in this final motivational report 
were approved by the Group Surveyor who also provided a 
supporting document to the report. 
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FIGURE 5.2 
Double Cut Mining: Waste Cut Blasted with Reef in Hangingwall 
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FIGURE 5.2A 
Double Cut Mining: LHD Below Reef in Hangingwall 
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FIGURE 5.3 
Dilution Control in Access Stope Drives: refer to Annexure 5.2 Volume 3 
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FIGURE 5.4 
Dilution at Tipping Points in Access Reef Decline: refer to Annexure 5.2 Volume 3 
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FIGURE 5.4A 
Dilution Calculations Related to Figure 5.4: refer to Annexure 5.2 Volume 3 
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Equipment 
The detailed inventory for the equipment required for 80000 
tons/month (Phase 1) was set out in the report. 
 
Units      No of Units Required 
LHD 4,3m³      8 
Electro-hydraulic Drill Rig   8 
Roofbolter      2 
32 ton Dump Truck    10 
Utility Vehicle     5 
Land Cruiser      14 
Impact Breaker     4 
Grader      1 
Bulldozer/Grader     1 
Winches 37kW     50 
Personnel Transporter (busses)   3 
Explosive Vehicle (underground)  1 
 
The numbers of the primary units were calculated in terms of the 
following analysis. 
 
LHD’s 
LHD’s were required for development, stoping and waste packing 
operations. The production capacity of an LHD (and a truck) was 
calculated from a basic formulae which evolved from the 
following parameters. 
 
 Production capacity in tons/minute is tons trammed by LHD ÷ 
 total cycle time of the unit in minutes. 
  
 In terms of the above: 
 Tons trammed/minute = 0,85 x L 
 Where 0,85 is the utilisation of the machine and L is the carrying 
capacity of the LHD  or 7 tons in the bucket of a 4,3m³ LHD. 
 
Total cycle time of the unit can be split into two elements where T 
 is that part of the cycle to load, manoeuvre and tip and the 
 tramming portion of the cycle is (2 x D) ÷ S x   1000 
             60 
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Where D is the one way tramming distance in metres, S is the 
 average return trip speed of the LHD in kph, 1000 is the 
 conversion factor from kilometres to metres and 60 is the 
 conversion factor from hour to minutes. 
 
Therefore, the production capacity of the unit (P) is: 
P =  0,85 x L   ÷  T  +    2 x D 
                S x 1000 
                 60 
 
or P    = 0,85 x L   ÷  T +     2 x D      tons/minute 
           S x 16,67 
 
or P    = 60 x 0,85 x L ÷   T +        2 x D     tons/hour 
          S x 16,67 
 
or P    = 51 x L  ÷  T +      2 x D          tons/hour 
       S x 16,67 
 
The monthly production of the unit can be estimated from the 
available hours in the month using the definitions stated below. 
 
Availability = Total hours  – Engineering downtime     x 100%
     Available hours 
 
Utilisation =      Hours worked (metre readings)          x  100% 
     Total hours – Engineering downtime  
 
The assumption for these calculations for both availability and 
utilisation was in general 85%. 
 
The relevant calculations for the LHD of 7 tons capacity were 
therefore as follows; utilisation is built into the above formulae. 
 
For Development: 
Maximum one way tram (D)   = 300 metres  
Dump, manoeuvre and tip (T)   = 5 minutes 
Average return trip speed of LHD (S)  = 5kph 
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Therefore: P = 51 x 7 ÷ 5 +       2 x 300 = 29 tons/hour 
                     5 x 16,67 
 
Therefore production rate/day is calculated at  
29 x 15 hours x 0.85 (availability)  = 370 tons/day 
 
 The LHD was assumed to clean 2 rounds (130 tons each)/shift   
 Total duty /day is (2 x 2 x 130)   = 520 tons/day 
 
Therefore number of LHD’s required for  
development     =  1.4 (say 2) 
 
For Stoping: 
Average tramming distance one way (D) = 75 metres 
Dump, manoeuvre and tip (T)   = 3 minutes 
Average speed for return trip (S)  = 5kph 
 
Therefore P = 51 x 7 ÷ 3 +      2 x 75  = 74 tons/hour 
                   5 x 16,67 
          
Total production rate/day is calculated at 
74 x 15 hours x 0.85 (availability)  = 943 tons/day 
 
Daily production from stoping is 
80000 ÷ 23,5     = 3400 tons/day 
 
Therefore number of LHD’s required for 
stoping      = 3.6 (say 4) 
 
For Waste Packing: 
Footwall lifting waste tons to be packed per month was based on 
twenty five panels being worked at any one time, each advancing 
20 metres per month. At a stoping width of 120 cms the total 
waste tons to be packed was calculated to be of the order of 6400 
tons/month assuming that only 60% of the total tons blasted 
would be packed. 
 
One way tram (D)     = 500 metres 
Load, manoeuvre and dump (T)   = 6 minutes 
Average speed for return trip (S)  = 5 kph 
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Therefore P = 51 x 7 ÷ 6 +       2 x 500  = 20 tons/hour 
           5 x 16,67 
    
Production capacity/day is calculated at 
20 x 15 x 0.85 (availability)   = 255 tons/day         
Waste tons to be packed/day is 
6400 ÷ 23,5      = 272 tons/day 
 
Therefore number of LHD’s required for 
waste packing     = 1.1 (say 2) 
 
The total number of LHD’s (4.3m³ capacity) for the project was 
therefore estimated to be 8. 
 
Trucks 
Using the same formulae as for LHD’s and the following 
assumptions: 
Tramming distance one way (D)  = 1000 metres 
(grade 8° with passing points every 200m) 
Average speed (S)     = 5kph 
(estimated at 5kph to allow for empty 
trucks stopping at passing points) 
Load, manoeuvre and tip (T)   = 21 minutes 
(LHD loading 4/5 passes) 
 
Truck capacity (L) is assumed to be 29 tons (32 ton rated truck) 
P = 51 x 29 ÷ 21 +     2 x 1000   = 33 tons/hour 
     5 x 16,67 
 
Production capacity/day is calculated at 
 33 x 15 x 0.85 (availability)   = 420 tons/day 
 
Total production per month is 80000 tons 
reef and 12000 tons waste    = 92000 tons/month 
          or = 3915 tons/day 
 
Total number of trucks therefore  = 9.3 (say 10) 
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Drill Rigs 
In determining the number of drill rigs, cognizance had been taken 
of the following parameters. 
 
At steady state production, 500 metres of access stope drives 
advance would be necessary; 25 panels advancing 20 metres/day. 
Assuming that one rig would drill three rounds of footwall lifting 
per day of 3 metres advance, this would require say three rigs. 
 
It was also estimated for this report that 300 metres of 
development in reef declines and footwall service declines would 
be necessary in a month. It was assumed that two rounds per day 
would be drilled by a rig; this would necessitate three rigs for 
increased  tramming distance between development ends.   
 
In addition to the above, two additional drill rigs would be 
required for the development of the 70 Level gathering haulage. 
 
In total it was decided to plan for a total of 8 electro-hydraulic 
twin boom drill rigs. 
 
Roofbolters 
At that time it was estimated that two roofbolters would be 
necessary for development operations. 
 
Utility Vehicles 
The five UV’s planned for were predominantly flat-bed vehicles 
with a crane for material handling. Specialist vehicles such as a 
dedicated explosives vehicle, a grader and a bulldozer would be 
additional and were also provided for. 
 
Personnel Vehicles (Land Cruisers) 
At the time, the Land Cruiser was the favoured vehicle for general 
work and in this inventory it was planned for fourteen such units. 
The necessity for this type of vehicle in a mechanised operation 
could never be over emphasised. These vehicles would be 
constantly used for transporting small mining crews, engineering 
artisans, explosives, spare parts, some mining stores and for 
overall supervision. The breakdown of the units planned for were 
as follows. 
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       No of Units 
Mining work      4 
Engineering – two per level    4 
Survey/sampling      2 
Senior management     1 
Underground Manager     1 
Mine Overseers      2 
      Total  14 
 
Busses 
On any one shift it was expected that of the order of three 
hundred persons would need to be transported from the terminal 
(at the shaft station) to the inbye workings and this would require 
four cages (75 persons per cage). Therefore it was planned for 
three busses, of 75 person capacity, to be used for this work. It 
was realised that three busses would be adequate as the first bus 
would have returned to the station before the arrival of the fourth 
cage. 
 
Engineering Considerations 
The workshop which was to be constructed on 60 Level would 
provide for the total maintenance and overhauls for the complete 
fleet of equipment and would be fully equipped and operational 
before stoping operations commenced. The assembly bay to be 
established would be equipped before any trackless mining 
equipment went underground. 
 
All mining managers and supervisory mining personnel would be 
fully committed to the support of the engineering discipline for 
the maintenance of equipment, and would demand driver 
discipline to ensure that the maintenance of the equipment could 
be carried out strictly in accordance with the relevant planned 
schedules. 
 
Initially all trackless equipment necessary for the development of 
the mine would have to be stripped on surface prior to going 
underground. The proposed large cage in No 4 Shaft would later 
obviate the necessity for this major stripping operation; however, 
the large cage would only be installed after the commissioning of 
the No 3/4 Shaft system. 
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Labour 
The estimated underground labour complements for the Phase 1 
of the project (80000 tons reef/month) were relatively unchanged 
from the earlier reports: 159 CWS and 1132 NCWS. The surface 
complement had been assumed by factorisation of the Feasibility 
Study complement to be 132 CWS and 650 NCWS. The total 
complement was therefore 291 CWS and 1782 NCWS. In terms of 
Phase 2 (120000 tons reef/month) the total complement for CWS 
and NCWS would increase to 386 and 2459 respectively. 
 
Working Costs 
The cost difference in favour of the trackless option was 
confirmed at R11/ton (again in 2014 money terms this would be 
more than R120/ton); of the R11/ton, R8/ton would be related to 
development. The total mine costs were fixed at R54/ton and 
R65/ton for the trackless and conventional options respectively. 
 
The final motivational report Proposed Trackless Access Gathering 
Haulage Mining Operations at the H.J.Joel Project by K.A.Rhodes, dated 
23 January 1986, can be seen in Annexure 5.2 in Volume 3. 
 
5.6 Formal Approval of Trackless Mechanised Mining at the H.J.Joel Project 
Following submission of the final report, a presentation was made by 
K.A.Rhodes to the Executive Committee of the Board of JCI on 30 
January 1986. Included in this presentation was a summary comparing 
the conventional and trackless mining methods and this can be seen in 
Figure 5.5. 
 
The relevant extract from the minutes of the Executive Committee on 30 
January 1986 is included on the following pages. The main 
recommendation being ‘that all further planning associated with the 
Joel Mine be based on trackless mechanised methods’. 
 
5.7 Shaft Sinking and Mid-Shaft Loading 
Pre-sinking of both No 3 and 4 Shafts commenced in August 1985; these 
operations at No 3 Shaft were  completed in  late  October and  at  No 4 
Shaft in early November of the same year. Pre-sink was carried out to a 
depth of 45 metres below the collar of both shafts. 
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FIGURE 5.5 
 
A Comparison of Conventional and Trackless Mining Methods 
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Main sinking started on 06 January 1986 after the erection of the two 
headgears, refer to photograph in Figure 5.6.  
 
Following equipping of both shafts for mid-shaft loading (MSL), trackless 
development started on 60 Level on 30 December 1986. On 70 Level, 
trackless development started in July 1987 following the equipping of 
the MSL between 60 Level and 70 Level. At the end of December 1987 
shaft sinking and the associated development had been completed at No 
3 Shaft and stripping had commenced from the shaft bottom up the 
shaft. These stripping operations were completed to surface in February 
1988 and the use of the service cage, which had been operating in that 
shaft to support the MSL development operations, was then lost to MSL 
development. This left MSL development operating under single outlet 
conditions from No 4 Shaft and only in May 1988 could it be expected 
that a single cage facility would be made available in No 3 Shaft. 
 
Up until this time (in effect the end of April 1988) 4314 metres of 
trackless development had been completed using the MSL installation. 
In fact, when the No 3 Shaft had been completely commissioned in late 
1988 for rock hoisting, men and material handling, more than 6000 
metres of MSL development had been carried out simultaneously with 
the sinking operations and equipping programmes. The result of this was 
to bring forward the first reef production by one year. 
 
This project, which involved the sinking of two shafts with its associated 
station development on four levels concurrently with MSL development 
on two levels, was extremely complex. The interface of these operations 
carried out on a seven day week basis necessitated a total ‘hands-on’ 
style of management for it to succeed. However, it also had to be 
remembered that the H.J.Joel Gold Mine was the first gold mine in South 
Africa to be designed as a trackless mine from the outset, with only 
minimal lead time, as has been described in the narrative to this 
chapter; this alone had required innovative planning and management 
controls. In addition to these factors, management had to be aware of 
the need to avoid an inrush of water from the deep underground 
aquifer, the constant dangers of methane, the complications of the 
ventilation systems when operating  MSL  concurrently with sinking, and 
the obvious necessity at all times for the safety of persons working in the 
shafts. During  this  period  another  aspect  which  proved  important  to 
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FIGURE 5.6 
 
No 3 and No 4 Shaft Headgears 
179 
 
manage was the turnover of personnel, not only in shaft sinking but also 
for MSL development; work on a new developing mechanised mine was 
totally different from that on an established conventional gold mine and 
it proved difficult for new employees. 
 
For a full description of shaft sinking and MSL operations at the mine 
refer to the technical paper, “Shaft Sinking and Mid-Shaft Loading 
Operations at H.J.Joel Gold Mine, Orange Free State, South Africa” by 
K.A.Rhodes, attached as Annexure 5.3 in Volume 3. This paper was 
published in the transactions of the Institution of Mining Engineers in 
the United Kingdom, The Mining Engineer, in August 1988. 
  
5.8 Early Mine Development 
Throughout 1987 and 1988, during the early development and build-up 
of production at the mine, there were many investigations, 
optimisations and technical exercises carried out and, in addition, a 
substantial learning curve had to be overcome by the mining and 
engineering personnel, most of whom were experiencing trackless 
mechanised mining for the first time. Some of these issues can be 
discussed here. 
 
5.8.1 Rock Mechanics Considerations 
As more knowledge of underground strata conditions became 
available during early development operations at H.J.Joel Mine 
and also information from the neighbouring Beatrix Mine, it was 
necessary to review the support system for the mine. The 
changing conditions at the mine would lead to the consideration 
of various options. Originally it was considered that timber props 
and yielding reef pillars would be the support system and later the 
use of timber props and grout base packs was favoured. 
Nevertheless it was stated in the October 1985 motivational 
report that the use of backfill was to be investigated. 
 
In terms of a technical evaluation of the effectiveness of all the 
above options it became evident that a backfill method would 
provide the best support system for the mine, this taking 
cognizance of the potential for inrushes of water as mining would 
be taking place in a deep aquifer. There would also be a need for 
regional pillars but to a certain extent this would be provided for 
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by fault losses due to the increasing number of N-S faults being 
encountered in the early development work. 
 
Design work therefore commenced for the introduction of 
uncemented backfill material over the total stoped out workings. 
 
5.8.2 Ventilation 
In Phase 1 of the operation, final calculations for the main fans’ 
duties, taking cognizance of the trackless equipment planned for, 
would be 350 – 360 m³/sec of air at the density of 1kg/m³. The 
expectation of hot fissure water could cause relatively high wet 
bulb temperatures which would necessitate that heat tolerance 
testing facilities would have to be made available. In addition, the 
start of Phase 2 of the mine, where operations would be in the 
northern deeper part of the mine, would dictate the installation of 
a refrigeration system. 
 
5.8.3 Structural Geology 
In 1988 it became clear that the immediate area of the mine being 
developed from the No 3/4 Shaft system was significantly more 
affected by faulting than was at first thought, specifically N–S 
faulting, which was to break up the mining area into smaller 
blocks. In addition, the dip of the reef was much steeper than had 
been originally expected. This improved understanding of the 
geology would certainly have necessitated an increase in 
development if conventional mining had been planned for, and 
the advantages of trackless mining, when negotiating geological 
faults between mining blocks, was therefore clearly proven. 
 
5.8.4 Cover Drilling 
At the time of the original Feasibility Study it was known that the 
neighbouring Beatrix Mine had intersected water fissures on 
dykes and faults and it was anticipated that water intersections 
would occur at H.J.Joel Mine. However, no specific information 
had been gained from exploration drilling. As elsewhere in the 
Free State Goldfields the area of the project was characterized by 
the confined (deep) Ventersdorp and Witwatersrand aquifer 
which is overlain by the relatively impermeable Karoo sequence. 
The free ground water table in the Karoo sequence was measured 
prior to the commencement of work at H.J.Joel Mine and the 
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average below ground level was 20 metres. Prior to the 
commencement of mining at Beatrix Mine in 1980 it is believed 
that the pressure head in the deep aquifer was about 110 metres 
below ground level. However as mining operations expanded at 
Beatrix this water level continued to drop. This was to be 
expected but in early 1986 when the Beatrix Mine was close to 
being flooded following a major water intersection it was decided 
to drastically intensify cover drilling and cementation during shaft 
sinking at H.J.Joel Mine and this continued during MSL 
development operations. This was a very necessary step to take as 
only limited pumping capacity was in place during the early 
sinking and development phase.  In order to significantly reduce 
the risk of any inundation, it was decided to drill the cover round 
from the face thereby causing development of the end to stop 
while cover drilling was taking place. Thus the development in 
such an end was restricted and thereby partially negated the 
advantages of trackless mechanised development. The rate of 
advance in development ends was further reduced by the 
necessity for diamond drilling which was much slower than 
percussion drilling; however, this was decided for safety reasons 
when more control could be exercised in the event of striking 
water. Only in late 1988, when the deep aquifer had been de-
watered to well below 60 Level, did cover drilling operations 
revert to percussion drilling, carried out simultaneously with 
development. 
 
5.8.5 Methane Gas 
Associated with the large quantities of fissure water was methane, 
which was present in solution and later released into the 
underground workings. Emissions of methane would occur during 
pumping operations and also when de-watering caused a lowering 
of the water table of the deep aquifer. Under these conditions, as 
was generally the case in the southern Free State Goldfields, 
certain regulations which applied to fiery mines were also made 
applicable to the H.J.Joel Mine. 
 
In terms of the directive from the office of the Chief Inspector of 
Mines in Virginia, it was necessary for the mine manager to 
compile a Methane Manual which was both comprehensive and 
had wide implications for the operation of trackless equipment. In 
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the preparation of this manual the mine manager was assisted by 
the document “Flammable Gas in Metal Mines, A Guide for 
Managers” dated October 1989 and based on the original Guide 
published by the Association of Mine Managers, Orange Free 
State Branch in 1973. Since the issue of the original guide 
cognizance had been taken of the revised regulations which 
prohibited any work when the flammable gas concentration was 
above 1%, thereby necessitating the mandatory use of accurate 
flammable gas detecting instruments. Refer to Annexure 5.4 in 
Volume 3 for the contents of this manual and see Section 2 which 
is specifically relevant for trackless drill rigs in use at the mine.  
 
 On a brief technical visit to the United Kingdom in August 1987, 
KAR observed a control system at Selby Colliery whereby the 
underground environment was being monitored from a surface 
control room. At that colliery, at every working face, a sensor 
head was transmitting to surface the concentration of methane in 
the general body of the air, and outbye of the face, a further 
monitoring device was recording the roof layer. This system for a 
gassy mine was considered invaluable and would later be 
introduced by KAR for the H.J.Joel Mine. 
 
5.8.6 Stope Face Drilling and Blasting 
It had been assumed in early motivations that the stope face 
would be drilled conventionally with pneumatic jackhammers. 
However, by 1988 it had become a commitment to introduce a 
hydraulic rig (the Stomec stope rig) to improve the efficiency of 
the project. 
 
The blasting system, which still had to be finalised, would 
incorporate delay detonators for improved throw and to minimise 
cut-offs; nonel or magnadets would be the choice. 
 
5.8.7 Dilution Control 
The operation of large trackless machines in narrow reef 
conditions was always going to be challenging. It had been shown 
that waste dilution from the trackless mining method should not 
be greater than for a conventional operation. It had also been 
shown that the theoretical volume available for packing in 
worked-out areas would always be greater than the volume of 
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rock to be blasted in development operations hence proving that 
it was theoretically possible to pack all the broken waste, 
notwithstanding that it had been planned to only tram 60% of the 
total waste to worked-out areas. However, it had been estimated 
that if all the waste from on reef development was allowed to be 
sent as reef to the mill then the waste content of tons milled 
would be 18%. The necessity to exercise control over waste 
tramming was therefore obvious to everybody. 
 
5.8.8 Optimisation Exercises 
During the early period of shaft sinking there were opportunities 
for KAR to consider optimisations to the mine plan. One such 
proposal was to develop a ramp between 60 Level and 70 Level 
thereby eliminating the need for a workshop on 70 Level and 
making use of the 60 Level main workshop complex. The cost 
savings of this proposal were R100 000, which in today’s 2013 
terms would be R1,2 million. There were also non-quantifiable 
benefits to be gained from this proposal, mainly that engineering 
maintenance supervision would be improved due to the 
concentration of all services in one workshop. Also the overall 
supervision of the mine would be improved by a connection 
between the two levels for supervisors’ vehicles; in the original 
plan access between the two levels was by means of a vertical 
shaft only. 
 
This proposal, submitted to the Consulting Engineer, motivated by 
the cost saving and supported by the Capital Projects Control 
(CPC) Department, was approved; refer to memorandum dated 16 
June 1986 and supporting document from CPC in Figures 5.7, 5.7A 
and 5.7B. 
 
Further proof of the flexibility of the trackless method of mining 
was an exercise related to 70 Level operations. In terms of the 
Option 10 Plan, 70 Level was planned as a gathering haulage with 
trackless access on 60 Level. Geological information which came to  
light in  early 1987  caused  70 Level  to  have  a dual purpose: a 
gathering haulage by means of dump trucks and as a trackless 
access to a portion of one of the blocks (Block A) also accessed by 
60 Level, this being necessary due to a fault having divided Block 
A. The rail gathering haulage was then planned for 90 Level. 
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FIGURE 5.7 
 
Optimisation Proposal for Ramp from 60 Level to 70 Level 
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FIGURE 5.7A 
 
Cost Variation: Cancel Workshop on 70 Level and Develop Ramp from 60L to 70L 
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FIGURE 5.7B 
 
Cost Saving: Ramp Optimisation Proposal 
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5.8.9 Equipment 
As the project gathered momentum in 1987 and into 1988 there 
were certain matters to consider with regard to equipment 
selection. 
 
Size of Equipment 
The equipment selected for the H.J.Joel Project was detailed in the 
Option 10 motivation report and was agreed to. In fact, the same 
size of equipment had been recommended and accepted for the 
95L UEIA narrow reef project at Cooke 2 Shaft, REGM, previously 
discussed in Chapter 4. When taking cognizance of the known 
geology and structure of the orebody at the time of the initial 
motivation report, the selection of the equipment for the H.J.Joel 
Mine had been well considered. However, in those areas where 
the reef had been found to be generally narrower than expected it 
had been necessary to downsize some of the equipment on the 
reef horizon. Nevertheless, such a decision complied with the 
general principle of selecting the largest size machine possible, 
always taking cognizance of roadway dimensions and the possible 
effect of dilution. 
 
Rigs 
Six standard face rigs, capable of drilling a 3,8 metre hole, had 
been ordered. In addition two face rigs, with telescopic chain 
feeds capable of drilling a 2,8m roofbolt hole in a single pass in a 
height of 4,8 metres, had also been ordered; the same machines 
were also able to drill a 3,2 metre face hole. Early experience had 
shown that for the successful operation of electro-hydraulic drill 
rigs constant attention had to be given to numerous factors, some 
of which are identified below. 
 
It was necessary to establish a standard procedure for boom 
movements during the drilling of a round and once determined it 
was essential to exercise discipline over the operators. Such a 
typical sequence is seen in Figures 5.8 and 5.8A for the two boom 
drill rig; left hand boom (green), right hand boom (red).  
 
The use of check list procedures by rig operators was vital with the 
necessary follow-up inspections by supervisory officials. In this 
respect the  mechanical equipment supervisor was a key person.  
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FIGURE 5.8 
 
Typical Boom Sequence for a Two Boom Drill Rig 
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FIGURE 5.8A 
 
Boom Sequence for Two Boom Rig with Details of Cut 
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It was important that supervisory staff, including senior 
management, had to be aware of the more important supervisory 
points in order to exercise proper  control  over  the  operation; 
failure to master these skills would cause costs to spiral out of 
control and reduce the drilled metres per shift. 
 
It had become clear that poor operator performance, whether 
due to limited skills or plain abuse of the machine, would reduce 
drill string life markedly. Particular attention had to be given to 
hole collaring and bit removal. Incorrectly adjusted pressures 
would also exacerbate the problem. 
 
It was also important to monitor drifter performance, the single 
most costly component of drill rig costs. 
 
Roofbolters 
Two dedicated roofbolters had been ordered, each with two 
booms to be able to drill a 1,8 metre roofbolt hole in a height of 
3,3 metres in a two pass system; the second boom with a hanging 
basket enabled a person to change rods and install the bolt. 
 
Face rigs were not used for roofbolting operations with the sole 
exception of the telescopic rigs, previously referred to, which had 
been introduced purposefully for the development of the high 
workings close to the shafts, for example in the workshop area. 
 
The introduction of an automatic roofbolter had proved difficult 
due to the necessity to install the standard approved 2,7 metre 
long roofbolt. This same problem of simple geometry had 
occurred at the Cooke 2 Shaft 90 Level E8 Project and the same 
two pass roofbolters were introduced there and were still 
working. However, after two years of consideration and 
discussions with a specific OEM it had become possible to 
recommend a  dedicated automatic roofbolter (a Robolt) which 
would be able to operate in the footwall service declines and 
ramps without necessitating any additional height. This new 
machine, operated by one man, would vastly improve the safety 
of the operation: all the functions necessary to drill the hole and 
install the bolt would be carried out safely by remote control with 
the operator in the cabin or under a safety canopy. 
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LHD’s/Trucks 
In terms of LHD requirements a later decision was taken to 
purchase two 7m³ units, the remaining six units being 4,6m³. This 
decision to opt for the two larger units was motivated by the 
(initial) long tramming distances from MSL waste development on 
60 Level before the introduction of trucks was possible; the timing 
of the completion of the main tip being the crucial factor. The 7m³ 
machine proved to be a workhorse on both 60 Level and 70 Level. 
In fact, in terms of size the 7m³ unit was marginally narrower 
(bucket width) than the 4,6m³ machine. Refer to photographs of 
7m³ LHD on surface and underground in Figure 5.9 and 5.9A. 
 
The 4,6m³ LHD’s and the 24 ton trucks operated well together, 
specifically in main development work. However, it was realised 
that when narrower reef than planned for originally had been 
encountered it had become necessary to reconsider the size of 
equipment on the reef horizon in order to control dilution. 
 
Refer to photographs of 24 ton truck at the 60L main station tip in 
Figures 5.10 and 5.10A.  
 
5.8.10Workshops 
Construction of the main workshop on 60 Level was carried out 
through 1987 and 1988, refer to Figure 5.11 for a sketch of the 
original workshop layout. Refer to photographs in Annexure 5.5 in 
Volume 3 showing the workshop both under construction and 
partially completed. 
 
5.8.11 Technical Audits 
From the outset of operations, arrangements were made with the 
responsible OEM’s to carry out technical audits of their equipment 
and also for them  to  assess  operators’ skills. Drilling audits were 
particularly important in order to maintain performance and for the 
control of drill rig costs, including drill string. Also, every 
opportunity was taken to gain technical knowledge from OEM 
specialists when they were visiting South Africa from overseas. 
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FIGURE 5.9 
 
7m³ LHD on Surface 
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FIGURE 5.9A 
 
7m³ LHD Working Underground 
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FIGURE 5.10 
 
24 Ton Truck at 60 Level Main Station Tip 
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FIGURE 5.10A 
 
24 Ton Truck Tipping at 60 Level Main Station Tip with Impact Breaker 
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FIGURE 5.11 
 
Original Workshop Layout on 60 Level Station: refer to Annexure 5.2 Volume 3 
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5.8.12 Damage 
Damage and abuse to equipment is not uncommon throughout 
the mining industry world-wide, particularly in underground mines 
and where operators’ skills are only considered to be less than 
average. At a new project like at H.J.Joel Mine damage could have 
been particularly high and it was therefore extremely important to 
exercise control from the outset. Firstly a damage investigation 
procedure was agreed upon; this investigation was initiated by the 
responsible project engineer and followed through by the MES.  
 
Following the investigation a report would be forwarded to the 
responsible manager and resident engineer before being finally 
signed off by the mine manager. Full documentation of every 
incident, with the relevant approved disciplinary action which had 
been taken, was being kept by the mine manager in a damage 
book for future reference and action. Damage and abuse of 
equipment can be extremely costly to an operation and, more 
importantly, the loss of production caused by such damage is 
never easy to quantify but is undoubtedly very significant. 
 
It was for these reasons that damage control was an early key 
issue and which also highlighted the importance for training 
programmes for operators, supervisors and management and the 
need for the MES to exercise driver discipline from the beginning; 
in fact, the appointment of the MES was made before the delivery 
of any equipment to the mine. 
 
The early appointment of the MES was based on the experience of 
KAR at Cooke 2 Shaft, REGM where such an appointment had 
been made for the first time. This decision was vindicated as soon 
as trackless development commenced at H.J.Joel Mine. Because of 
the inexperienced staff and the difficulties of recruitment, and the 
fact that operators and supervisors had only limited, if any, 
experience with the concept of trackless mechanised mining, 
there was significant damage to equipment from the outset 
specifically in the first year of operations in 1987. During 1987 the 
mine was considering the recruitment of operators from Prieska 
Copper Mine in the Northern Cape of South Africa which was 
winding down its operations towards the end of its life. It was 
interesting to learn from Prieska that in the first twelve months of 
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an operator’s appointment disciplinary action for damage and 
abuse of equipment was very high but it fell away markedly after 
that period. Therefore, damage could be expected to be high early 
in the mine’s development programme. However, without the 
discipline exercised through the appointment of the MES from the 
outset and a damage investigation programme driven by KAR as 
the mine manager, damage could easily have spiralled totally out 
of control. As it was, in 1987 damage was still occurring almost 
daily, as reflected on the daily reports from the MES. 
 
5.8.13Recruitment and Training 
Undoubtedly the biggest challenge to the success of the mine, in 
the first two years of mine development, was the recruitment and 
retention of personnel, both mining and engineering, at operator 
and artisan level and also in supervisory positions.  
 
Recruitment 
From 1987 the major issue at H.J.Joel Mine, which affected the 
level of skills, was recruitment. The mine was a long way from JCI’s 
gold mining operations in the Transvaal and it proved very difficult 
to persuade even a limited number of officials and supervisory 
staff to transfer to the Orange Free State. Also, for similar reasons 
it was not easy to recruit people with any experience from other 
mines. Even after recruitment it proved difficult to retain skills: in 
the first year of operations there was a turnover of 60% of 
production supervisory staff, both mining and engineering. 
 
It was also difficult to recruit new employees with the right basic 
qualifications to be trained as operators. All new candidates for 
training had first to undergo psychometric testing before being 
accepted and the failure rate at the beginning was disturbingly 
high; see overleaf a letter, sent to the mine manager from the JCI 
appointed industrial psychologist and via the  JCI Senior  Personnel 
Officer based at Battery Reef Training Centre, which refers to the 
difficulties of recruiting candidates for trackless equipment 
operator training. 
 
During 1987 and early 1988 attempts were made to recruit 
operators from far afield in South Africa, from Prieska Copper 
Mine  nearing the  end of  its life  and  also  from the du Toits Kloof  
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Tunnel Project which was nearing completion and where KAR had 
visited in 1986. A recruitment drive for artisans was also directed 
overseas with some limited success. Artisan skills was a particular 
problem as there were few skills available and to some  extent  
labour  brokers  had  stepped in to commandeer their skills; 
therefore the mine was also employing contract artisans through 
these companies. 
  
Training 
There was the need to train operators and supervisors working for 
the first time on a highly mechanised operation which was totally 
different and more highly demanding than work on a conventional 
gold mine.  
 
At any new trackless mechanised mining project skills training is 
vital for operators, artisans, supervisors (both mining and 
engineering), engineers and managers. In this respect all suppliers 
of equipment (OEM’s) had the responsibility to provide training 
programmes related to their specific equipment, these 
programmes being part of any package deal when purchasing an 
OEM’s equipment. One such programme for supervisors (including 
managers and engineers) was compiled by the OEM supplying drill 
rigs. The theoretical part of this programme was set out in a series 
of simple drawings which identified components and also good 
and bad practices; this short training course proved highly 
beneficial and is considered of such importance that a copy of the 
course, with KAR’s handwritten notes (in red), is attached as 
Annexure 5.6 in Volume 3.  
 
The importance of this supervisory training could not be over 
emphasised. Reports from the MES were constantly referring to 
instructions being given to the operators by too many people and 
the danger there was that untrained supervisors were giving 
instructions to trained operators, causing driver frustration. 
Another issue which often lead to conflict was that operators had 
a pre-conceived mind-set that their job was to drive a machine 
and at first they did not accept that if the machine was under 
maintenance or breakdown, they would be required by their 
supervisors to do other work, such as working on the 
improvement of roadbeds. 
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The initial training of operators following the selection procedures 
was the responsibility of Battery Reef Training Centre (BRTC) at 
Randfontein; this facility was set up by JCI for trackless equipment 
training for the Group’s gold mines. 
 
As with supervisory staff it was proving difficult to stabilise the 
complement of operators. In the first year there was a high 
absenteeism, particularly on weekends and Mondays; there was 
also a high desertion rate. In many cases, where operators were 
new to mining, they were unable to adjust to underground 
working conditions. Even after the first nine months of 
development work there was a deficiency of 25 operators of a 
planned complement of 100 and as operators were classified 
upwards from in-training through ‘C’, ‘B’ to ‘A’ it was significant 
there existed no ‘A’ category operators. In an attempt to improve 
on this situation a revised procedure for engaging and initial 
training was devised in discussions between the MES and BRTC. 
The crux of this proposal was that initial tests would take place at 
the mine and if satisfactory candidates would go to BRTC for full 
testing only. If the candidate passed both tests he would return to 
the H.J.Joel Mine for a period of say three months to work as an 
engineering or mining helper, in other words, a candidate 
operator who would be monitored by the MES on his attitude, 
presence at work (time and attendance), willingness to learn and 
work, self-discipline and generally prove himself worthy to be 
trained as an operator. Following a successful interim period at 
the mine he would return to BRTC for operator training. 
 
5.8.14Standards 
Juxtaposed with the training programmes was the necessity to 
develop standards for the operation and maintenance of trackless 
equipment. It must also be realised that H.J.Joel Mine was a 
totally new greenfields operation and all procedures and job 
procedures were required to be set out, not only those relating to 
trackless equipment. The total number of such standards signed 
off by KAR in the early years, were in the hundreds, relating to 
shaft sinking, MSL procedures, ventilation, engineering 
procedures, in addition to all the trackless mining requirements. In 
fact, if they were all to be included in this record of work it would 
warrant a manual in itself. For examples of some very early 
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managerial instructions related specifically to trackless mining, 
refer to Annexure 5.7 in Volume 3 for directives forbidding the 
cannibalization of equipment, any breaches of which would be 
severely dealt with; general instructions for the operation of 
trackless equipment; special instructions to LHD drivers clearly 
stating that the LHD was to be used for cleaning operations only; a 
directive how to manage roadbeds including the control of water. 
These instructions were typical of the time, being hand-written by 
KAR, the mine manager; later directives and standards were of 
course more formalised. 
 
A supervision report was also designed at that time specifically for 
trackless development which would assist front line supervisors. 
 
5.8.15Management, Men and Morale 
Mining managers, firstly, had to have the required engineering 
technical knowledge in order to be able to manage and direct 
mechanised operations. Secondly, mining managers had to be 
committed to the engineering function. Mining managers were 
responsible for the operations or production whilst engineering 
managers were responsible for the maintenance and therefore the 
availability of the machines. Both had their independent 
responsibilities but they had to work as a team and it was the job 
of KAR to ensure that this happened. Wherever possible, 
advantage was taken for senior officials to visit Cooke 2 Shaft 
REGM to view progress and improve their knowledge and even to 
criticise where they thought it necessary; these visits were 
followed by reports which were distributed at senior level. Audits 
by the OEM’s (and other audits by overseas experts) were 
scrutinised, discussed and action taken; even audits carried out for 
Cooke 2 Shaft, REGM followed the same procedure. All these 
reports and the relevant discussions were part of the objective of 
acquiring technical knowledge. 
 
With a committed higher management team it was necessary to 
improve morale throughout the organisation from the top down 
to the lowest level. There were certain key stages: convince the 
men that the plan could be achieved; continuously talk to the men 
in order to motivate for a higher performance; maintain high 
standards of work and carry out major construction work on day 
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shift only, under senior supervision; inform crews of performance 
and encourage competition between crews (use information 
boards for daily progress, for example, record the fastest round); 
maintain equipment in first class condition. It was also vital to 
have motivational briefings to emphasise objectives and safety 
standards. These would be month end gatherings for motivation 
and morale building. The address by the mine manager would 
explain overall monthly performance and would always motivate 
and strive for a higher performance. 
 
The development of a new mine, and this mine was the first of its 
kind in South Africa, developed from farmland in the middle of the 
northern OFS, was not going to happen without some degree of 
autocratic management. Notwithstanding, KAR did introduce a 
concept typified by an acronym: ARA. ARA meant authority 
(delegated down within defined parameters), with the 
commensurate responsibility which makes one accountable for 
one’s action. What KAR was attempting to put in place was a clear 
cut line of command where one’s authority was known and when 
decisions were taken at all levels within defined parameters to suit 
the circumstances of a newly developing trackless gold mine. 
 
5.9 Trackless Mining Symposium 1988 
In February 1988 at the Trackless Mining Symposium held in 
Johannesburg and initiated by the Association of Mine Managers of 
South Africa (AMMSA), the paper “The Design of a New Trackless Gold 
Mine” by K.A.Rhodes, Mine Manager, H.J.Joel Gold Mining Company 
Limited, was presented and later published in the transactions of 
AMMSA. A copy of this paper is attached as Annexure 5.8 in Volume 3. 
 
This paper was awarded the AMMSA medal for the best paper 
presented at the symposium. 
 
5.10 Postscript to Chapter 5 
On 21 October 1988 the H.J.Joel Gold Mine was officially opened and the 
first gold pour ceremoniously carried out. The opening of the mine took 
place only three years after the first motivational report had been 
submitted for a change in the design of the mine from conventional 
mining to a trackless mechanised mining method. It had therefore taken 
only three years to change what existed originally as two farms, 
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Leeuwbult and Leeuwfontein, into a producing gold mine, the first 
trackless gold mine in South Africa. 
The mine was named after Jim Joel. He retired as chairman of Johnnies 
(JCI) in 1962 and at the time of the opening of the mine he was still alive 
at the age of 92 years. H.J (Jim) Joel was the last significant family link 
with the company founded by Barney Barnato in 1889 which was 
registered as the Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Company Ltd.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
205 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
 
 
 
Establishment of the Waterval Mine, 
Rustenburg Platinum Mines 
 
 
 
 
 
 
206 
 
CHAPTER 6 
Establishment of the Waterval Mine, Rustenburg Platinum Mines 
 
In this chapter KAR will relate to his involvement in the Waterval Project, a 
new platinum mine part of Rustenburg Platinum Mines. The chapter will also 
define his work as a mining consultant on the introduction of low profile 
mechanised equipment for narrow tabular reefs prior to the establishment of 
the Waterval Mine. 
 
6.1 Introduction 
At the end of 1995 KAR formed his own single member consultancy, KAR 
Mining Consultant cc and worked extensively as a consultant to Anglo 
American Platinum Limited (Amplats). This work was mainly focussed on 
the use of trackless mechanised equipment in narrow reef platinum 
orebodies. A most important milestone in this respect was an 
investigative report into the use of trackless mechanised mining in 
narrow reef stope widths; this report being submitted to Amplats in June 
1999. What followed from this investigative report was the 
establishment of the Waterval Platinum Mine at Rustenburg Platinum 
Mines. The mine has since been re-named Bathopele Mine, but for the 
purpose of this exposition the name Waterval has been retained as all 
relevant documentation refers to Waterval Mine. 
 
6.2 Availability of Low Profile Trackless Equipment in 1999 
In the year 1999 there was seen to be a need to improve productivity 
and reduce operating costs at Amplats’ mines and, therefore, the 
objective of the investigative report referred to above was to consider 
the application of trackless mechanised equipment in a mining width of 
1,5 metres; this was later to be amended to 1,8 metres. Indeed, that 
perception in 1999 is even more valid today in 2014 than it was then as 
operating costs on platinum mines continue to escalate while metal 
prices stagnate. 
 
           It was intended to split this investigation into two phases. Phase 1 was 
the investigative survey to identify low profile drilling and loading 
equipment capable of working in narrow reef widths; a subsequent 
phase would be to define methods of mining and examine their viability 
at Amplats’ mines. The investigation necessitated holding discussions 
with all original equipment manufacturers (OEM’s) as to their current 
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available equipment and also to find out if they were intending to 
pursue the development of low profile equipment. In this respect a 
matrix of drilling and loading equipment was systematically set out in 
the report. From this matrix it could be concluded that there was at that 
time only limited equipment available which would be capable of 
working in a planned mining width of 1,5 metres. Machines capable of 
working in narrow widths were identified as a drill rig, manufactured by 
Tamrock in France, which was intended to be used on South African 
chrome mines; at the time four machines had arrived in South Africa 
with the first rig sent to Millsell Chrome Mine. GHH were also 
manufacturing LHD’s in South Africa and Germany. It was also learnt that 
low profile equipment was operating on KGHM’s copper mines in 
Poland. The existence of low profile equipment working at KGHM’s 
mines was clearly significant to this project. 
 
The recommendations of this report were then set out. 
6.2.1 To carry out a hands-on visit to KGHM’s mines in Poland. 
 
6.2.2 Subject to a positive report on KGHM’s operations, it was then a 
recommendation to define mining methods and explore the 
viability of all possible trackless options. 
 
6.2.3 It was also necessary to define the requirements and costs of 
operating trackless equipment in a 1,8 metre mining width at a 
new mine such as Waterval. 
 
A copy of the investigative report An Investigation into the Availability 
of Low Profile Trackless Mechanised Mining Equipment for Narrow 
Stope Widths by K.A.Rhodes dated June 1999 is attached as Annexure 
6.1  in Volume 4. 
 
6.3 Visit to KGHM’s Mines 
In terms of the recommendations of the investigative report, submitted 
to Amplats by K.A.Rhodes, a visit to Poland took place in October 1999. 
Accompanying K.A.Rhodes on this visit were senior officials of Amplats. 
Also on this visit discussions relating to LHD’s were held with GHH in 
Germany and in discussions with Tamrock in Austria it was confirmed by 
Tamrock that they had set their sights on a full range of low profile 
capital equipment. However, it was in Poland at KGHM’s Polkowice –
Sierozowice mines that full scale trackless mining in narrow reef 
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conditions was seen (but not down to 1,5 metres). However, LHD’s in 
use had insufficient carrying capacity and were therefore considered 
unsatisfactory. 
 
Nonetheless, the overall general conclusions to be drawn from the visit 
to Poland was that it was now important to obtain proposals from the 
major OEM’s for a full suite of equipment,  able to operate in a mining 
width of 1,8 metres with a maximum machine height of 1,4 metres. The 
visit therefore provided the opportunity for KAR to initiate a new 
trackless mining design for Waterval Mine. 
 
Brief notes on the visits to these mines and mine companies,  Notes on 
the visit in October 1999 to Germany, Austria and Poland, compiled at 
the time by K.A.Rhodes, are attached as Annexure 6.2 and can be seen 
in Volume 4. 
 
6.4 Waterval Platinum Mine 
In October 2000 the contract for the project management of Amplats’ 
new Waterval Mine was awarded to Townsend Van Der Walt and 
Partners, Consulting Engineers (TWP) and KAR was asked by Amplats to 
be mining consultant for the project. Notwithstanding that a feasibility 
report had been completed by Amplats, this was an opportunity to 
design and consult on a new platinum mine which would employ 
trackless equipment from the outset. 
 
The mining method would be room and pillar operating on the UG2 Reef 
horizon on full dip of not more than 10° . This would be the first major 
operation by Amplats to exploit the UG2 reef; up until then there had 
been only limited mining of the UG2 reef at other shafts at Rustenburg 
Platinum Mines. 
 
6.4.1 Access to Mine 
The control budget estimate (CBE) for the Waterval Mine provided 
for two decline systems (East and West). However, it was believed 
by KAR that in order to reduce technical risk to manageable levels 
it was necessary to sink three decline systems (East, Central and 
West). With reference to Figure 6.1, the arguments for this 
proposal were set out as follows. 
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FIGURE 6.1 
 
Three Decline Systems: East, Central and West 
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West Mine 
At the West Mine it was considered most improbable that any 
production panel mining would take place beyond the Hex River 
fault (refer to Figure 6.1). The reason for this was based on 
experience of mining the Merensky Reef and more recently the 
experience gained on the UG2 Reef at the nearby Paardekraal 
Shaft. It was also considered most likely that approximately 50% 
of any mining operations at the West Mine would be affected by 
rolling reef conditions where amplitudes of 4 to 5 metres could be 
common; this opinion was also based on recent experience at 
Paardekraal Shaft. It should be recorded that KAR had wide 
experience of rolling reef conditions on the Merensky Reef as 
manager of Townlands Shaft in the late 1970’s. Taking cognizance 
of these factors KAR recommended that the West Mine decline 
development be moved west by approximately 500 metres (again 
refer to Figure 6.1). 
 
Although previously it had been assumed that total mine 
production would be split equally between East and West Mines, 
it was now recommended that the West Mine’s planned 
production should be (say) one third only. 
 
East Mine 
Following from the recommendations for the West Mine, it then 
followed that the East Mine should be planned for an output of 
approximately two thirds of total mine production. However, in 
order to limit any technical risk it was further proposed to develop 
two decline systems east of the Hex River fault. There were 
several reasons for this proposal: two declines would accelerate 
the opening up of the area; there would be an increased 
geographical exposure to geological information related to the 
best mining cut (UG2 only or UG2 + Leader in the hanging wall of 
the UG2); two major points of attack would reduce the risk of any 
sudden loss of face, specifically due to pothole activity which 
could be significant; improved flexibility in terms of face 
availability which was important for trackless mechanised 
operations. 
 
The access options and change of scope design parameters, 
intended to be used for capex estimates, were compiled and 
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submitted by KAR on 19 November and 27 November 
respectively; see Waterval UG2 Project Access Options and 
Change of Scope Design Parameters by KAR, in Annexure 6.3  
included in Volume 4. 
 
6.4.2 Access Development 
The Waterval UG2 Project CBE and also the subsequent mining 
development enquiry document had provided for three on reef 
access declines at each decline system. KAR did not believe that 
this was the best practical way to develop a mine based on the 
room and pillar layout; it was considered that additional access 
decline roadways were necessary (to act as ‘ledging’ roadways) in 
order to accelerate the opening up of production stoping sections 
off the main development. This recommendation to open up the 
mine by means of five on reef decline roadways as proposed by 
KAR was agreed to by Amplats. Refer to Figure 6.2 for general 
layout of on reef mine development. 
 
6.4.3 Mine Design 
The normal UG2 chromitite has a width or thickness of the order 
of 0,65 metres to 0,85 metres. The lower contact of the UG2 
occurs above a pegmatoidal pyroxenite of approximately 10 – 30 
centimetres in thickness, which is underlain by norite , generally in 
excess of 10 metres. The hanging wall to the UG2 is a feldspathic 
pyroxenite of varying thickness. The overlying strata of pyroxenite 
contains several chromitite layers and the first hanging wall 
chromitite above the UG2 is generally a substantial chromitite 
seam, typically 20 – 30 centimetres in thickness and is known as 
the UG2 Leader; its location relative to the UG2 is of great 
significance. There are other chromitite occurrences in the 
hanging wall, including what is known as the ‘triplets’. 
 
The location of the UG2 Leader above the main UG2 Reef dictates 
the mining width. In general at Waterval Mine the middling 
between the UG2 Reef and the UG2 Leader was too great and 
would normally preclude the mining of both together. Therefore it 
was planned to mine only the UG2 Reef with footwall (norite) 
waste to make up the mining width to 1,80 metres, a stoping 
width considered necessary for total mechanisation of the project; 
refer  again  to  the  investigative report, compiled by  KAR, on the  
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FIGURE 6.2 
 
General Layout of On Reef Mine Development 
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availability of low profile machines for narrow stoping widths. 
 
Room and pillar was the choice of mining method working on a 
full dip of 9°, this dip being generally consistent.  It was now 
considered feasible to operate mechanised equipment on a true 
dip (with production panels on strike) of up to (say) 10° and 
therefore it was not deemed necessary to use the stepped room 
and pillar configuration as was adopted for the 90 Level E8 Project 
at REGM in the mid-1980’s (refer to Chapter 3). All mining 
operations would be mechanised: face drilling, loading, 
roofbolting, charging up operations and transport. Transfer of reef 
to surface would be by means of conveyors. 
 
Production Parameters 
The planned UG2 reef production was for 140 000 tons/month. 
Assuming   
UG2 S.G.     = 4,0 
UG2 Reef channel width  = 0,80 metres 
F/W waste S.G.   = 2,9 
Waste mined   = 1,00 metres 
Then 
M² reef mined   = 140000 ÷  (4,0 x 0,8) 
     = 43750m² 
Tons waste    = 43750 x 2,9 x 1,0 
     = 126875 tons 
 
Therefore total tons broken = 266875 tons 
In fact it was assumed that 270 000 tons would be broken in total 
per month (140000 tons UG2 reef + 130000 footwall waste). 
 
An important issue in the early design stages was the amount of 
waste to be separated and left underground and this will still be 
discussed. 
 
Mine Access 
As previously stated, there would be three decline systems. 
However, in establishing the mine only two declines would initially 
be developed; East and Central. The West Mine would only be 
developed at a later date. Each decline would have a conveyor 
and  space  for  the  movement of  trackless  machines. During the  
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sinking of the two access declines it was planned to develop 
muckbays to a depth of 10 metres in order to reduce LHD 
tramming distances (LHD cleaning direct to surface) during the 
face cleaning cycle, thereby enabling face drilling and final rock 
clearance to take place simultaneously. 
 
Generalised Mining Layout 
All operations were on the reef horizon, the only exceptions being 
the main access declines and the necessary reef transfer 
arrangements at the bottom of each main decline.  
 
The general opening up of the mine would be by means  of a five 
road development (changed from three roadways) from which 
production sections would take place on strike. Main roadway 
dimensions were planned at 6,50 metres wide x 1,80 metres high 
with the central conveyor roadway being 2,0 metres high. 
Production panels were to be turned off at 5° above strike from 
the main development. 
 
Panel Geometry 
The main parameters of the room and pillar layout were rooms at 
14 metres wide; initially pillars would be 6 metres on strike and 5 
metres on dip but increasing with depth; pillar holings were 
planned to be 6,5 metres on dip, theoretical extraction being 87%. 
There were no barrier pillars planned for. 
 
Cycle of Operations 
Mining would take place on two shifts of 10 hours for six days a 
week. 
 
The full suite of equipment would operate in a height of 1,80 
metres. In terms of the aforementioned investigative report by 
KAR, such a suite of equipment would be available from major 
OEM’s. The basic cycle parameters would provide for single boom 
face drill rigs which would drill a round of not less than 3,2 metres; 
blasting with emulsion explosives; loading out of the face by a 6 
ton low profile LHD; roofbolting using low profile single or double 
boom rigs with both manual rod handling and bolt installation. 
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Full reports from the responsible consultants for rock engineering 
and ventilation were submitted later. A draft skeleton document  
outlining the mining design criteria Waterval UG2 Project: Mining 
Design Criteria by K.A.Rhodes, dated June 2001, is attached as 
Annexure 6.4  in Volume 4. 
 
6.4.4 Equipment Requirements and Equipment Selection 
The tender document called for a fleet of equipment comprising 
18 (6ton) LHD’s, 14 single boom drill rigs and 14 roofbolters; these 
requirements were based on the following calculations. 
 
LHD’s 
Using the formulae for performance (P) 
P = 51 x L ÷ T +        2D        
    S x 16,67 
Where: 
L = 6 ton capacity 
D = one way worst tramming distance of 100 metres 
T = loading, manoeuvring and tipping of 3 minutes 
S = average speed of LHD at 6kph 
Therefore 
P = 51 x 6 ÷ 3 +     2 x 100     
      6 x 16,67 
 
 = 61 (say) 60 tons/hour 
For 280 hours/month working time the tonnage of 270000 
tons/month would require 16 units. If it is assumed that 
performance on development down dip will be marginally less 
than in stope panels it was prudent to assume for 18 units. 
 
Therefore number of 6 ton LHD’s required was 18. 
 
Drill Rigs 
In a 14 metre room (and 6,5 metres split) the tons/blast generated 
was calculated as follows: 
 
Room width  = 14 metres 
Reef thickness = 0,8 metres 
S.G. of reef  = 4,0 
Split width  = 6,5 metres 
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Waste section = 1,0 metres 
S.G. of waste = 2,9 
Advance/blast = 3,0 metres 
Therefore: 
Room tons/blast = (14 x 0,8 x 4,0 x 3,0) + (14 x 1,0 x 2,9 x 3,0) 
   = 256 tons/blast 
Split tons/blast = (6,5 x 0,8 x 4,0 x 3,0) + (6,5 x 1,0 x 2,9 x 3,0) 
   = 118 tons/blast 
If it is assumed that the guaranteed penetration rate of the rig was 
2,5 metres/minute and there were 89 holes in a room and 49 
holes in a split and also assuming a 40 second interval for boom 
movements between holes, then the time for drilling a room is as 
follows: 
Room   = (89 x 3,2 ÷ 2,5) +  (89 x 40) 
                60 
   = 173 minutes 
If it is further assumed that it would take 5 minutes for a set-up 
(there would be two in a 14 metre room) and 15 minutes to tram 
between rooms, then total time for a round in a room 
   = 173 + (2 x 5) + 15  
   = 198 minutes 
In a similar calculation the total time to drill a split is therefore: 
Split   = (49 x 3,2 ÷ 2,5) + (1 x 5) + (1 x 15) + (49 x 40)
                     60 
   = 115 minutes 
Therefore tons generated/minute from the drill rig are (256 ÷ 198) 
and (118 ÷ 115) or 1,28 and 1,02  for a room and split respectively. 
 
The average tons/minute for rooms and splits is adjusted in the 
ratio of 2,5 to 1 (number of rooms for one split). Average 
tons/minute can therefore be calculated at 1,20 and the average 
tons generated in a month per drill rig, assuming 6 hours 
availability in a shift and 47 shifts/month, can be estimated at 
20304. 
 
For a total production of 270000/month, the number of drill rigs is 
calculated to be 13,3  (say 14). 
 
Therefore the required number of drill rigs was 14. 
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Roofbolters 
The estimated m² of ground exposed for 140000 tons reef 
production/month   = 140000 ÷ (0,8 x 4,0) 
     = 43750m² 
The roof bolt pattern was determined to be 1,5 metres x 1,2 
metres. Therefore the number of roofbolts required/month 
     = 43750 ÷ (1,2 x 1,5) 
     = 24305 
Assuming 10% additional bolts installed 
     =  26736 (say 27000) 
Therefore number of roofbolts required in a shift assuming 47 
shifts/month   = 575 
It was assumed that in a 6 hour shift that a roofbolter could install 
42 bolts and therefore requirements would be 13,6 (say 14). 
 
Therefore the required number of roofbolters was 14. 
 
In March 2001 an enquiry document was issued for the supply of 
trackless mechanised mobile (TM3) equipment for the Waterval 
UG2 Project and all tenders were received from the main OEM’s 
on 03 April 2001. In order to make the final recommendation on 
the choice of TM3 equipment, KAR deemed it necessary to follow 
a logical and systematic strategy to the selection process.  
 
Preliminary Matrix 
Following presentations by the OEM’s a preliminary matrix was 
prepared to enable the number of options to be reduced. After a 
scrutiny of this preliminary matrix it was then decided to 
concentrate on the main suppliers; in principle this matrix was set 
out as in Figure 6.3. 
 
During the preliminary stages of the selection process it became 
apparent that, although roofbolters were both available and being 
developed for narrow width mining, the selection of any specific 
roofbolter would best be deferred until certain trials and 
investigations had taken place. There were some sound reasons 
for this decision. The viability of rotary drilling had to be tested 
when drilling in the pyroxinite hanging wall and it was only 
expected that drilling trials would be complete by the end of that 
year (2001). 
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 PRELIMINARY EQUIPMENT SELECTION MATRIX GUIDE 
 
 
Supplier   LHD  Face Rig  Roofbolter 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
etc 
 
 
For each OEM a symbol was recorded from the following selection 
 
 
Notes 
A (green) = Available to work in less than 1,80 metres mining height and  
       currently operating in either South Africa or elsewhere in the  
        world. 
 
N/A (red) = Not available 
 
D (blue) = Designed for and under construction with availability this year. 
 
E (black) = Eliminated 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6.3 
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The assessment of the use of Swellex was being made by the 
Amplats Rock Engineering Consultant and the development of a 
specific roofbolter to take advantage of the use of Swellex was 
also being considered. 
 
One OEM had introduced its first roofbolter to Bleskop Shaft and 
another OEM’s roofbolter was being assembled prior to trials. 
 
In terms of the above it was decided to defer a final decision on a 
mechanised roofbolter until the end of 2001. 
 
Second Matrix 
A second matrix was used for the final adjudication of the 
remaining OEM’s tenders. This matrix considered three aspects: 
costs, technical aspects and planned deliveries. 
 
In terms of costs both capital costs and maintenance contract 
costs, projected for four years, were compared. These costs 
provided only for maintenance labour, spares, staff and 
administration. They did not include any provision for tyres, fuel, 
greases, oils, bucket lips, drill string or  machine operators’ costs. 
 
The technical adjudication part of the matrix considered engine 
capacity kW, bucket carrying capacity m³, axle capacity, tyres, 
tramming capacity in tons, height (with canopy), ground 
clearance, machine length and width, mass tons and power/mass 
ratio. 
 
Finally, consideration was given to earliest available delivery 
dates. 
 
Final Selection 
The option of choosing only one OEM for both LHD’s and face rigs 
was also considered as it could then be possible to negotiate a 
more favourable maintenance contract agreement. 
 
At the end of a technically exhaustive process the 
recommendation by KAR, accepted by Amplats, was to select both 
LHD’s and face rigs from Atlas Copco: the ST 600LP LHD and the 
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Boomer 281L 1SL face rig. Both these machines can be seen in 
photographs in Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5. 
 
With regard to the roofbolter, later in the year it was decided to 
purchase the Boltec SL, making the total fleet Atlas Copco. 
 
6.4.5 Blast Design 
The application of trackless equipment in narrow reef conditions 
in  a  room and  pillar operation  must  necessitate  mining  waste. 
In other operations in the Bushveld Igneous Complex (BIC), 
specifically in chrome mines and also at Kroondal Platinum Mine 
(immediately downdip of Waterval Mine), scalping of waste 
underground was common. In these operations the waste portion 
of the mining cut is the pyroxenite middling, typically between the 
LG6 and LG6A on chrome mines and the UG2 and the Leader at 
Kroondal. In all these operations there is little or no drilling in the 
pyroxenite middling but only in the chromitite, above and below 
the middling. In practice, due to a closely spaced near vertical 
jointing, the pyroxenite middling breaks into blocks that allows 
scalping at the tipping point.  However, the lithology at Waterval 
was such that the middling between the UG2 and Leader was too 
great to provide for a viable cut of both seams. It was therefore 
necessary to include footwall waste with the UG2 in the cut and as 
such required intensive drilling of the footwall waste portion in 
order to break the round. 
  
The CBE document for Waterval had assumed that 45% of the 
waste could be scalped at the tipping point and packed 
underground. Notwithstanding, KAR argued that this was not 
practical, primarily because the footwall waste of the UG2, being 
intensely drilled, would be highly fragmented and be almost 
impossible to separate as there would be no marked difference in 
appearance of the chromitite and the footwall pegmatoidal norite. 
Therefore, 45% segregation could not be achieved and it would be 
sensible to plan for 0% and target (say) 10% with the possibility of 
5% being achieved. 
 
After trials, conducted by a blasting consultant at RPM’s Bleskop 
and Boschfontein Shafts, the results showed that  for a 1,80 metre  
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FIGURE 6.4 
 
Low Profile LHD 
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FIGURE 6.5 
 
Low Profile Drill Rig 
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cut with the UG2 only and footwall waste being mined, only 2.5% 
of the blasted rock would not pass through a 300mm grizzley. 
Therefore the trials proved that the CBE document which 
estimated waste segregation to be 45% for the project was flawed 
and it also confirmed that the recommendations of KAR to plan 
for 0% segregation had proved correct. Refer to a report by 
A.J.Rorke titled Waste Fragmentation in Stoping UG2: Waterval 
dated 10 December 2000; in Annexure 6.5 in Volume 4. 
 
6.4.6 Face Availability 
For the production tonnage of 270 000 tons/month with no waste 
packed, and making an assumption that face advance in a room 
would be 35 metres/month representing one blast every two days 
or four shifts. Advance per month is 23,5 (days) ÷ (2 x 3,0 advance) 
= 35,25 (say) 35 metres. 
 
The number of rooms required to achieve the planned call of 
270000 tons/month (all blasted rock sent to the mill) is therefore 
270000 ÷ (T x 35) where T = tons blasted/room/metre advanced. 
 
Assuming SG of UG2  = 4,00 
F/W Pyroxenite/Norite SG = 2,90 
UG2 channel width  = 0,80 metres 
F/W waste    = 1,00 metres 
Average SG of face   =  (0,80 x 4,00) + (1,00 x 2,90) 
           1,80 
      = 3,39 
Tons/metre advance in a room  = 14 x 1,80 x 3,39 x 1,24 
     = 105,9 
    Say T = 105 
 
Where Room width  = 14,00 metres 
   Room height  = 1,80 metres 
   Average SG  = 3,39 
 
A conversion factor of 1,24 accounts for extra tonnage blasted in  
strike holings     
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The number of rooms required to be available at all times is 
therefore calculated as follows: 
Number of rooms   = 270000 ÷ (105 x 35) 
     = 73,4 
 
However, in order to make provision for faces having to be 
stopped, primarily for potholes or for any other reason, it was 
prudent to plan for an additional 50% available face (73,4 x 1,5)  
or 110 rooms which could relate to twelve production sections of 
nine roadways. In terms of pothole activity, the UG2 Reef is 
known to descend below its normal footwall horizon and come to 
rest on a lower horizon; these depressions are known as potholes. 
The depth of the pothole can vary and they are common at RPM’s 
mines. Although in certain cases some potholes can be mineable, 
potholes will disrupt mining operations and face will be lost while 
development takes place around the affected area. Potholes at 
this project could represent up to 20% of the mining area but their 
occurrence is both random and erratic and it was therefore 
necessary to plan for an additional (say) 50% face availability. 
 
6.4.7 Engineering Maintenance 
It was always the intention to enter into an agreement with the 
principle OEM for a maintenance contract. In later years KAR was 
to establish a maintenance action plan which could be adapted for 
any underground mine and this will be further examined in 
Chapter 7. 
 
6.4.8 Rock Clearance 
When the Waterval Project was being planned for the generally 
accepted method for rock clearance in semi-mechanised room 
and pillar operations in the chrome mines of the BIC, utilising 
LHD’s for face loading, was by conveyor. No recommendations to 
change this system to truck haulage were made by KAR for 
Waterval Mine; notwithstanding that trucks had been introduced 
by KAR, for the first time, at the trackless projects at REGM and 
H.J.Joel Gold Mine, described in previous chapters. At the same 
time that the Waterval Mine was being established, KAR had been 
planning the East and West Boschfontein Mines for Amplats and 
these operations were planned for truck haulage. 
225 
 
 
The reason that no real consideration was given at that time by 
KAR for ore clearance by truck was because the Waterval Mine 
was a totally on reef operation where the channel width of about 
80cms had already been diluted more than 100% to enable 
mechanised operations to take place. Nonetheless trucks could 
have been utilised in a single trucking roadway from an LHD 
loading point to surface or to a single decline conveyor and direct 
to surface. The hanging wall of this roadway would have had to be 
carried above the UG2 Reef horizon to expose the UG2 Leader 
(thereby gaining ongoing knowledge of the exact location of the 
UG2 Leader) in order to enable sufficient height for at least a 30 
ton capacity truck to operate. In hindsight this could have been a 
better option. The operation would have been much simpler, 
particularly in the early build-up to steady state production, 
because there were excessive delays in the installation of the 
section strike conveyors and also with the new Stamler feeders 
where the most serious issue was big rocks causing long delays at 
the tip leading to increased LHD cycle times. 
 
Immediately following the commissioning and hand-over of the 
Waterval Mine, KAR had advised the Board of Impala Platinum 
Mines to plan for trucks at their new operations at Ngezi in 
Zimbabwe; today, ten years later, Ngezi is still successfully 
operating trucks from underground to surface in a similar room 
and pillar operation. 
 
6.5 Contractual Factors 
The development of a new mine from scratch is no mean feat. 
There will always be issues, problems and challenges in the early 
stages and in the build-up to steady state production. It is not 
common for any mining engineer to have had the experience of 
starting up a new mine. Nonetheless, KAR has been fortunate, as a 
project manager and a mine manager, for the start-up of the 
Otjihase Copper Mine in South West Africa forty years ago; for the 
total design and management of the H.J.Joel Gold Mine in the 
Orange Free State, fully described in Chapter 5; and as the mining 
advisor and project consultant for the Waterval Mine at 
Rustenburg.  
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The Waterval UG2 Project was developed from the detailed design 
stage to potential steady state production in just two years. In 
terms of such a build-up period, the project must be seen in 
general terms to have been an overwhelming success. 
Notwithstanding, it was considered by KAR that the programme 
could have been further reduced and brought to the point where 
full production would have been realised earlier. There were 
specific issues which had an effect on the contract programme. 
Whilst it is not intended to interrogate the contract performance 
in any detail, reference can be made to two issues: development 
advance and site management. It must be stated from the outset 
that following the selection of the contractor, certain layouts were 
changed by KAR from the mining design originally documented in 
the feasibility study. A major difference in the development 
layout, motivated by KAR and agreed to by mine management, 
caused the development footprint to change from a three 
roadway layout to five roadways. 
 
At the tendering stage the contractor submitted that they would 
achieve 18 metres advance at each decline on a daily basis, 
utilising a suite of equipment of their own. In order to maintain 
the same sinking rate over the five roadways it was agreed to 
supply the contractor with an additional suite of equipment 
provided by the mine. Theoretically this could have provided for a 
total daily advance of 30 metres. However, the target daily 
advance was agreed to be 25 metres by both the contractor and 
project team. Daily advances never achieved 25 metres however 
and the target was systematically scaled down to 17 metres per 
day as the project neared the end of its life.  In reality, the average 
total daily advance for life of the project was of the order of only 
12 metres at each decline. 
 
In early 2002, when it became clear that the revised target of 25 
metres in the footprint at each decline was unachievable by the 
contractor, KAR initiated indabas primarily between the project 
team and the contractor, by means of a specific objective action 
plan (SOAP). This technique had been developed and used before 
on many occasions by KAR on trackless operations and projects; 
refer to Guidelines for Specific Objective Action Plans, attached as 
Annexure 6.6 in Volume 4. 
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With regard to the lower than planned performance by the 
contractor at Waterval, many factors were identified at the 
indabas but probably the five most important of these were as 
follows. 
Advance/Blast had proved unacceptable. Following the indabas, 
audits by a blasting consultant recommended that more attention 
had to be paid to drilling the round correctly with a concentration 
on the cut and also the use of stemming. 
The Stamler Feeders had given problems primarily due to large 
rocks causing long delays at the LHD tipping point. In a response 
to an audit on the Waterval conveyor system, KAR wrote a Note 
for the Record, see Figure 6.6, specifically relating to the LHD 
requirements planned for in the design of the mine; refer to the 
calculation of the production capacity of the LHD (previously seen 
in this chapter) and shown again in Figure 6.6A.  
Poor Ventilation Conditions in the contractors’ area of 
responsibility were constantly experienced due to ventilation 
curtain brattices and ventilation doors being damaged in the 
updip areas of the mine being developed independently by the 
mine company; this caused intolerable conditions for the 
contractor in the downdip development. 
A Lack of Control of Water from the upper production sections 
was causing flooding of the downdip development almost daily. 
On previous operations managed by KAR, an important directive 
was to develop production roadways below strike in order to force 
the pumping of water out of these faces and not to allow water 
from drilling operations to flow by gravity to the downdip 
development thereby causing flooding; this policy was not 
accepted by the mine management. This was a glaring example of 
the mine’s inability to control service water in the production 
workings of the mine, with water from their mining operations 
(immediately updip of the contractor) flooding the downdip 
development roadways being developed by the contractor; 
through to the completion of the footprint the mine was unable to 
manage this issue.  
Shift Changeovers required an interrogation with the focus on 
communications between shifts, communications during the shift 
and the organisation of work on any specific shift. In December 
2001 KAR undertook a technical trip to Western Australia and on 
all the mines visited, there  was  in use  a  shift changeover system  
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FIGURE 6.6 
 
A Note for the Record by KAR: LHD Requirement 
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Calculation of Production Capacity of LHD’s when Loading onto a Section 
Conveyor Feeder 
 
 
 
 
In the following formulae 
 
 
 
P =  51 x L  ÷    T  +            2D 
             S x 16,67 
 
Where 
 P, is the production capacity in tons/hour 
   
 L, the carrying capacity of the LHD, is 6 tons 
 
 D, the one way tramming distance is 100 metres 
 
 T, loading, manoevering and tipping time is 3 minutes 
 
 S, the average speed of the LHD is 6kph 
 
Therefore, P = 51 x 6 ÷ 3 +    2 x 100  
         6 x 16,67 
   
  = 61 tons per hour, (say) 60 tons per hour 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
          FIGURE 6.6A 
 
230 
 
which had been in use for about five years. In that system, specific 
instructions for the oncoming shift (two changeovers a day) were 
written onto a board, usually by the manager in charge. All 
workers on the oncoming shift were present at this briefing and at 
the end of the meeting, which lasted about twenty minutes, a 
copy of all the instructions written on the board were given to all 
the shift workers (copies being printed directly off the board). 
Notwithstanding that South African mines, even mechanised 
mines, are far more labour intensive than those in Australia, such 
a changeover shift meeting, which could include say for example 
supervisors and primary equipment operators, would be 
extremely advantageous to any new trackless mining operation. 
 
Unfortunately, despite the identification of these major issues the 
contractor did not improve on their performance. Throughout the 
period of the contract the contractor continued to make repeated 
senior personnel changes, both at site manager and master sinker 
levels, and the new appointees were generally recent entrants to 
the company. There can be no doubt that repetitive changes of 
site management by a contractor on a project employing trackless 
mechanised equipment, which requires hands-on control, can 
only be destructive to the project. 
 
6.6 Postscript to Waterval 
As stated in the above paragraphs, execution of the project could 
have been better. However, the starting up of any new mine will 
always have its problems (or challenges if one prefers) but that is 
to be expected in any new operation; there is no textbook guide 
available to start up a new mine.  
 
However, there are some very clear principles learnt by KAR when 
building a new mine or even for any new project. In the opinion of 
KAR it is important during the start-up of a new mine for all 
persons to be able to see clearly the line management structure, 
to understand who is the responsible person in charge  and also to 
accept that an autocratic style of management may be needed at 
times. It can only be re-iterated that the building of a new mine is 
totally different from the ongoing management of an established 
mine. 
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At Waterval Mine the company made the decision to appoint an 
outside consultancy to manage the project. This approach became 
‘fashionable’ from the late 1990’s. Thus there were three parties: 
mine management, the project team and the contractor all 
working on one project, with the project team controlling the 
contractor. When the development footprint had opened up face 
room  on strike, the mine became involved with mining and at the 
same time the contractor, managed by the project team, carried 
on with the downdip development. Under these circumstances 
experience has shown that this can prove suicidal. This approach 
was alien to KAR as his experience at Otjihase Copper Mine, Cooke 
2 Shaft, REGM and H.J.Joel Gold Mine had shown the necessity for 
a clear line management structure with one competent person, 
with mining qualifications, in overall charge of the mine personnel 
and any mining contractors. At the Waterval Project, KAR was the 
technical advisor and consultant to the project but was not the 
manager, as had been the case at REGM and H.J.Joel Mine. 
Nonetheless, there was credit to be gained by the establishment 
of the Waterval Mine less than four years from the investigation 
by KAR into the availability of low profile trackless equipment: in 
that time Waterval had become the first fully mechanised 
trackless platinum mine in the BIC. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Other Trackless Mechanisation Projects, Proposals and Trials: 
1998 - 2008 
 
 
Since K.A.Rhodes formed KAR Mining Consultant cc in 1995, KAR has been 
involved in the design and trackless mechanised mining consultancy work for 
numerous mines. In some cases KAR was the project manager or worked as 
part of project management and in others KAR acted as the consultant for 
these projects or trials. Notwithstanding that KAR’s consultancy experience in 
the last twenty years has been associated predominately with mines 
employing various trackless mechanised mining methods, including wide 
orebody and massive mining operations, this chapter will focus primarily on 
KAR’s work on narrow reefs in South African platinum mines up to 2003. This 
exposition will cover the work carried out for Amplats on their new projects, at 
that time, in the Rustenburg area and in addition certain trials with new mining 
techniques during the same period. Discussions will relate to the planning of 
the Styldrift Mine where it was intended to utilise high powered tunnel boring 
machines to access the orebody; the development of Boschfontein East and 
West Mines by the hybrid method with large capacity trucks for ore clearance 
to surface; trials with long hole stoping methods; a project to develop a reef 
raise with a tunnel boring machine at Bafokeng Rasimone Mine. 
 
In addition, this chapter will refer to the work carried out later by KAR as the 
project manager of a gold mine in Ethiopia and also in the development, over 
several years, of a maintenance action plan to be used in the management of 
trackless operations in general. 
 
7.1 Planning for the Styldrift Mine 
In mid-1999 KAR was requested by Amplats to carry out the initial 
mining planning and design work for the Styldrift Project; the new mine 
would be contiguous with Amplats’ Bafokeng Rasimone Mine, situated 
in close proximity to the Sun City Magaliesberg Complex in the North 
Western Province of South Africa. 
 
It was intended that this planning work would lead eventually to a 
controlled budget estimate (CBE) for the project, following the 
completion of a series of preliminary cost estimates (PCE’s). 
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7.1.1 Early Concepts 
At the start of this project a series of low accuracy PCE’s were 
carried out, specifically in terms of mine access options. The 
original conceptual plan had been a conventional multi-level 
vertical shaft access to exploit the narrow 0,9 metre Merensky 
Reef. However, geological data suggested that the area where the 
transition from Rustenburg facies type reef to Zwartklip facies 
type reef occurred there was a ‘broad band’ of reef traversing the 
property located more or less in the middle of the farm, see 
Figure 7.1. This area was conservatively estimated to contain 
some 55–65 million tons of reef at not less than 1,5 metres to 
more then 2,0 metres wide (possibly 2,5 metres wide). In terms of 
this transitional change of facies and the overall flat dip of the reef 
a change of mining method, from a conventional method with 
excessive footwall development, to a trackless mechanised 
method on the reef horizon had to be considered by KAR. 
Notwithstanding that it would be necessary for further geological 
drilling, the shaft system design changed from a multi-level station 
layout to an effective single level station, in order to access the 
reef horizon by trackless methods.  Preliminary cost estimates for 
this change showed an improvement in the viability of the project. 
 
Following this decision it was then proposed for this trackless 
option that access to the mine should change from a vertical shaft 
to a decline layout. There were many advantages for a trackless 
mining method with a decline layout: direct access to the mine for 
vehicles without the need for stripping and re-assembly of 
equipment underground; improved easy access for supervisors 
and management; equipment readily removed to surface; direct 
access by vehicle for maintenance personnel when breakdowns 
occur; easy delivery of spares. In fact the PCE showed a lower 
capital cost and working costs, with a reduction in time for the 
build-up to full production. Various options were considered for 
developing the declines and in July 1999 KAR proposed, for the 
first time, to access the Styldrift Mine by tunnel boring machine 
(TBM). On 10 August 1999 a decision was made to proceed only 
with the TBM option for the CBE; see Figure 7.2 for copy of an 
original Note for the Record. In terms of this decision, two 
declines were  planned for: a 6,5 metre  diameter tunnel equipped 
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FIGURE 7.1 
 
Facies Change between Zwartklip and Rustenburg Facies of the Merensky Reef 
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FIGURE 7.2 
 
A Note for the Record: Decision to Proceed only with the TBM for the CBE 
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with a man-riding conveyor belt and with vehicle access and a 
second 5,0 metres diameter tunnel for vehicle access, thereby 
providing for separate up and down traffic. This concept proved to 
have an improved IRR for the project. 
 
 7.1.2 Mine Design 
Following the decision to opt for a trackless mine with access 
declines developed by TBM’s, mine design commenced and was 
completed in October 1999 for CBE costing purposes. The initial 
basic mine design parameters were set out by KAR; refer to Figure 
7.3. More detailed aspects of the mine design follow. 
 
 Geology 
The broad band defining the transition zone on the Merensky Reef 
horizon, previously referred to, had been assumed to have an 
economic mining width of 200 cms, well in excess of the normal 
conventional mining best cut of 90 cms. With an estimated dip of 
the reef at 10°, the deposit would lend itself to trackless 
mechanised mining methods. 
 
The resource had been estimated at about 78 million tons at 2,0 
metres wide with a 23% geological loss and 15% overall loss for 
pillars. At that point in time it had been proposed to drill an 
additional ten holes to increase the confidence of the planning of 
the project. Nonetheless, the existing geological data justified the 
planning of a mechanised mine. 
 
 Production Parameters 
All the previous PCE exercises had assumed a steady state 
production rate of 230000 tons per month and this was accepted 
for a CBE; this would envisage a life of 28 years for the mine. 
 
Mine Access 
A twin decline system would access the mine by means of TBM’s 
at a dip of 11°. The conveyor decline was planned to be driven at 
6,5 metres diameter for a length of 5480 metres. In addition to 
rock transport the conveyor would be planned for man-riding 
facilities at the main shift times. Service vehicles would be able to 
travel alongside the conveyor. The service decline, with a 
diameter of 5,0 metres for a length of 5473 metres, would provide  
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STYLDRIFT BASIC MINE DESIGN 
 
The Styldrift Project is planned as a totally mechanised mining operation in a reef mining width of 
2,0 metres. Access to the mine will be a twin decline system. 
 
Mine Access 
The two declines will be developed by tunnel boring machines (TBM’s) at a declination of 11°. 
 
Conveyor Decline 
This decline will be bored with a diameter of 6,5 metres for a length of 5480 metres. In addition to 
the transport of reef out of the mine, the conveyor will provide for a manriding facility at main shift 
times. 
 
Service Decline 
This decline will have a diameter of 5,0 metres for a length of 5473 metres and will provide for 
vehicle access to the mine for material and equipment and also for personnel during the shifts. The 
availability of a service decline direct from surface to the underground workings has major 
advantages for any trackless mining operation. 
 
The new generation of TBM’s, known as ‘high performance’ machines are capable of rapid rates of 
advance and it is envisaged that these declines will be completed within a year of their 
commencement (approximately 450 metres advance in each decline per month). 
 
General Mine Layout 
All mine development will be carried out on the reef horizon with the exception of a main level 
footwall infrastructure which consists of a trackless equipment workshop, material handling 
facilities, pump station and reef transfer arrangements. Following completion of this footwall 
development, which will take place during the build-up to full production, no more waste will be 
sent out of the mine. 
 
Mining Method 
The method of mining selected for this project is mechanised room and pillar mining. Mining will 
take place in two stages. During primary mining on advance the percentage extraction will be 68%; 
in secondary operation on retreat pillars will be reduced in size and the final percentage extraction 
within panels will be 91%. 
 
Panel mining will be cyclical. All drilling operations will be carried out with mobile drill rigs; face rigs 
and roofbolters. Broken ore will be trammed from the faces by LHD onto the tail end of panel 
conveyors and conveyed to underground silos by trunk conveyors. 
 
Mine Planning 
The total mining operation has been scheduled and the mine can be expected to be in full 
production at the rate of 230000 tons per month reef, four years after the decision is given to 
proceed with the project. 
 
 
 
K.A.Rhodes: October 1999 
 
FIGURE 7.3 
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vehicle access to the mine for materials and for personnel during 
the  shift when man-riding on the conveyor would not be possible. 
It was conservatively expected that both the declines would be 
completed in one year at an average sinking rate of 450 
metres/month. Although these advances may have seemed high, 
it had to be emphasised that the TBM technology was well 
proven, even in the most extreme conditions, and it was possible 
to place a high level of confidence in the decision to use TBM’s 
which were of a new generation and known as ‘high performance’ 
machines. 
 
 Rock Engineering Considerations 
There were specific rock engineering parameters defined for this 
project which were based on the practical requirements of a room 
and pillar operation. Rock engineering modelling work had 
confirmed these recommendations. 
 
In terms of the mining depth and the necessity to optimise 
extraction and in order to take full cognizance of safety 
requirements, it was recommended that barrier pillars should 
surround the mining sections. These were planned at 15 metres 
wide with mine panels of 215 metres. Mining operations would 
therefore be compartmentalized thereby eliminating the risk of an 
uncontrollable pillar run throughout the mine. Extraction would 
take place in two stages. A sequence of primary and secondary 
extraction had the distinct advantage that pillars developed during 
the primary operation on advance would be larger than final 
requirements and thus would represent a higher factor of safety. 
 
During primary mining the room span was recommended to be 15 
metres and pillars 15 metres x 10 metres with access holings 4 
metres wide. During secondary extraction on retreat, pillars would 
be reduced to 4 metres x 10 metres, in effect crush pillars. 
Maximum extraction would be achieved during the secondary 
operation because it would take place on retreat. The percentage 
extraction during the primary mining would be only 68%, with 
final secondary extraction (after the secondary phase) being 
calculated at 89.5% (say) 90%. Refer to Figure 7.4 and Figure 7.5. 
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               Final Pillar Size is PW x FPL (Final Pillar Length) 
                       = 10metres x 5 metres  
        S     = 50m² 
     Where FPL = 5 metres 
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Final Extraction (after secondary mining) 
=  (PW + RW) x (PL + S) – 50 
 (PW + RW) x (PL + S) 
 
= (10 + 15) x (15 + 4) - 50 
 (10 + 15) x (15 + 4) 
 
= 89,5% 
 
 
 
FIGURE 7.5 
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  Ventilation Aspects 
The use of a large fleet of trackless equipment underground at 
relative depth could be expected to necessitate a large quantity of 
ventilating air. It was also not acceptable to course air from one 
panel to the next adjoining panel and, therefore, dedicated return 
airways (RAW’s) would have to be established from the outset. 
 
The quantity of ventilation required to satisfy all the criteria for 
the project, including double shift multi-blasting stoping 
operations (fixed time blasting at the end of the shift), was 
calculated to be 750 kg/sec. In terms of this quantity, ten main 
intake roadways with eight RAW’s would be required. In order to 
ensure acceptable quality of ventilation at the faces it would 
require that all intake air into a panel be forced along the flank 
roadways of a panel thereby causing high velocities of air in a 
restricted number of roadways. This would avoid any heat build-
up which would inevitably occur from slow moving air passing 
over a larger number of roadways; this policy being mandatory 
due to the expected high virgin rock temperatures. Jet fans were 
to be used close to the working faces to ensure adequate face 
velocities. Refer to Figure 7.6. 
 
It was expected that due to a high virgin rock temperature and the 
use of diesel driven equipment that 15mW of refrigeration from 
bulk air cooling would be necessary from the outset. 
 
Provision was made for all the required health and safety matters: 
gas detection and monitoring, self-contained self-rescuers, refuge 
bays and fire suppression systems on all mobile equipment. 
 
General Mine Layout 
All development was planned to be on the reef horizon with the 
exception of any main level infrastructure, with all footwall waste 
development being completed during the build-up phase. 
 
Footwall infrastructure would include workshops to provide for 
ongoing maintenance of all the equipment and all other ancillary 
requirements. Material storage bays would be  provided for in the 
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FIGURE 7.6 
 
Stope Ventilation 
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underground layout, with the necessary service access roadways 
for utility vehicle transporters. Provision was made for vertical 
settlers and clear water dams and a pump station. 
 
From a centrally situated orepass on the reef horizon, reef would 
be conveyed to three silos with a live storage capacity of about 
5000 tons or 50% of the daily call. From loading stations below the 
silos, reef would be transferred by sacrificial conveyor to the main 
decline conveyor and then to surface.  
  
 Mining Layout 
The main on reef development was to consist of 18 roadways on 
dip and strike (all 6 metres x 2 metres); 10 intake and 8 RAW’s. 
 
Panels would be developed off the strike development. Mining 
would take place downdip in a room and pillar layout with a 
mining width of 2,0 metres. A panel would consist of nine rooms 
(eight pillars). 
 
Cycle of Operations 
Operations were to be cyclical operating with a full suite of 
trackless equipment: face rigs, roof bolters, LHD’s. 
 
All face drilling was planned to be carried out by low profile 
electro-hydraulic single boom rigs. Length of round would be 3,5 
metres with hole diameter of 41-43mm. Preliminary drilling 
patterns had been designed. 
 
Blast designs were conservative as specific site conditions were 
not known; this was also because of the necessity to ensure good 
muckpile conditions for LHD loading and further, to eliminate 
serious bottlenecks at the panel tipping point due to large rocks. 
Ore fragmentation was therefore critical and blast designs were 
such that 50% of the broken rock was expected to be less than a 
range of 70 – 100mm with maximum lump size of 300mm. 
Notwithstanding the success of ANFO over many years in the 
mining industry, because of the focus on mechanisation and 
improved labour efficiencies it was proposed to use emulsion 
explosives. Some of the more important advantages of emulsion 
explosives are that emulsion is non-explosive and cannot be  
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detonated until it is sensitised during the charging process, which 
means it can be transported as material stores; improved face 
advance was likely and it would be possible to achieve an advance 
of 0,5 metres greater than that of ANFO; charging cycles are 
markedly reduced; emulsion is water proof which was an 
advantage for down dip mining; because its density can be 
changed during the charging process there is increased flexibility 
in blast design, for example, perimeter holes could be charged at a 
lower density. All blast designs provided for the use of shock tube 
assemblies. 
 
Cleaning would be carried out by low profile 3,3m³ LHD’s with 6 
ton carrying capacity. The LHD would tip onto the end of an 
advancing panel conveyor standing in the centre of a panel, with 
the average one way travel distance of the order of 75 metres. It 
can be stated at this point that this project was being planned at 
the same time KAR was the consultant for Waterval Mine where 
trucks were not being planned for; previously discussed in chapter 
6. Therefore, trucks were not being considered for Styldrift at this 
stage of planning. 
 
In panel mining support was designed to be on a 1,5 metre x 1,5 
metre pattern with 1,5m long  x 16mm diameter roofbolts. All 
roofbolt holes would be drilled by a roofbolter with manual 
installation. 
 
Although no waste was planned to be mined from the cut there 
would be waste generated from the hanging wall, because of a 
necessity to blast for conveyor/material roadway crossings and air 
crossings, and also at tipping points; such waste would be packed 
in worked-out areas. 
 
When secondary extraction occurred there would be certain 
changes to the cycle. Drilling of pillars would be carried out by a 
long hole production drill rig and blasted in a single blast (±620 
tons). No support would be installed and cleaning of the blasted 
reef would take place with remote controlled LHD’s. Refer to 
Figure 7.7. 
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 Dilution 
In terms of a mining cut of 2,0 metres without waste, theoretically 
there would be no planned for dilution. Waste would therefore 
only be generated as a result of bad mining practices. 
 
 Equipment 
It must be remembered that immediately before the design, by 
KAR, of Waterval Mine had been completed, KAR had issued the 
report on the availability of low profile equipment for narrow 
width mining. It was therefore to be expected that, during the 
course of the detailed design stage of the Styldrift Project, 
equipment would be available for mining in a width of 2,0 metres 
(the mining cut at Waterval Mine was planned at 1,8 metres). It 
was also at this time that the visit by KAR and some of Amplats’ 
senior managers to KGHM’s mines in Poland took place. 
 
The preliminary fleet of equipment had been determined by KAR 
and can be summarised below. 
 
Type of Equipment  No of Units 
LHD’s (6 ton)    16 
Face Drill Rigs    16 
Roofbolters     10 
Production Long Hole Rigs  (4) 
    (conversions only) 
Grader     1 
Personnel Transporter   20 
Material Transporter   12 
Crane Truck Transporter   2 
Decline Bulk Transporter   3   
Total      80 + (4) 
 
Commentary on this fleet is below. 
 
LHD’s 
Notwithstanding all the previous arguments in these chapters 
regarding the choice of the largest units, taking cognizance of the 
mining width, there could be arguments for the use of an 
increased size of LHD in the main development where a 2,0 metre 
height had to be maintained; such a unit could have been 4,6m³ 
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capacity. However, in stope panels a low profile LHD of 6 tons 
capacity was assumed. Ejector buckets would also be required for 
tipping on to the tail end grizzley of the conveyor without the 
necessity for hanging wall stripping. 
 
In determining the LHD requirements in the stope panels, the 
following calculations were made. 
 
 Tons/hour:     P  = (51 x L)  ÷  T +         2D 
               S x 16,67 
In this case the following assumptions were made: 
Load, manoeuvre, dump:  T  = 3 minutes 
One way tram (conservative): D  = 100 metres 
Average speed:   S  = 6kms/hour 
Carry capacity of LHD:  L  = 6 tons 
 
  Therefore  P  = 51 x 6 ÷  3 +    2 x 100 
          16,67 x 6 
 
         = 61 tons/hour 
 
If production of 230000 tons/month was split into 200000 tons 
from stope panels and 30000 from development sections and if 
the estimated working hours of the LHD was 280 hours/month, 
then from production panels the LHD requirements would be 
200000  ÷ (280 x 61) = 11,7 (say 12). 
 
From development, due to face availability restrictions, tons/hour 
trammed by LHD’s would be less due to a lower utilization and we 
could therefore assume the tonnage would be (say) 10000 
tons/month from one LHD. 
Development LHD requirements are therefore  30000 =  3 
             10000 
Therefore total LHD’s = 12 + 3 = 15 
For conservatism assume 16 LHD’s. 
 
Face Drill Rigs 
In determining face drill rigs requirements the following 
parameters were used. 
Drilling penetration rate  = 1,5 metres/minute 
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Time between holes  = 40 seconds (0,67 minute) 
Time between set-ups  = 5 minutes 
Time to tram between faces = 15 minutes 
Hole length    = 3,2 metres 
Calculation of the time from a typical ‘total’ room which includes 
the four metre heading in advance of the face with two shoulders 
at 5.5 metres and a 50% availability of a split. Headings and 
Shoulders have total number of drill holes at 87. 
 
Therefore, time to drill face = 87 x 3,2 + (87 x 0,67) 
              1,5 
     = 244 minutes 
Set-ups are 3 x 5   =   15 minutes 
Move     =   15 minutes 
    Total  = 274 minutes 
 
The split between pillars requires 33 holes. 
Time to drill split   =  33 x 3,2 + (33 x 0,67) 
                  1,5 
     = 93 minutes 
Set up    = 5 minutes 
Move     =        15 minutes 
             113 minutes 
 
Therefore total time  = 274 + 113 x 0,5 
     = 330 minutes 
For a total of 331 metres 
Metres/minute   = 1,0 
 
In determining the tons/metre drilled, the following parameters 
were used: 
Advance for 3,2 metre round = 3,0 metres 
SG     = 3,15 
Therefore tons are calculated as follows 
Tons (Headings)   = 4m wide x 2m highx3x3,15 
     = 76 tons 
Tons (Room shoulders)  = 5,5 metres/shoulder x 2 x 2 
      x 3 x 3,15 
     = 208 tons 
Split (same as heading) x 50% = 38 tons 
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Total tons    = 322 tons 
Tons/metre drilled/minute = 322 ÷ 331   
     = 0,97 
 
In a nine room panel with eight splits, tons and metres drilled are 
as follows: 
 
      Tons 
Headings 9 x 76   = 684  
Shoulders 9 x 208   = 1872  
*Splits 8 x 76 ÷ 0,5   = 304       
Total     = 2860 tons 
*Splits are generally 50% of the available time 
 
           Metres Drilled 
Headings 9 x 33   = 297 
Shoulders 9 x 54   = 486  
*Splits 8 x 33 x 0,5   = 132  
Total     = 915 metres drilled 
     = 915 x 3m effective advance 
     = 2745 metres 
Tons/metre drilled   = 1,04 tons/metre 
 
Assuming 0,97 metres drilled/minute, 1,04 tons/metre drilled, 280 
hours in a month: 
Tons generated for a rig   =  280 x 0,97 x 60 x 1,04 
     = 16950 tons/month 
    say =  16000tons/month  
Rigs required 230000÷16000 = 14,3 
or matching the suite of 1 LHD = 1 Rig, then rig requirements 
would be 16 same as for LHD. 
Therefore the number of Face Rigs required was 16. 
 
Roofbolters 
The arguments for the availability of roofbolters was the same as 
for the Waterval Project 
 
In determining the number of roofbolters required, the theoretical 
number of roofbolts to be installed in a month would be 
calculated as follows. 
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Area mined per month in m² = 230000 
      2 x 3,15 
Where: 
Monthly tonnage   = 230000 
Mining height   = 2,0 metres 
S.G. of reef    = 3,15 
Therefore: 
Area mined/month  = 36500m² 
At a roofbolt pattern of 1,5 metres x 1,5 metres the number of 
roofbolts/shift   = 36500 ÷ (1,5 x 1,5) 
     = 16200/month 
    or = 345/shift 
Therefore: 
Number of roofbolters, assuming 42 bolts to be installed in a shift 
     = 8,2 say 9 
However, there would be a necessity to install additional bolts for 
faults, slips or generally poor ground conditions. 
Therefore number of roofbolters required was 10. 
  
 Trucks 
It was not planned for the use of trucks at steady state production 
and in hindsight this was probably a mistake. However, during a 
period in the initial development of the footwall infrastructure it 
would have been required to employ large 50 ton capacity trucks 
to clear waste rock up the service decline before permanent 
transfer arrangements could be established. 
  
 Pumping 
The mining was down dip room and pillar which meant that water 
would have to be pumped from the face when the drill rig was 
working. The philosophy was that every drill rig had to be 
allocated a portable electric pump which had to operate when 
drilling was taking place. Water from the panel would then be 
pumped to dams situated in the strike development and from 
there through boreholes and launders to the clarifier. 
 
Logistics 
In this respect logistics is intended to cover rock clearance and 
transport of materials and people. 
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Following the transfer of reef by LHD to the panel conveyor (or 
development to the main trunk conveyor), reef would be 
transported finally to surface: from the panel conveyor onto the 
strike conveyor and by trunk conveyor into a common orepass 
feeding the main decline conveyor. All conveyors were planned at 
1050mm. 
 
The service decline was to be the main arterial into the mine for 
materials; bulk transporters would carry materials, engineering 
spares, bulk chemicals for blasting operations and containers to 
the material bays on the main level and from this point, section 
transporters would carry all materials and equipment direct to any 
part of the mine. This concept, although simple in principle, 
required detailed planning input at the project management stage 
in order to fully streamline the operation. The total requirements 
for materials can be seen in Figure 7.8. 
 
 In the original design concept persons would be transported down 
 and out of the mine by manriding conveyor; this would primarily 
 operate for people at fixed shift times. At other times vehicles 
 would operate in both declines for supervisory and service 
 personnel. However, at a later stage when detailed planning was 
 done this changed with the decision to develop a single TBM 
 decline; in terms of this decision changes were made to the means 
 of transporting persons underground and these will be discussed  
 later in this chapter. 
  
 Engineering Maintenance 
The main workshop complex was to be developed underground 
on the main footwall level and would provide for all aspects of 
trackless vehicle maintenance: planned and scheduled 
maintenance; major repairs and breakdowns; lubrication; fuel 
supply; welding bays; electrical workshop; tyre management; 
stores and offices. 
 
It was always the policy to enter into a maintenance service 
agreement with the appointed OEM and, at that time, in 
discussions with one specific OEM the following six levels of 
performance type of contract were available and it is considered 
worthwhile to briefly define these options. 
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 Spare Parts Contract: the contract secures availability, delivery 
 and cost of spare parts to keep the equipment running. 
Component Exchange Contract: critical spare components are 
stocked at site and charged as required. 
Preventive Maintenance Contract: the OEM makes scheduled site 
visits based on equipment usage and supplies the service parts 
and carries out periodic maintenance according to fixed charges. 
Cost and Availability Contract: The OEM would provide 
guarantees on operating costs and mechanical availability of the 
equipment; this would include cost per hour, cost per drilled 
metre etc. The OEM would supply full supervision and 
maintenance personnel. 
Cost and Productivity Contract: this contract would, in addition to 
the cost and availability contract, provide for productivity 
guarantees of the purchased equipment. 
Performance Agreement Contract: in this contract the OEM 
would provide the equipment including guarantees related to the 
costs and productivity with financial rewards or penalties which 
have been agreed to by both parties. Equipment is up-graded, re-
built or replaced at the OEM’s discretion. 
 
The above contracts provide for increasing responsibilities and 
commitments from the OEM and the choice of level of contract 
needs to be determined by the mine company before delivery of 
equipment. 
 
For the estimation of working costs for the Styldrift CBE it was 
assumed that a cost and availability contract would be agreed to 
and the estimated costs per hour of the major capital equipment 
had been provided by the OEM. 
 
Fuel would be sent, in measured bulk quantities, from a surface 
bulk storage tank to the underground workshop fuel station by 
pipeline. 
 
Trackless Management 
At this time KAR was giving consideration to a specific objective 
action plan (referred to in the previous chapter as a SOAP), for the 
management of a trackless mining operation; the action plan to 
incorporate all the factors related to the availability of the 
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equipment (which is the responsibility of the underground 
maintenance discipline) and the use of the availability of the 
equipment (this being the responsibility of the mining production 
discipline). 
 
Schedules 
The development of the mine was completely scheduled following 
the planned completion of the TBM declines through to steady 
state production and the key dates, based on the assumption that 
a decision to proceed with the project was given before the end of 
1999, were as follows. 
Date    Action 
January 2000  Start project management and design, 
    including the refurbishment of the TBM’s 
 
October 2000  TBM’s start boring 
 
November 2001  TBM’s withdrawn from mine 
 
January 2002  Start underground development work 
 
October 2002  Ventilation and rock transfer  
    arrangements complete 
 
November 2002  Commence on reef development 
 
January 2004  Full production rate of 230000 TPM 
    reef achieved 
 
Labour 
Preliminary planned labour complements for the underground 
mine were estimated as follows. 
Mining (production)  216 
Mining (other)     83 
Logistics    182 
Supervision      19 
Services    160 
   Total  660 
 
Therefore, tons (reef) per underground employee was say 350. 
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Working Costs 
Operating costs were estimated and for this exercise it was 
assumed that an OEM maintenance service agreement would be 
agreed to. A breakdown of costs is below. 
         Rands/ton Milled 
Mining (in panel stoping and development)  44,38 
Logistics (transport and conveying)     6,88 
Supervision         1,74 
Services         6,49 
CARA (Abnormal Capital Allowance)     4,35 
Power         9,00 
Refrigeration        8,00 
      Total  80,84 
 
The above figures were submitted in September 1999 for CBE 
purposes but at the beginning of 2000 certain adjustments had to 
be made; these costs were finalised in terms of the following. 
 
September 1999 
CBE costs estimated by KAR at R80,84/ton. 
 
January 2000 
Following discussions with the Amplats Finance Division the 
September 1999 costs were escalated to R85,05/ton. 
 
June 2000 
Amplats Planning Department considered the estimated costs 
could be grossly underestimated; R120/ton was stated as possible 
costs, an increase of 40%. Using the Anglo American Technical 
Services costing model, the audited costs arrived at were R88,23 
in January 2000 terms; this a mere 3,7% greater than those costs 
set out by KAR for the same date. See Figure 7.9 for copy of an 
original memorandum on the subject. 
 
July 2000 
In July 2000 terms the R85,05/ton (R88,23/ton) was escalated to 
R91,61/ton. 
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Memorandum on Shaft Head Cost Estimates 
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The new Shaft Head Costs Summary was then as follows. 
          R/ton Milled 
Mining Production    51,99 
Logistics       7,97 
Supervision       1,92 
Services       7,48 
CARA        5,43 
Power     11,83 
Refrigeration      4,99 
    Total  91,61 
 
For a further breakdown of these costs refer to Annexure 7.1 in 
Volume 4 titled: Breakdown of Working Costs for the Styldrift 
Project in July 2000 Terms. 
 
The above would probably have risen to R100/ton by March 2001. 
However, it would then have been necessary to re-interrogate the 
costs from a zero base, specifically in terms of exact wage scales 
and those costs affected by the devaluation of the rand in 2000 
and its effect on equipment imported from outside the country. 
 
7.1.3  Change of Concept in Terms of Access by TBM 
In terms of a CBE optimisation exercise an alternative option for a 
single larger diameter decline to be developed by TBM was 
considered against the decision to bore two declines. 
 
Initially it was thought the diameter of the single decline would 
need to be 9,1 metres and would have to provide for a conveyor 
for rock clearance and manriding (at shift times), material 
transport, access for trackless machines and off shift personnel 
transport. Further, with only a single decline it would be necessary 
to establish a second outlet; the downcast shaft for bulk air 
cooling would have to be equipped. 
 
There were to be changes made to the mine access concept, 
based on a single TBM decline. This exercise carried out by KAR, 
showed that there were perceived technical risks to manriding on 
a long decline conveyor and a change was made. 
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 Manriding 
The single decline exercise had highlighted the need to review the 
transport of persons by manriding on the decline conveyor. 
Manriding on a conveyor 5500 metres long represented an 
excessive travelling time in and out of the mine; at the maximum 
legal belt speed of 2,5 metres/second one way travelling time 
would be 36 minutes. In order to reduce the time to an acceptable 
period it would require the belt speed to almost double to 4 even 
5 metres/second. However travelling at this speed would 
introduce risks. Firstly, alighting at these speeds could be 
considered dangerous. Although on a visit to German coal mines 
KAR had experience of belt speeds of 3,5 metres/second planned 
for, an adjacent decelerating conveyor belt had to be installed at 
the alighting platforms to enable persons to get onto before 
finally stepping off onto the stationary platform. Secondly, high 
speed travelling allows very little time for a person to adjust from 
a travelling position on the conveyor to an alighting position, at 
which time that person must be standing.  
 
These risks caused KAR to consider an alternative method for the 
transport of people. 
 
Alternative Means of Transport for Persons 
The most obvious way for persons to access the mine would be by 
vehicle down the decline. In this way persons working in the same 
area or working together, such as panel crews, could be allocated 
their own vehicle and drive directly to their working place, thus 
ensuring that the whole crew arrives together. Other more 
general workers could be transported in multiple carrier vehicles 
which would then be available during the shift for materials, as in 
a cassette system. These arguments were considered to be the 
most practical for the project. Nevertheless, this would require an 
increase in the number of personnel vehicles from 20 to 50. 
 
 Rock Clearance 
The conveyor would carry reef out of the mine, as in the CBE, with 
no manriding facility. The new proposal would now provide for 
the conveyor to be installed in the crown of the decline thus 
enabling the full width of the circular decline to be used for 
passing traffic, thereby avoiding bottlenecks in a long decline.  
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However with the conveyor slung in the crown and situated above 
moving vehicles travelling below on the invert, in order to avoid 
any large rocks falling off the conveyor and causing possible 
injuries to persons, it was proposed to establish a crushing station 
at the bottom of the mine. 
 
In order to finalise the diameter of the single decline a more 
definitive exercise had to be carried out; see the arguments briefly 
stated in Figure 7.10 and refer to Figure 7.11 for a cross section of 
the single tunnel in its final condition. 
 
 Second Outlet Provision 
The CBE had provided for a twin decline system with two means 
of egress. A single decline arrangement would then necessitate 
planning for a second outlet and this would be provided for in the 
downcast ventilation shaft. It was proposed that a safe and 
effective hoist such as a rack and pinion Alimak system would 
meet this requirement. The use of the system would obviously be 
very infrequent and there would therefore be no need for a sub 
bank for the flow of bulk cooled air from the refrigeration plant. 
 
 Material Transport 
Bulk carriers would transport material and emulsion explosives 
down the decline. 
 
 Ventilation Requirements 
There would be no change to the ventilation planning. Intake air 
down the decline would be discharged directly into the upcast 
shaft after ventilating the footwall development complex, 
requiring only 100kg/second at an air speed of only 3 
metres/second in the single decline; refer to Figure 7.12 for a 
Note for the Record issued by KAR. 
 
 Production Build-up 
The primary motivation for the development of the mine by 
means  of  TBM’s  was  an  accelerated  build-up to  full production  
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FIGURE 7.10 
 
Arguments to Finalise the Diameter of the Single TBM Decline 
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FIGURE 7.11 
 
Cross Section of Single TBM Decline in Final Condition 
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FIGURE 7.12 
 
Note for the Record on Ventilation Design Criteria issued by KAR 
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and, therefore, it was imperative that this advantage was not lost. 
More detailed planning suggested that there could be an increase 
in the time to ramp up to steady state production of about two 
months. However, some advantage could be gained if the 
conveyor could be carried close behind the TBM and waste 
trucking to surface might then be eliminated; in the CBE, trucking 
of waste from development would take place in the Service 
Decline while the Main Decline was being equipped. With this 
method there would be no loss of production build-up time. 
 
Final Proposal 
The single access design factors can be summarised: underground 
crushing of reef; direct transport of persons underground by ‘land 
cruiser’ type vehicles; transport of materials by bulk carrier to 
underground storage bays; bulk transport of emulsion explosives 
(chemicals) to underground silos; fuel pipeline from surface to 
underground bulk storage tanks; second outlet provision at the 
downcast ventilation shaft by means of Alimak hoist; no change to 
CBE ventilation planning. 
 
7.1.4  AATS Review 
In July 2000 a technical audit was carried out by Anglo American 
Technical Services (AATS) on the Styldrift Feasibility Study and 
CBE. In terms of mining, it supported the use of a TBM to access 
the workings by driving declines and not sink vertical shafts. It also 
approved the selection of a mechanised room and pillar method 
of mining. 
 
In conclusion it found no technical issues which could jeopardise 
the technical success of the project. However, the review did 
suggest that more geological information would improve the mine 
design and planning. Some comments on issues raised at these 
audit meetings and on the responses by KAR to a memorandum 
from the Technical Director of Anglo American Corporation are 
seen in Annexure 7.2 in Volume 4. 
 
7.1.5 TBM Project 
In February 2000, prior to the change of concept for access design, 
a technical visit was made by KAR and other responsible engineers 
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to the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. The objective was to see 
a TBM operation and have discussions with TBM engineers. 
 
 Visit to Mohale Tunnel 
The Mohale Tunnel was a joint venture by Concor/Hochtief and 
was being developed from both ends by separate TBM’s; total 
length would be 32 kms. There were certain matters discussed 
during the visit which related directly to the Styldrift Project; a few 
of the more important issues were as follows. Firstly, there was an 
immediate need to carry out surface drilling along the line of the 
TBM route in order to gain detailed information for geological and 
rock classification; refer to Annexure 7.3 Volume 4, for a general 
description of the geology along the TBM route. Secondly, it was 
recommended that during the refurbishment, by the appointed 
contractor, of the selected TBM the client should monitor the 
work; this conclusion follows from experience at Mohale when 
problems occurred with the cutterhead and main thrust bearing of 
the TBM. Thirdly, the matter of heat build-up during TBM 
tunnelling, specifically with high-powered machines, needed to be 
further understood and it would therefore be necessary for the 
Group Ventilation Consultant to make a ‘hands-on’ visit to a 
typical site. Finally, it was recommended that the enquiry 
document should only be issued after the pre-qualification 
discussions had taken place. Refer to Figure 7.13 for a view of the 
Mohale TBM and also refer to Annexure 7.4 in Volume 4 for 
Notes on a Visit to Lesotho Highlands Water Project, 17-19 
February 2000; notes prepared by K.A.Rhodes. 
 
 Pre-Qualification of Tenderers 
The Pre-Qualification documentation was issued on 13 July 2000 
and was received back on 27 July 2000, with a short list prepared 
by 10 August 2000. On 26 September 2000 it was decided to enter 
into negotiations for a contract, with a JV known as the 
Hochtief/Concor/Statkraft/Cementation Joint Venture, to become 
known as Platun JV. In early 2001 Platun JV proposed that a 
selection process for a TBM be carried out, which would include 
visits to TBM’s in Europe and the USA. Five TBM’s were evaluated 
but the preferred machine was an Atlas Copco Robins MK27 – 
3360 which was practically new and therefore the risks of material 
fatigue were unlikely. It  is  common with TBM boring that a unit is  
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FIGURE 7.13 
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identified somewhere in the world and is then re-furbished to the 
requirements of any new site. In this case the TBM would have to 
be fitted with a new cutterhead and also, due to the decline being 
bored at 11°, a new back-up system would have to be designed 
and manufactured. The re-furbishment time would be 40 weeks. 
In order to secure long lease equipment times it was necessary to 
reach consensus on contract terms and prices. The project 
duration, from placement of order for the TBM until completion 
of the work, was predicted to be 25,6 months. 
 
Shortly following the visits overseas to select a TBM, a detailed 
technical document was prepared by Platun JV which included 
details of the back-up system and a risk analysis report.  
 
Technical Proposal by Platun JV 
Briefly, the length of the tunnel would be 5500 metres with a 
tunnel diameter of 7,62 metres, the vertical curve radius of 2000 
metres and the inclination of the tunnel 0,3° - 11°. Excavation 
would be by the open hard rock TBM method. Tunnel cross 
sections during sinking and permanent condition are shown in 
Figure 7.14  and  7.14A  respectively, both  taken  from Platun JV’s  
Report of April 2001. Although the rock to be bored could be 
classified as very hard to extremely hard, vertical and sub-vertical 
jointing of the rock and their orientation in relation to the line of 
advance was expected to be favourable for the TBM penetration 
rate. 
 
The TBM would be without a shield; a shielded machine would 
hinder rock support close behind the face. Installed power of the 
machine was 2500kW. The unit would be equipped with a probe 
drilling rig, grouting equipment, roofbolt drill rig, shotcrete 
platform, steel arch erector and pumping facilities. 
 
The back-up system would provide for fire detection and 
suppression system, chilling system to cool air on the TBM, rescue 
capsule, conveyor extension to accommodate the permanent belt 
conveyor behind the TBM and gas measuring instrumentation 
with automatic shutdown of the TBM. 
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FIGURE 7.14 
 
Cross Section of Decline in Sinking Conditions 
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FIGURE 7.14A 
 
Cross Section of Decline in Permanent Condition 
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In terms of predicted performance the average long term weekly 
production time would be 5,79 days: boring would take place 
Monday to Saturday with maintenance and probe drilling taking 
place on Sunday. The penetration rate would be in the range of 
1,2 to 2,0 metres/hour with a maximum possible rate of 4,0 
metres/hour. Long term penetration rate was expected to be 1,7 
metres/hour at 39% production per day. Average advance was 
predicted at 11 to 18 metres/day with an average of 92,1 
metres/week. The project duration was planned for 111 weeks 
(25,6 months); 40 weeks for TBM refurbishment, manufacturing 
and assembly on site with 69 weeks boring and 2 weeks for tunnel 
finishing. It was also planned to leave the TBM underground on 
completion of the tunnel but the back-up system would be 
removed. 
 
 TBM Project Progress from 2001 
In May 2001 continuous discussions took place between the 
Amplats’ Project Team and Platun JV which culminated in 
meetings in London in May-June 2001. These meetings had the 
main objective of coming to an agreement on a contract at an 
acceptable cost and to have a clear understanding of the type of 
contract which was being proposed: the New Engineering 
Contract (NEC). By July 2001 a draft contract document had been 
compiled with a detailed Schedule of Responsibilities. 
 
However, in 2001 Bafokeng Rasimone Mine (BRPM) became a part 
of the project and by late 2001 the Royal Bafokeng Nation became 
involved for the first time with their technical representatives, the 
Minerals Corporation. Following the intervention by the Royal 
Bafokeng Nation KAR became less involved with the Styldrift 
Project. 
 
In April 2002 a risk assessment was carried out over two days by 
Snowden Consultants. In the opinion of KAR (who was a 
participant in the workshop) there were two relevant issues in the 
final report from the workshop. Firstly, there existed the risk of 
not getting the shift underground down the decline in an 
acceptable time frame if the mining method had to be changed 
from trackless mining to conventional mining: a lack of flexibility 
for  the  decline system  transport  arrangements  for  any  marked  
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increase in labour complements. It was correct to say (by KAR) 
that the decline access was motivated by the choice of the mining 
method: the advantages of a decline from surface for a trackless 
mining method have been set out many times before. The 
downcast shaft was to be equipped only for an emergency, in 
terms of the need for a second outlet. Secondly, there was a 
recommendation to carry out a further risk assessment of the 
TBM method of accessing the mine in terms of time and cost. KAR 
was not aware of this particular exercise ever being done. 
 
By the end of that year, December 2002, with KAR no longer the 
lead consultant, a new option had been proposed and accepted 
which still retained a TBM for access (without a conveyor) and 
vertical shafts (East and West Mines) for men, materials and rock 
hoisting. Also a new enquiry for tunnel boring was then issued but 
tenderers were also invited to tender alternatives to a TBM. 
 
After an intervening period of several years, it appears from media 
publications, that the final feasibility study on Styldrift was 
approved in September 2008. Access will be by a twin vertical 
shaft system to a depth of 740 metres. The method of mining will 
be both mechanised and conventional. Production will still be 
230 000 tons/month and is planned to commence in 2015, with 
steady state in 2018. 
 
7.1.5 Postscript to Styldrift 
KAR began the work of the design of the Styldrift Mine in mid-
1999 and continued for nearly three years. The project was 
reviewed by Anglo American Corporation and the conclusion in 
their report published in August 2000 stated “No major technical 
issues were found that would jeopardise the technical success of 
the project”. Nevertheless, by the end of 2001 things changed 
dramatically with the intervention of the Royal Bafokeng Nation’s 
technical advisors. 
 
If the project had gone ahead as originally planned Styldrift would 
have been the first trackless underground mine in South Africa 
developed from surface by TBM. 
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7.2 Boschfontein East and West Mines 
In late 2001 KAR had completed a design for the Boschfontein East and 
West Mines at Amplats’ Rustenburg Section, based on the room and 
pillar method. This work was being carried out at the same time that the 
Waterval Mine was being designed and developed; this has been 
discussed in chapter 6 of this treatise. However, a coarse comparative 
exercise was carried out by KAR on an alternative design for the 
Boshfontein Mines which assumed a hybrid method of mining. In terms 
of this exercise the hybrid design was considered to be marginally more 
viable and consequently a new controlled budget estimate (CBE) was 
prepared which was based on the hybrid layout. The main factors which 
influenced this decision to prepare the new CBE and change to a hybrid 
concept were an accelerated build-up to steady state production and a 
significant improvement in head grade. 
 
7.2.1 Hybrid Philosophy 
At this point in time it would be appropriate to discuss hybrid 
philosophy. The hybrid concept (although not named as such) was 
first introduced to South African mines by K.A.Rhodes (KAR) at the 
Randfontein Estates Gold Mine in 1984; refer to chapter 4 for a 
full description of how this evolved. In 1984 the geology of the 
reef on 95 Level at Cooke 2 Shaft (REGM), in relation to the 
footwall development grid as it was, had suggested to KAR that a 
rapid access onto the reef horizon with a ‘super’ gathering 
haulage on a deeper level would be favourable for the 
introduction of trackless mechanised mining to the narrow flat 
dipping reef. Following the successful introduction of this type of 
mining at REGM, KAR designed, managed and commissioned the 
H.J.Joel Gold Mine based on the same method although the 
geology of the reef there would normally have been associated 
with conventional multi-level footwall development; H.J.Joel Gold 
Mine has been fully described in chapter 5 of this exposition. 
 
Since then hybrid mining has been introduced into certain other 
operations in South Africa but has not generally been accepted in 
the mining industry. In simple terms, the hybrid design juxtaposes 
trackless mining methods (for main development, cleaning and 
ore clearance operations) with a conventional labour intensive 
narrow reef stoping layout. The retention of conventional stoping 
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in the design cannot be considered ideal as it does not provide for 
the elimination of hand-held rock drills. However, in the mid 
1980’s it was always considered, and expected, that a mechanised 
drill rig would be developed and be able to take over from hand-
held rock drills; refer to the discussion of the development of the 
Stomec Rig in chapter 4. 
  
A further aspect of hybrid mining is the use of trucks, and this is 
now discussed for narrow reef mining specifically at the 
Boschfontein East and West Mines, which were designed by KAR. 
 
7.2.2 Ore Clearance by Truck 
In terms of any ore clearance system for a hybrid design there is 
several options: LHD into trucks, LHD onto conveyors or even LHD 
cleaning into orepasses with direct loading into trucks. At the 
H.J.Joel Gold Mine LHD’s loaded into trucks which transported the 
ore back to the vertical shaft for hoisting. At the Boschfontein East 
and West Mines the hybrid design, set out by KAR, provided for 
trucks to travel direct to surface by means of the developed ramp 
system. 
 
However, at that time (2002) conventional wisdom at Amplats did 
not accept the concept of direct tramming to surface by truck for 
a new shallow mine: ore had to be conveyed to surface. 
Notwithstanding, it was agreed with KAR that a conveyor installed 
to surface could be served by a single tipping point underground 
for trucks which would move deeper into the workings every few 
years as tramming distances increased. In this concept the mine 
would be opened up with trucks tramming direct to surface until it 
was the right time to establish a conveyor.  
 
In fact, a comparative exercise, led by KAR, was carried out at the 
end of June 2003 which considered the three options for ore 
clearance at the Boschfontein West Mine: trucking directly to 
surface; trucking to a single fixed tipping point underground onto 
a conveyor; trucking to a vertical rock hoisting shaft. For the 
purpose of that exercise the life of the mine (approximately 15 
years) was split into three phases in time. The model developed 
for the study indicated that trucking of rock to surface should 
continue after the initial development of the mine until such time 
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that it would no longer be viable to operate trucks to surface, 
which in the study was in the second phase (up to 10 years). In 
terms of this exercise, it was recommended that any installation 
of a conveyor should be delayed, thereby deferring significant 
capital expenditure. 
 
Visits to base metal mines, mining massive orebodies, by KAR in 
April 2002 had confirmed that it was a common practice to tram 
ore by truck to a single tipping point underground and then by 
conveyor to surface. It was also accepted practice that trucks 
would travel up full to the tip and down empty back to the 
workings. The conclusions of the above exercise and the visits to 
base metal mines to see in practice the use of trucks on ramps, 
supported KAR’s decision to include, in the design of the 
Boschfontein Mines, truck tramming in ramps both to surface and 
later to a common tipping point. 
 
For completion of the above discussion, the study referred to 
above is included (without the appendices) as Annexure 7.5 in 
Volume 4: Boschfontein West Mine Rock Transport Investigation, 
by K.A.Rhodes, June 2003. 
 
7.2.3 Summary of Mine Design 
In summary, the underground mine design for both Boschfontein 
East and West Mines was based on a hybrid layout: conventional 
stoping operations with development (except raising on reef) 
carried out with trackless equipment. 
 
Production 
The mines were planned for 150ktpm and 100ktpm at the West 
Mine and East Mine respectively. 
 
Design Parameters 
Underground development was planned to take place from twin 
ramps developed from surface. During the build-up to full 
production all broken rock was to be transported to surface by 
truck. At steady state conditions reef would be trammed by truck 
to a single underground tip and crusher station before being sent 
by conveyor out of the mine. Cleaning and tramming of all rock 
would be carried out by 18 ton capacity LHD’s and 50 ton trucks. 
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A complete suite of trackless equipment would be utilised in all 
big end access development: twin boom drill rigs, roofbolters, 
LHD’s, trucks, UV’s.  
 
Stoping was planned on a downdip layout with stope backs 190 
metres. Stope faces were 28 metres long with a planned stoping 
width of 0,9 metres. For the downdip layout scraper winches 
would clean down the reef raises (‘box per panel’) to muck bays 
from where LHD’s would load directly into trucks. 
 
Grade and Dilution 
At the Boschfontein Mines the most important motivation for the 
hybrid layout over a room and pillar layout, as designed for 
Waterval, was an improvement in head grade. The UG2 Reef 
would be mined at minimum width and all development rock 
(both reef and waste) would be sent out of the mine as waste and 
not to the mill.  
 
7.2.4 Final Comment on Hybrid Philosophy 
The retention of labour intensive stoping and the necessity for the 
manual operation of rock drills for face work is the most 
significant disadvantage of any hybrid layout; this has been the 
case since its first introduction by KAR at REGM in the 1980’s. The 
need to mechanise face operations and eliminate conventional 
rock drill operators in narrow reef stopes had always been the 
objective of KAR, firstly in the 1980’s on JCI’s gold mines and later 
in the 1990’s at Amplats’ platinum mines.  However in the early 
2000’s, at the time that Amplats’ Rustenburg UG2 expansion 
programme was being planned for, there had been no 
commitment to such a new method even though trials had been 
planned, designed for and carried out on Amplats’ sites at Union 
Section and Rustenburg Section; these trials will be discussed 
further in this chapter. 
 
7.3 Long Hole Stoping Trials 
There has always been an obvious necessity to improve face productivity 
by means of a proven alternative to the present conventional drilling 
and blasting of narrow reef stopes on the gold and platinum mines of 
South Africa. In terms of this need, early discussions with a leading OEM 
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were initiated by KAR as far back as 1993, when working as a consulting 
mining engineer for JCI. Later in 1996 KAR, as an independent mining 
consultant, completed a project assignment for Amplats related to long 
hole drilling techniques for the blasting of stopes on their platinum 
mines. 
 
7.3.1 Background 
Although the drilling of long holes in stoping operations is 
common practice in massive orebodies and indeed in steeply 
dipping narrow vein mining conditions world-wide, it has never 
established itself in the narrow flat dipping tabular orebodies 
found in South Africa. Nonetheless, trials with long hole drilling 
have been carried out over the years on South African gold mines. 
A study of the Association of Mine Managers’ Transactions reveals 
that experimentation took place on gold mines in the Orange Free 
State in 1958/59. These trials, although they were limited, are 
perceived from the relevant technical papers to have been 
successful. Further documentation of any subsequent trials cannot 
be found in later transactions of the Association of Mine 
Managers. It is therefore inconclusive as to why long hole 
production stoping methods were not further developed. A 
possible answer may be seen in the contribution by J.P.Andrew, to 
a paper by R.P.Plewman from Harmony Gold Mine, when he 
stated that “no matter what method is used, the limits of the 
method are decided more by what can be handled than what can 
be broken”. This is an important conclusion to be borne in mind 
when designing any new method. 
 
In all of these early trials the dip of the reef was between 17° and 
20° with a stoping width of 1,2 metres to 1,5 metres. Drilling was 
carried out by bar rigged machines with hole lengths of up to 60 
feet (20 metres). The questions asked of the method by KAR in 
1996 were what might have been asked forty years before, and 
were related specifically to the dimensions of the access drive for 
a drill rig to operate; the accuracy of the hole to be drilled; the 
effect of a heavily charged blast; the comparison of costs to 
conventional; the overall productivity of the new method and 
would it be more viable. 
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In July 1996 K.A.Rhodes presented to Amplats his project report 
Long Hole Drilling Techniques for Blasting Stopes in Narrow Reef 
Conditions on Platinum Mines, this complete report can be seen 
as Annexure 7.6 in Volume 4. In his conclusions KAR 
recommended that Amplats should carry out trials at Union 
Section; details of this proposed trial were set out in the report. It 
was further recommended that trials should be carried out at a 
second site in order to develop the concept. 
 
This report of 1996 had demonstrated that the long hole stoping 
system (LHS) was capable of being developed to a technically 
proven level which could be economically viable. If these trials 
could prove successful the overall objective would be to introduce 
the new method to a ‘greenfields’ operation, when the design of 
the mine could support the new technology from the onset; in 
principle, similar to the establishment of the H.J.Joel Gold Mine in 
the 1980’s, fully documented in chapter 5 in this exposition. 
 
7.3.2 Union Section Trial 
Immediately following the submission of the above technical 
report, KAR proposed that a trial be carried out at Union Section 
(RPM). It was proposed to split the trial into two separate phases: 
a pre-stoping test drilling programme and stoping trials on a 
selected panel.  
 
The methodology for the test drilling would focus on optimum 
hole length in respect of accuracy; drill steel confirmation; bit size; 
collar procedure taking cognizance to not exceed 100 bar 
percussion pressure; the use of tubes. During the full period of 
this trial all drilling operations were to be under the ‘hands-on’ 
supervision of a drill master supplied by the OEM (Tamrock). 
 
In terms of the stoping trials on a panel, the objectives were to 
determine the drilling accuracy of the long holes (follow-up to the 
test drilling programme); determine throw blasting characteristics; 
assess the effect of the blast on conditions in the stope, 
specifically the hanging wall; to optimise burdens and hole 
spacings; to ascertain drilling and blasting costs; to establish 
overall costs, to some degree of confidence, for the method. 
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Prior to these proposals, in fact as far back as 1993, significant test 
work had been carried out by the same OEM, this work being 
initiated by KAR. This work, carried out at Tamrock’s Test mine, 
specifically focussed on drilling accuracy and the conclusions at 
that time were that tube drill steel (with 64mm bit) had to be used 
at a percussion pressure of not more than 100 bar in order to 
achieve the objective of a hole deviation of not more than 100mm 
over a length of 20 metres (0,5% accuracy); reference Reef Mining 
Project, Tamrock Technology Centre Research, dated 03 
December 1993. Refer to Figure 7.15 showing graphs of drill hole 
deviation at variable percussion pressures. 
 
In 1998 KAR submitted his final proposed study for long hole 
drilling stoping at Union Section Declines; this submission set out 
a conceptual layout.The long hole system (LHS) as proposed would 
not require persons to work in the stope panel and, therefore, no 
in stope support would be planned for. For this requirement the 
span between pillars was restricted to 18 metres; the Group Rock 
Mechanics Consultant for Amplats provided supporting comments 
to the proposal. 
 
Key production parameters were identified and it was expected 
that the long hole drill rig would drill 5000 metres in any month 
and with a burden of 100 cms between the two rows of holes the 
monthly production from one rig would be 2500m². The necessary 
stope development required to support the project’s production 
parameters was also defined as 427 metres per month for a 
monthly production (reef) of 26000 tons. 
 
Refer to Annexure 7.7 in Volume 4 for A Conceptual Study for 
Long Hole Stoping at Union Section Decline by K.A.Rhodes, dated 
02 November 1998. 
 
 Notwithstanding, before the trials commenced there were some 
concerns from Union Section which were responded to in a brief 
document. A copy of these concerns and the responses set out by 
KAR can be seen in Volume 4; refer to Annexure 7.8, Union 
Section Concerns Related to the Long Hole Stoping Method, 
dated 30 November 1998. 
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FIGURE 7.15 
 
Drilling Deviation of Variable Percussion Pressures: refer to Annexure 7.7 Volume 2 
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In summary, the results from the trials could not be classed as an 
overall success in that the production rig in use, being primarily a 
machine designed for long hole drilling in large open stopes, was 
not the ideal machine for long hole drilling in narrow flat tabular 
reefs. It was therefore believed that a new low profile drill rig, at 
that time being developed for South African chrome mines, could 
be designed specifically for long hole drilling in the narrow 
platinum reefs. This was one of the machines identified by KAR in 
his investigation report prior to his planning of the Waterval Mine. 
 
7.3.3 Boschfontein Trial 
Following the Union Section trials, in 1999 KAR held discussions 
with the management of Rustenburg Section (RPM) on the 
possibility of carrying out LHS trials at their Boschfontein Decline 
Section. Boschfontein had been developed as a trackless hybrid 
project which had then been abandoned but there were some 
pillars available for extraction and also there were areas that had 
been developed by trackless equipment, making it favourable for 
LHS trials. Subsequently, for a six month period in 2000 LHS trials 
did take place at Boschfontein. The objectives at Boschfontein 
were similar to those at Union Section with one major difference 
in that a much reduced stoping width was targeted (65cms or less) 
as the Merensky Reef channels at Rustenburg Section are 
extremely narrow compared to the 1,5 metre UG2 Reef at Union 
Section. The re-designed low profile rig was used in the trial to 
drill 15 metre holes with the same accuracy as planned for at 
Union Section of 0,5% (75mm maximum deviation). Refer to 
Figure 7.16 for the general stope layout. 
 
In overall terms this trial was considered to be a success, in that 
expectations had been met specifically in terms of stoping width 
control; accuracy of drilling long holes; very good hanging wall and 
footwall conditions in the stoping area; no necessity for persons to 
enter the stoped out workings. In terms of these findings, KAR 
submitted a further motivational report for the continued use of 
LHS. The conclusion in that report stated that a reduction in costs 
of 3,8% was likely which, coupled with an improvement of grade 
of about 6%, could result in an overall improvement in profitability  
of the order of 10%. It was clearly a safer method than that of 
conventional stoping and it had to be a definite move towards the 
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FIGURE 7.16 
 
General Stop Layout for Long Hole Stoping Method 
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ultimate goal of total mechanisation. Therefore it was axiomatic 
that if any improvement in the viability of stoping operations 
could be achieved it would be considered worthwhile to pursue 
the concept. The recommendation therefore was to continue with 
the project and extract the pillars on the Merensky Reef and 
subsequently to prepare a more definitive feasibility for the 
mining of the UG2. Notwithstanding the different geotechnical 
conditions on the two reef horizons, it was proposed that the 
Merensky Reef layout would be assumed for the UG2 Reef subject 
to confirmation (or otherwise) by the Amplats Rock Engineering 
Consultant. A copy of this motivation entitled Preliminary Report 
on Future Long Hole Stoping Operations at Boschfontein Shaft, 
Rustenburg Section, Rustenburg Platinum Mines by K.A.Rhodes, 
dated 02 August 2000 is seen in Annexure 7.9 in Volume 4. 
 
At the same time, in order to further motivate the use of LHS, KAR 
set  out a  conceptual  proposal for  a  modified  type  of  long hole 
stoping, defined as resue long hole stoping (RLHS); the mine 
targeted was Bafokeng Rasimone Platinum Mine (BRPM). This 
method was intended to counter the uncontested argument that 
LHS in the trials was development intensive. In this proposed 
change to the LHS, long holes would be drilled in the waste below 
the reef and the waste would be blasted away from the advancing 
face allowing the reef to be blasted down in a separate operation 
and then loaded out. The proposed method allowed for an 
increased working height for machines to operate on the reef 
horizon but would allow the waste to be left behind. It had the 
advantage of being less reliant on the drilling accuracy, possibly 
tolerating greater deviations in longer holes, and grade would be 
improved over the standard LHS method. There was no interest in 
a feasibility study for the method and therefore no follow-up took 
place. The concept of the method was drawn up by KAR in late 
2000 and the proposal Mechanisation Options for Bafokeng 
Rasimone Mines, by K.A.Rhodes is attached as Annexure 7.10 in 
Volume 4. 
 
Nonetheless, in spite of the success of the above trials the 
potential for LHS as an alternative mechanised mining method has 
not been realised on platinum mines. 
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However, as a postscript to this section on long hole stoping, it 
can be recorded that in recent years there has been two gold 
mining companies prepared to introduce LHS as the production 
mining method on their operations. Firstly, Central Rand Gold who  
intended to mine out reefs left over 100 years ago at their 
Consolidated Reef Mine. Unfortunately they had to cease 
underground mining shortly after commencement of operations 
but this was not directly due to the method of mining. Secondly, 
Great Basin Gold Burnstone Mine closed down in 2012 and were 
therefore unable to prove the method conclusively. 
 
To sum up, the overall conclusion regarding LHS is that until a 
proven viable rock cutting method for stope face operations can 
be developed it is axiomatic that trials of LHS should be pursued 
on a wide enough scale to determine whether it is a viable 
alternative to conventional stoping and therefore an 
enhancement to hybrid trackless mining. 
 
7.4 Tunnel Boring Machines 
The planning for the access decline development of the Styldrift Mine by 
TBM has been discussed previously in this chapter. This section will now 
focus primarily on the tunnel boring of a reef raise project managed by 
KAR. However, before this discussion it is relevant to this section to 
discuss the project report on the BorPak boring system, prepared by KAR 
in 1999. 
  
7.4.1 BorPak Boring Machine 
In 1996 KAR prepared a project report for Amplats which 
recommended the purchasing of a BorPak 1500 blind borer for the 
development of stope connections (reef raising and orepass 
development).  
 
The first trials with the prototype BorPak had taken place in the 
late 1980’s and the first production machine was introduced to 
the mining industry at the Las Vegas Mining Show in 1992. The 
BorPak was an automatically operated blind boring machine which 
could bore excavations varying between 1,2 metres and 2,5 
metres in diameter. In effect it was a mini tunnel boring machine 
in the way it operated; there was no drill string or any need for a 
pilot hole. The machine was stabilised by packers, inflated against  
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the walls of the excavation, which absorbed the thrust and torque 
of the machine, refer to Figure 7.17. The machine could easily be 
transported through the workings by rail haulage even in a 
conventional mine; refer to Figure 7.18 and Figure 7.19. In 
orepass development, cleaning of cuttings would be by gravity 
whereas in flat inclinations (reef raises) it would be necessary to 
use a vacuum system; refer to Figure 7.20. Only three machines 
had been in operation at the time of the project report but the 
technical aspects were believed to have been proven; KAR had the 
advantage of seeing the BorPak in operation at the Hartley 
Platinum Mine in Zimbabwe in May 1996. The BorPak was capable 
of drilling an accurate hole up to 300 metres in length whereas 
other blind borers were restricted to 100 metres due to their 
limitations in accuracy; therefore it had the potential to bore a 
conventional reef raise at  Amplats’ mines. In effect the project 
investigation showed that the BorPak was capable of developing a 
stope connection (reef raise and orepasses) in a time of six 
months less than by conventional means; refer to Figure 7.21. This 
was therefore an opportunity for a more rapid build-up of face 
where required at an existing mine or in the build-up to steady 
state at a new mine. 
 
The report indicated a financial justification for the BorPak 
machine and recommended the purchase of a rail mounted 
BorPak for its immediate introduction at any existing shaft where 
a more rapid opening up of face would be advantageous or at any 
new greenfields mine. Unfortunately the recommendation was 
not acted upon. A copy of the project report The Application of 
the BorPak Boring System for Raise Development in Platinum 
Mines, by K.A.Rhodes, dated February 1997, is attached as 
Annexure 7.11 in Volume 4.  
  
7.4.2 Bafokeng Rasimone Tunnel Boring Project 
On 05 September 2000 Amplats signed a contract with Bomar 
Tunneling and Underground Contractors (Proprietary) Limited 
(BOMAR) for the boring of a reef raise at Bafokeng Rasimone 
Platinum Mine (BRPM); the length of the raise was envisaged as 
450 metres in length but in fact it proved to be 340 metres. KAR 
was the appointed project manager. 
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FIGURE 7.17 
 
BorPak: Sequence of Re-Gripping: refer to Annexure 7.11 Volume 4 
286 
 
 
 
FIGURE 7.18 
 
BorPak on Rails: refer to Annexure 7.11 Volume 4 
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FIGURE 7.19 
 
Rail Transport of BorPak Underground: refer to Annexure 7.11 Volume 4 
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FIGURE 7.20 
 
Proposed Vacuum System for BorPak: refer to Annexure 7.11 Volume 4 
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FIGURE 7.21 
 
A Programme Comparison of Conventional and BorPak: refer to Annexure 7.11 Volume 4 
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Background 
The use of a TBM is common practice in civil engineering projects 
around the world but with few exceptions the mining industry has 
failed to take advantage of this proven technology. Amplats 
perceived the need to accelerate the rate of reef development for 
new mines, such as the BRPM Project then being developed; this 
being the background for the signing of the contract with BOMAR 
working in association with the Robbins Company in the USA. 
 
Machine Details and Scope of Work 
The TBM used for this project was a Jarva MK6, manufactured in 
1972 and the scope of the work was to establish a reef raise 340 
metres in length. It was generally expected that the TBM would 
bore at  an  inclination of  plus 14° and  therefore  cleaning  of  the  
rock chippings could not be gravity assisted. It was planned for 
cleaning of the raise, immediately behind the machine, to be 
carried out by scraper winch, the return sheave wheel being 
attached to the back of the TBM. However, this did not prove to 
be an ideal cleaning system. 
 
Ventilation Considerations 
The ventilation arrangements consisted of an exhaust system 
which proved effective, notwithstanding initial problems primarily 
due to interference by the scraper winch arrangements. It was 
mandatory to equip an inflammable gas detection sensor as close 
as possible to the cutter head; this sensor was calibrated to cut off 
the power to the TBM when the methane concentration reached 
1.4% in the vicinity of the sensor head. The system was checked at 
weekly intervals and, further, all personnel were trained in gas 
detection and operators carried a methanometer at all times. 
These precautions were necessary as methane gas is not 
uncommon on platinum mines. 
 
Problems and Delays 
The TBM started boring from a launching platform on 13 
December 2000 and holed through on 15 June 2001. 
 
Learning Curve 
Initially it had been expected that the actual boring of the 340 
metre reef raise would have taken about two months; this turned 
291 
 
out to be highly optimistic and it actually took six months (22 days 
lost for holidays). However, for this new project there was a long 
learning curve with many problems. 
 
From the outset the operators experienced difficulty in the 
steering of the machine. This lack of skills caused the TBM to hole 
into an orepass with a loss of 24 days; it had been planned for the 
TBM to pass over this excavation. The presence of a Robbin’s 
technician, sent for from the USA, resulted in an improvement in 
the ability of the TBM to climb steeper. 
 
Fouling of the services in the raise by the scraper arrangements 
caused delays; such problems would demand a different cleaning 
system for future flat dipping raises. 
 
There were also numerous delays due to mechanical and electrical 
failures of the TBM.  
 
Towards the end of the project three intersections of methane 
occurred, causing the TBM to shut down automatically. 
 
Performance 
Approximately one month was lost due to holiday breaks, 
therefore the boring phase took five months. The average rate of 
penetration (ROP) was 0.47 metres per hour. This was considered 
slow but rates were affected by potholes, steering problems, an 
inefficient cleaning system and a low powered TBM. 
 
In the later stages of the project the best results occurred: best 
advance in a day 13.8metres; best advance in a week 47.6 metres; 
best advance in a month 104.7 metres (last month); best ROP in a 
shift 1.33 metres/hour. From a total of 3208 hours, boring time 
was 716 hours (22,3% TBM utilisation). A summary of delays can 
be seen in the pie chart on Figure 7.22. 
 
Lessons 
There is no doubt that the project proved successful in spite of the 
choice of an old (1972) TBM. 
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FIGURE 7.22 
 
TBM Project at BRPM: Summary of Delays 
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When scrutinising the penetration rates of the different rock types 
the best results were achieved when boring on reef and when the 
reef plane was the least disrupted, specifically by pothole 
occurrences. 
 
Optimum advance would never be achieved with scraper winch 
cleaning and it was realised that it would be necessary to design 
for an alternate system; possibly conveyors or a vacuum system. 
The installation of services had to be interrogated further, the use 
of a scraper did not allow for boring to take place when services 
were being installed. 
 
The need for ‘hands-on’ supervision and management from the 
outset was a pre-requisite for such a project; the performance 
improved markedly after the TBM technician/advisor from 
Robbins became involved. The splitting of the day into three 
shifts, one for maintenance on dayshift and the following two 
shifts for boring, proved successful. 
 
TBM Project Summary Report 
A detailed description of this project has been documented in a 
paper presented to the 6th International Symposium on Mine 
Mechanisation and Automation at the Sandton Convention Centre 
in September 2001. This paper was prepared by KAR assisted by 
Peter Horrell, a TBM consultant. This paper can be seen in 
Annexure 7.12 in Volume 4; “Reef Development with a Tunnel 
Boring Machine on a South African Platinum Mine” by 
M.Stander, K.Rhodes, P.Horrell, D.Sammons, G.Harrison, J.Dean. 
(Mr Stander presented the paper as the mine manager of BRPM.) 
 
 However, a summary report written by KAR and Peter Horrell in 
December 2001 sets out in greater detail additional project costs 
and those mistakes which would not want to be repeated at  
future projects. In addition, the report details the pre-planning 
requirements considered necessary for any TBM project. These 
comments are far-reaching and cover issues not included in the 
above mentioned technical paper. The summary report is included 
in Annexure 7.13 in Volume 4; Summary Report on the Use of a 
Tunnel Boring Machine for Reef Development at Bafokeng 
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Rasimone Platinum Mine by K.A.Rhodes and P.Horrell, December 
2001. 
 
To sum up, the TBM used in the trial was manufactured in 1972 
and its design, with its back-up system, was not considered ideal 
for reef development. Notwithstanding the long delays when 
boring and other problems, there was the belief that a new TBM 
could be designed specifically for reef development, with a more 
flexible steering system in order to negotiate changes in reef, that 
would be able to achieve a high rate of advance, up to say 400 
metres/month. It was therefore expected with some confidence 
that reef development could and would be carried out with TBM’s 
in the future. Unfortunately this has not been the case to date. 
 
7.5 Post 2003 
During the period 2003 to 2008 KAR continued to consult on 
mechanisation projects for mines exploiting narrow reefs; typical 
examples were the hybrid method for Eastern Platinum Mines’ Barplats 
Mine, the Snap Lake diamond mine in North-West Canada and a 
proposed new uranium mine in India.  
 
7.5.1 Legadembi Gold Mine 
 It was during this period that KAR was the Project Manager for the 
Legadembi Gold Mine in Ethiopia. Legadembi Gold Mine, situated 
near Shakisso in the south of Ethiopia, had been operating as a 
surface mine for several years and it had become necessary to 
develop an underground mine. 
 
The mining method chosen by KAR was a horizontal cut and fill 
method and operations would be fully mechanised. Although open 
stoping methods would be commonly selected for wide steep 
orebodies, at Legadembi there was a need for selective mining 
which would necessitate strict control over the drilling and 
blasting operations. In addition, open stoping methods would 
create high, near vertical, stopes where instability of the hanging 
wall would represent a high risk of dilution which was 
unacceptable for the mine. The proposed horizontal cut and fill 
method would enable stoping operations to be confined to the 
payable limits of the orebody. 
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At the time that the underground mine design was being carried 
out it was known that about half the extent of the main orebody 
had a payable width of 30 metre and geotechnical work had 
established that a maximum stable span would be only 14 metres. 
In terms of the selected mining method it was therefore necessary 
to design for a modified room and pillar layout within each cut 
being mined; pillars would be necessary to ensure that 14 metre 
spans were not exceeded. Therefore a modelling exercise had to 
be carried out to determine the best way in which the mined out 
rooms and pillars would be left. 
 
In the horizontal cut and fill system drilling was to be carried out 
flat on each cut. In this manner a horizontal slice would be taken 
out with the face being mined as a brow (planned for at 4 metres) 
with a 2 metre high slot left below for the full length of the stope. 
This slot provided for a space for the broken rock and also served 
as a ventilation airway in the stope. All operations were to take 
place on waste fill. In this manner mining was similar to a wide 
reef room and pillar operation but which was repeated for each 
horizontal slice in a series of vertical lifts in the orebody. Refer to 
Figure 7.23 for details of a stope cross section. 
 
Various stope layout options were examined, for which in addition 
to a maximum room span of 14 metres, were also based on 
recommendations of both pillar and bay dimensions of 5 metres. 
The final recommendation was for a central room of 14 metres 
with staggered pillars 5 metres wide and 5 metre wide bays mined 
out either side of the central room. The details of these exercises 
to determine the preferred option for the room and pillar layout 
are the crux of the paper “Design of In Stope Pillars in Cut and Fill 
Mining for a Gold Mine in Ethiopia” written by K.A.Rhodes and 
T.Rangasamy, delivered at the 5th International MassMin 
Conference in Lulea, Sweden organised by the Lulea University of 
Technology, the paper being published in the transactions of that 
conference; refer to Annexure 7.14 in Volume 4. 
 
7.5.2 Maintenance Action Plan 
Reference has been made in this chapter to a maintenance action 
plan for trackless equipment. After many years of managing and 
consulting for  trackless mechanised mining projects and mines, in  
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FIGURE 7.23 
 
Stope Cross Section: Horizontal Cut and Fill 
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2008 KAR completed a guide for use in trackless management; this 
guide would be applicable to all mechanised methods of mining, 
notwithstanding that the focus of this exposition is on near flat 
tabular reefs. The importance of the engineering function for the 
success of any trackless operation has been stressed in this 
treatise. The establishment of a maintenance plan becomes even 
more critical when considering the change from conventional 
mining to trackless methods on gold and platinum mines in South 
Africa and with this in mind the details of the guide A 
Maintenance Action Plan by KAR 2008 is included as Annexure 
7.15 in Volume 4. 
 
7.6      Conclusions and Summary 
In this chapter the initiatives by KAR to pioneer the use of TBM’s for 
development on new platinum mines has been discussed. In the case of 
the Styldrift Mine, after nearly three years of detailed planning the 
project was aborted  following the  involvement of  the  Royal Bafokeng 
Nation. At that time, contractual negotiations between Amplats and a 
contractors’ consortium, Platum JV, were at a very advanced stage and 
planning for the boring of a large diameter decline had been completed. 
Without the intervention of the Bafokeng Royal Nation the Styldrift 
Project, which had been reviewed and approved by Anglo American 
Corporation, would have been the first underground mine in South 
Africa to be developed from surface by TBM. 
 
At BRPM a reef raise was bored by an old TBM as a trial, which under the 
difficult circumstances described in this chapter was still a success. 
However, no follow-up took place. Previously, in the late 1990’s, 
attempts to promote the use of a mini tunnel borer (the BorPak) also 
failed. 
 
Over a five year period KAR continued to advance the LHS method of 
stoping on narrow platinum reefs. Successful trials were carried out but 
the method still remains untested under production conditions in order 
to prove (or otherwise) its viability. 
 
The use of high capacity trucks for the start-up of new shallow decline 
mines and typically Amplats’ Boschfontein Mine has been described. It 
has been shown that trucking to surface can continue for an extended 
period until it becomes more viable to introduce a decline conveyor, 
298 
 
with the trucks continuing to tram to a single tipping point. The advice 
given by KAR to Impala (Zimplats), after the Boschfontein proposals, to 
utilise trucks to tram ore from the stopes direct to surface has proved to 
be a success at their platinum mines at Ngezi in Zimbabwe. 
 
The Legadembi Gold Mine, where KAR was the responsible project 
manager for a new underground mine design, has been referred to in 
this exposition; this project gave KAR the opportunity to use his 
experience over many years in the mechanisation of tabular reefs, to 
plan for an innovative design in a near vertical orebody. 
 
Finally, a detailed guide for the maintenance of trackless equipment, 
compiled by KAR over several years, has been referred to in this chapter 
and is included in Annexure 7.15 in Volume 4. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
Some Final Thoughts on the  Mechanisation of Narrow Tabular 
Reefs in South Africa: Past, Present and Future 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to set out briefly what could be the future for 
the mechanisation of narrow reefs on the gold and platinum mines of South 
Africa, taking into account what has been achieved in the past and what is now 
the present status of mechanisation on these mines. 
 
8.1 Past Experience 
Trackless mechanised mining operations commenced on the South 
African gold mines in the early 1980’s; these first projects have been 
described in chapters 3, 4 and 5 of this treatise. Prior to this date limited 
trials had taken place with LHD’s for cleaning operations in strike gulleys 
on a few gold mines. However, it was only at Randfontein Estates Gold 
Mine (REGM) in the period 1983 to 1985 that full suites of trackless 
equipment were introduced for the first time to tabular reefs in a gold 
mine in South Africa. In 1988 the H.J.Joel Gold Mine was commissioned 
as the first totally trackless gold mine in South Africa. This early work on 
the mining of narrow reefs by trackless mechanised mining methods 
(TM3) was pioneered by K.A.Rhodes at REGM and the H.J.Joel Gold 
Mine. 
 
Following this pioneering work by KAR, the Technical Director of the 
parent company (JCI) approved the introduction of numerous other TM3 
projects at all JCI’s gold mining operations. By 1986 JCI had, in either 
operation or had placed orders for, a total of 103 LHD’s, 103 drill rigs, 44 
trucks and 135 UV’s; these numbers were stated by the then Technical 
Director of JCI, Mr.H.Scott-Russell, in his keynote address to the 
Trackless Mining Symposium, Association of Mine Managers of South 
Africa (AMMSA), February 1988. Mr.G.W.Futcher, President of AMMSA 
at the time of the above symposium, wrote in his foreword to the 
transactions of that symposium that the symposium “has put together 
the steps that have been taken by the gold mining industry towards 
entering a new era of mining technique”. The statement reflected how 
gold mines in South Africa, at that time, had lagged behind the advances 
gained in mechanisation by other metalliferous mines (and coal mines) 
around the world; this also being typical of metalliferous mines (other 
than gold) and coal mines in South Africa. There was of course good 
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reasons for the South African gold mines failing to capitalise on advances 
made with mechanisation world-wide: one had to take cognizance of the 
narrow tabular reefs mined in South Africa which do not compare with 
orebodies mined elsewhere in the world. Nevertheless, it is important to 
quote again from the then President of AMMSA in his foreword to the 
aforementioned symposium transactions: “The introduction of trackless 
mining into South African gold mines has not been easy. No doubt 
many years of research development will be necessary before fully 
integrated trackless mining methods are utilised throughout the 
industry. The decade of the eighties has demonstrated without a doubt 
that trackless mining methods can be used in South African hard rock 
mining involving narrow tabular ore bodies”. Unfortunately this was 
not to prove to be the case as sufficient time was not given for further 
development of mechanisation on South African gold mines; as from the 
beginning of the 1990’s trackless mechanised mining in narrow reef in 
gold mines lost favour to the entrenched conventional methods of the 
previous hundred years. There were many reasons for this failure to 
follow through with mechanised mining. Some of the more important 
barriers to success were escalating costs of spares from overseas, 
difficulties in recruiting qualified artisans and probably more importantly 
management did not have the necessary knowledge of mechanised 
mining and there was a lack of determination to change. 
 
It can only be agreed with the then President of AMMSA that it would 
have taken many years to establish TM3 as a viable alternative 
throughout the South African mining industry. In this respect it is 
worthwhile reflecting on the time required to change from shovel 
cleaning to scraper winch cleaning on gold mines. In 1931/32 scrapers 
were first introduced for packing waste into old worked out stopes and 
also for cleaning flat raises and winzes and by 1933 they were being 
used increasingly in stopes. It was only in 1937/38 that the use of 
scrapers in stopes, which was almost standard equipment in the flat East 
Rand mines, was being extended to the steeper stopes of the Central 
Rand. In 1952 scrapers continued to be in general use and by 1955/56, 
with the exception of a single mine in the Orange Free State, scrapers 
were in overall use for cleaning stope faces. It was also at this time in 
1955/56 that scrapers were beginning to gain favour for cleaning strike 
gullies as opposed to hand tramming. 
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Acknowledgement is given for the above information to the paper 
“Stoping Practice on the Transvaal and Orange Free State Goldfields” by 
Beck, Henderson, Lambert and Mudd published in the Transactions of 
the Seventh Commonwealth Mining and Metallurgical Congress, 1961. If 
one takes cognizance of a period of twenty five years when these 
changes were taking place, from hand cleaning with a shovel to the use 
of scrapers, it is axiomatic that it would take many years to totally 
revolutionise the mining method for narrow reef stoping. At the time of 
the late 1980’s/early 1990’s there was clearly no overall determination 
in the industry generally to strengthen the case for mechanisation; it 
was too easy to remain with the established methods and there was no 
incentive to change as there was not the pressure from increasing labour 
costs as there is today. Nonetheless, there is no reason to not believe 
that the original hybrid method, first introduced in 1984 at Cooke 2 
Shaft, REGM by KAR (refer to Chapter 4) and then later employed by KAR 
in the design of H.J.Joel Gold Mine, could not have been converted to a 
totally mechanised method with the introduction of the electro-
hydraulic face rig replacing the manually operated compressed air 
jackhammers. Even as far back as 1977 a crawler-mounted face drill rig 
underwent trials at Rustenburg Platinum Mines; refer to the paper “The 
Demag Stope Drill Rig” by van der Meulen and Harrison, in the 
Transactions of the Association of Mine Managers of South Africa 
1976/77. The initial indications then were that the machine had a 
‘definite potential’ and its drawback could be overcome by new design 
and techniques. It was however expensive to run but it was still 
expected to have a significantly lower operating cost when the potential 
of the machine was fully developed. It is therefore the belief of KAR that 
with the necessary determination a mechanised face rig (the Stomec), 
previously referred to, could have been developed nearly three decades 
ago to be effective and viable in order to transform the hybrid system to 
a fully mechanised trackless operation. Similar rigs in very low profile 
form have been developed for the so called XLP operations on the 
platinum mines in South Africa; this initiative will be discussed later. 
 
With only limited experience of hybrid mining taking place in South 
Africa, from the mid 1980’s to the turn of the century, mechanisation of 
narrow reefs has been focussed on the extra low profile (XLP) equipment 
developed from about 2000. Early trials began at Lonmin Platinum 
Mines with a room and pillar layout which was changed to a breast 
mining layout with on reef development. In 2004 Lonmin decided to 
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mechanise all new shaft projects specifically at Hossy Shaft although 
Saffy Shaft was also included. However, the production build up did not 
materialise and in 2008 there was a change of strategy at Lonmin to 
reduce the scale of XLP mining in order to allow the method to prove 
itself on a significantly reduced scale. At the same time Saffy Shaft began 
the process of ‘de-mechanisation’ leaving only Hossy Shaft where limited 
XLP mining is still taking place. Trials with XLP equipment have also been 
ongoing in recent years at Amplats’ Batophele Mine (previously 
Waterval Mine). 
 
In summary, mechanisation of narrow reefs, where the focus shifted 
from gold mines to platinum mines in the 2000’s, has not proved viable 
to date with XLP equipment operating in very low stoping widths; 
although the method has proved far safer it cannot yet compete in 
terms of productivity with conventional mining. 
 
8.2 The Present 
Currently attention is concentrated on the platinum mines in South 
Africa where a strike on the mines of Amplats, Impala and Lonmin has 
recently dominated the industry. This strike has just been settled after 
exactly five months, the longest strike ever in the mining industry. The 
strike, called by the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union 
(AMCU), was in fact a follow through from the Marikana tragedy in late 
2012; since Marikana, AMCU have taken over as the major union on the 
platinum mines in the Rustenburg area from the National Union of 
Mineworkers (NUM) who had previously held that position for decades.  
 
It would be relevant to consider the build-up to the events at Marikana 
in 2012. The tragedy was preceded by a strike of workers from Lonmin’s 
mines where a demand for a basic entry wage of R12500 per month was 
demanded, an increase of more than 100% which clearly would be 
untenable for any mining company in South Africa utilising labour 
intensive methods of mining. This strike had been spearheaded by 
underground rock drill operators (RDO’s), a class of labour which was 
believed many years ago to be declining, emphasising the need to 
mechanise face drilling operations wherever possible. New trainees 
were not being made available; as an example in the experience of KAR, 
the position of spanner assistant to the RDO had been discontinued 
around 1990. With a shrinking source of new RDO’s it was obvious to 
everyone that the time would come when the platinum mining 
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companies would be ‘held to ransom’ by the RDO’s. Ongoing human 
relation problems and disputes over bonus payments had been a clear 
indication for a long time that a confrontation, between mine 
management and the large complement of RDO’s in labour intensive 
mines, would be inevitable. It could be argued that this in effect was 
what occurred at Marikana in 2012 and what then led to the longest 
strike in the history of mining in South Africa. This then was the 
background to the Marikana tragedy where thirty four miners lost their 
lives in a confrontation with police, notwithstanding that twelve other 
persons died in the weeks leading up to the final incident, amongst them 
police officers. 
 
The question to be asked in retrospect is whether the confrontation at 
Marikana was unavoidable or not. If a more determined effort had been 
given to the mechanised drilling of stope faces many years before, could 
the outcome have been different. It was ironical that the confrontation 
had occurred at Lonmin’s mines where only a few years previously 
(2004) Brad Mills, the CEO at that time, had said that all future mining 
operations would be mechanised, this strategy being reversed in 2008 
following his departure. Present thinking at Amplats appears to be that 
their older mines at Rustenburg could be sold off in the short term and 
they would introduce mechanisation, where they considered it 
practicable to do so, on any newer shallow orebodies now being 
developed. At Implats they are currently considering some type of 
mechanisation at their new shafts in the Rustenburg area but their new 
development at Leeuwkop may be mechanised or they would consider 
abandoning that new project: refer to Figure 8.1, Business Day lead 
article March 28, 2014. Any planned mechanised operation at Leeuwkop 
would reduce the labour from (say) 10000 for the conventional mine to 
less than 3000 for the mechanised alternative. 
 
8.3 The Future 
In terms of any future mechanisation of narrow reefs on South African 
mines, the focus will be on the platinum mines. In the last few decades 
the South African gold mining industry has been decimated. In 1961 
South Africa produced almost two thirds (65,6%) of the free world’s 
gold, and today it is only a tenth of that. Notwithstanding, since 2010 
Anglo Gold Ashanti (AGA) have developed partnerships with other 
organisations, known as  the  AGA Consortium, to  develop the  means of 
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FIGURE 8.1 
 
Business Day Report on Implats’ New Leeuwkop Mine 
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exploiting their deep level resources by advanced automation 
technology.  This   would  be  achieved  by   boring  out   the   reef   and 
introducing backfill of high strength. However, there is a huge gap 
between the present labour intensive methods employing unskilled 
workers and any future automation which would require a highly skilled 
labour force working at a depth of five thousand metres. The AGA 
Consortium would envisage minimum underground labour 
complements, albeit highly skilled, which clearly will be at variance with 
the need to create jobs and obviously unpopular with a unionised labour 
force. 
 
In terms of platinum mining, the industry goes back almost one hundred 
years and there is no reason to believe that it will not continue for many 
more years to come. Platinum mining began in the 1920’s on the Eastern 
Limb of the Bushveld Igneous Complex (BIC) from dunite pipes before 
production on the Merensky Reef began ramping up in the Rustenburg 
Region from 1925 to 2000. Since 2000 the UG2 has been mined 
extensively on the Western Limb. Nevertheless, the Eastern Limb is now 
again the favoured target area notwithstanding the push to expand 
surface mining operations in Limpopo on the Platreef (Amplats’ 
Mogalakwena Mine). The focus for mechanisation on the narrow tabular 
orebodies is the wider UG2 Reef (as opposed to the narrower Merensky 
Reef) and in the opinion of KAR mechanisation could be introduced at 
Amplats’ Amandelbult Mine or any new operations on the Eastern Limb, 
Implats’ new shafts in the immediate Rustenburg area and Lonmin’s 
operations at Marikana. Only recently, with a change of CEO’s, has 
Lonmin announced a policy of ‘de-mechanisation’ and therefore only 
Amplats and Implats are considering mechanisation at this point in time. 
 
The hybrid method, introduced originally by KAR at Cooke 2 Shaft REGM 
in 1984, started with the disadvantage of still employing compressed air 
driven jackhammers on the stope face but with the anticipated 
changeover to mechanised electro-hydraulic face drilling with the 
Stomec rig. However before the Stomec rig could be fully developed 
trackless mining operations were generally aborted on the South African 
gold mines. Since the XLP trials at Lonmin and Amplats’ Batophele Mine 
the mechanised face rig is now an option. In 2008 KAR was involved in 
the trials at Amplats’ Amandelbult Mine with crawler mounted XLP 
equipment working in steep dipping conditions of 18° to 20° in a UG2 
stope width of about 1,5 metres and the face rig and roofbolter 
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performed well; these machines were developed by Atlas Copco, the 
same company that built the Stomec all those years ago; refer to the 
photographs of the drill rig and roofbolter in Figure 8.2 and 8.3 
respectively. In addition Sandvik have been operating XLP equipment at 
Lonmin for over ten years and more recently at Batophele. The 
mechanised face rig is therefore available and it is the opinion of KAR 
that such equipment should be introduced using the hybrid layouts first 
planned thirty years ago. Also, face cleaning can now be done by dozers, 
recently proven in the XLP trials, and therefore any final clean-up from 
the stope face (after the throw blast) can easily be carried out by dozers. 
 
The reason XLP equipment was introduced in the first instance was the 
need to minimise dilution, which is always a concern with mechanisation 
in narrow reef workings. However, dilution from ‘big end’ access drives 
and roadways can be controlled (as can be seen in chapters 4 and 5 of 
this treatise). Therefore, if it can be assumed that when full 
mechanisation, including the use of a mechanised stope face rig, is 
employed at similar stoping widths as for conventional mining then 
there is every reason to believe that such a method, a type of advanced 
hybrid method, which is now totally mechanised would prove viable. At 
Amplats’ Batophele Mine where the UG2 channel width is 0,85 metres 
the cost of producing platinum is below the average break-even price 
(working cost and maintenance capex), as can be seen in Figure 8.4, a 
bar graph generated by J.P.Morgan in January 2013. If the Batophele 
Mine is cost effective and the UG2 channel width at Lonmin’s operations 
and at Amplats’ Amandelbult are 1,25 metres and 1,55 metres 
respectively, then it must be a consideration to introduce mechanisation 
to these mines, in a room and pillar operation as at Batophele Mine. It 
also has to be noted that in the Figure 8.4 bar graph the costs at almost 
all Amplats’ underground mines, Implats’ mines and Lonmin operations 
at Marikana lie above the break-even price; all these operations, with 
only minor exceptions, employ conventional labour intensive methods. 
Notwithstanding that the information in the bar graph may not be 
definitive now, it still reflects the ranking of the various producers’ 
operations and the conclusions remain the same. 
 
To sum up, for the immediate future it would make good sense for the 
major platinum producers to introduce mechanisation at selected 
operations, as discussed. The introduction of mechanised mining to 
these operations  will  result in a loss of jobs, mainly unskilled labour, but  
308 
 
 
 
FIGURE 8.2 
 
Remote XLP Crawler Mounted Drill Rig 
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FIGURE 8.3 
 
Remote XLP Crawler Mounted Roofbolter 
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FIGURE 8.4 
 
Bar Graph of the Platinum Mining Industry Break-Even Costs 
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it will generate opportunities to establish a more skilled labour force 
earning higher  wages and  bonuses. It  will  also  generate  profit  for the  
companies which in turn will consolidate existing jobs and may even 
create  new   jobs. The year 2014  appears  to   be  the  watershed  for 
underground platinum mining and it is believed that it is now the right 
time for a further serious attempt to introduce mechanisation at certain 
operations where the employment of CONOPS (continuous operations), 
for instance, could also be advantageous to any future mechanisation 
programme. 
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